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
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SOCIAL INDICATORS

America by The Numbers: Where They Come From, What They Tell Us, and What They Don't
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Public
Opinion

Volume 11, Number 4 November/December 1988

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TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL REPORT

by Mancur Olson

In the 1960s President Johnson assembled a group of scholars who had wide experience, diverse viewpoints, and varied expertise to give our society a fuller accounting of its overall well-being. The result was the Social Indicators project, directed by Mancur Olson, who also shaped its first publication, Toward a Social Report. *Later volumes were called, simply,* Social Indicators. *This interesting project was discontinued about a decade later.*

Today, the American Enterprise Institute is thinking about reviving Social Indicators. We believe that such an endeavor can be more useful when performed by a private rather than a government entity. In a private environment it is easier to weigh diverse opinions and to rank priorities.

We asked Mancur Olson for his recollections of the early project and for his reaction to its possible resurrection. His article follows. In addition we explored some different methods for understanding one of our most important indicators—income. Following Olson's essay are thirteen pages of income data. To put all this information in perspective, five well-known economists then offer their (quite different) interpretations of what the data tell us, what they don't tell us, and what we should be thinking about the income situation in general.

—The Editors

In some well-known respects the thinking of the 1960s was seriously deficient; in others the environment of that time stimulated broader visions than does the intellectual climate today. In the second half of the 1960s, the nation had just passed the Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts of 1964-1965, along with other measures that eliminated the Jim Crow system of racial segregation and subordination in the deep South. The South, rather than suffering the decades of violent turbulence that had been predicted, grew faster than ever before—much faster than most of the rest of the country.

The 1960s were also a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity in the country at large. It was a time when steady and fairly rapid economic progress was (wrongly, but almost universally) taken for granted, and a time when—naturally enough in light of recent achievements—more social progress seemed attainable, so long as the nation had aggressive leadership that was determined to achieve society's potential. This was also a time of technocratic confidence, when the "Planning-Programming-Budgeting System"—a plea for clear thinking about the distinction between inputs and outputs and a recipe for bringing modern economic thinking to bear on governmental choices and administration—was spreading throughout the U.S. government.

Thus, it was natural that the activism, optimism, and recent legislative victories of Lyndon Johnson should lead him to want social indicators parallel to the economic indicators the government already published, and a "Social Report" analogous to the "Economic Report" of the President's Council of Economic Advisers. President Johnson ordered the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to develop social indicators and a social report that would assess the problems and progress of American society as a whole. All this was done with an eye toward provoking discussion as well as learning more about who we were and how we were doing.

I directed the effort to develop the social indicators and write the social report. I had just published a book (*The Logic of Collective Action*) that used my tools as an economist to analyze some political problems and an article ("Rapid Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force") that brought some of the puzzling concomitants of economic growth to light. It appeared to me that the vagueness of the social indicators assignment would make it easier to proceed in the way that I wanted.

It seemed to me that society needed not only the kinds of quantitative information it had long had on *governmental inputs*—the money, personnel, and supplies used up by government—but also quantitative information on *social outputs*—the preservation or spoliation of the natural environment, the increases or decreases in the likelihood an honest citizen would fall victim to crime, real incomes and the extent of poverty, how much children had learned, and so on. The society needed more than the kind of information that was an automatic byproduct of the government's accountants and supply officers and the decennial census. We also needed measures of "welfare" and "illfare," "wealth" and "illth." With better and more nearly balanced information, the country could reasonably hope for more informed debate and wiser judgments about the options the society faced. A social report could present a better and wider array of information about how the society was doing and about the choices it would have to make. It was an awesomely difficult task, but the finest minds in every relevant field were happy to help, and almost everything was going very well. Before the 1960s were over, President Johnson could issue a document that he believed would be useful to the country, full of information and analysis that would be worthy of respect from fair-minded people across the political spectrum.

But Lyndon Johnson was not to remain president. Nor was Hubert Humphrey to be his successor. Richard Nixon would be president, and the normal tendency for a new administration of a different party to abandon initiatives that were conspicuously identified with its predecessor would surely prevail. There was no alternative but to issue a social report promptly as a lame-duck administration closed down. Thus, as the nation's eyes focused on the imminent inauguration of President Richard Nixon, *Toward a Social Report* was issued. I am as proud of that report as of anything in which I have been involved, and would love to recount the many undertakings in this and other countries that have, under diverse names, taken it as a starting point. But sadly, I must report that the nation's media and population were much less interested in this report than in the incoming administration, and *Toward a Social Report* was *not* the starting point for the nation's debates and choices.

I must also concede that some of the intellectual problems involved in a social report were more complicated than I understood. When I resigned from government in accordance with the customs and rules of our political system, I immediately began to write a book that would spell out the concepts behind the social report and carry them further. In 1972 I had a finished book-length manuscript and nice offers to publish it, but second thoughts and helpful criticisms from colleagues soon convinced me that I should hold back the book until I had reached a deeper level of analysis. This deeper level of analysis has been hard indeed to attain, and it is only in 1989 that the book, *Beyond the Measuring Rod of Money*, will reach the printer. But after more than two decades of intermittent, intense work on the subject, I am now quite confident of my views.

The Question

One of the questions the book poses and answers should illustrate the need for a broader array of information and analysis. The question is, "Why do the high incomes of the developed nations these days coexist with so many manifestations of discontent and despair?" There has been more dissatisfaction with the social order and with existing leadership in many periods of high income and rapid economic growth than in many times when incomes and rates of economic growth were much lower. In the United States, for example, real incomes grew unusually rapidly in the 1960s, yet the end of that decade saw more evidence of dissatisfaction with the social order—not only with government, but also with universities, families, and other institutions—than at the start of the decade.

When one looks across societies, it is by no means obvious that people in the richer nations are more content with their lot than those who live in the poorer ones. When one looks at history, it is by no means clear that periods of economic growth were the most quiescent politically—they were often periods of protest and even of violence. A glance at some suggestive social indicators reveals the same paradox. Suicide rates—the percentages of individuals whose level of satisfaction are so low that life no longer seems worth living—show that higher-income countries usually have relatively more suicides than poor ones. Nor does the number whose inability to cope with life takes the form of mental illness show any tendency to diminish as incomes increase (though modern medicines and policies have reduced the population in asylums).

Survey researchers have used sophisticated questionnaires to elicit subjective responses about how satisfied or dissatisfied people are with their lot. They have found that within any society, those with higher incomes report higher levels of contentment, but little or no evidence exists to suggest a higher average level of contentment in rich countries than in poor ones, or that contentment has risen as incomes have increased in the United States.

If we cannot be sure that rapid economic growth will diminish discontent, there is reason to ask: What really happens when the economy grows? Does economic growth necessarily make most people happier or better off? Or is it associated with subtle forces that reduce well-being along some dimensions just as they improve well-being along others? Is there at least a part of the population that is worse off in some sense than it would have been had the economic growth not taken place? Even those who believe, as I do, that economic growth is on balance highly desirable should want to understand why it fails to bring about the reduction of discontent and social pathology that might be expected.

The Measuring Rod of Money

Any effort to look in an integrated way at economic growth and its relation to contentment and discontent must recognize that income statistics tend to include most of the things that are readily brought under the "measuring rod of money," but to leave out most things that are not. Economics was defined by Alfred Marshall as the study of that which is readily brought under the measuring rod of money, so the economist in particular must be concerned about what it is about a phenomenon or good that makes it *readily* measurable in money terms.

Some people suppose that what keeps a good from being brought under the measuring rod of money is that it is "priceless." But only rarely are people willing to give up everything for a given good or purpose. And if one good is in fact priceless to an individual, a second good could not possibly be, because the person might then be confronted with a situation in which he could not have more of the one good without less of the other. The trade-off would indicate that he put a finite price on at least one of the goods. Others say that the best things in life are free, but in truth they are rarely so. The amenities of nature can be preserved only by forgoing the additional production or convenience that can be gained by exploiting them without inhibition; true love can usually be obtained only through sharing or sacrifice.

Normally, it is neither pricelessness nor costlessness that keeps a good from being brought under the measuring rod of money, but rather the prosaic fact that an individual cannot take more or less of it as he or she wishes. If a man takes more or less of some good, he reveals by what he has to give up (usually, money) how much it is worth to him. We know how much apples and oranges are worth to a shopper because we know what he or she has to give up in money (and thus other goods) to get another dozen.

Many things, and some that are precious to many people, are not available to the individual in greater or lesser quantities. Friendship and family relationships, for example, do not exist at all if there is only a minimal level of interaction. An acquaintance is not a half or a tenth of a friend, but something qualitatively different. A man also cannot have a "tenth of a wife": he might of course have a brief and delightful relationship with a woman, but that relationship would be a different thing—in the economist's language, a different "good."

When a relationship entails a substantial and lasting commitment, people do not regularly reveal how much a given relationship is worth to them. An individual who gets a divorce reveals that he finds a given relationship is on balance not worth the cost or sacrifice it entails, but the person who does not obtain a divorce may either place an extraordinary value on the relationship, or he may be nearly indifferent. In either case his behavior does not reveal the price he puts on the relationship: it isn't possible to take more or less, and thereby to reveal what one would and would not give up for it.

This difficulty in determining what a "good" is worth to an individual has been understood for some time in the case of what the economist calls "public goods"—those, like clean air, national defense, or law and order, that cannot feasibly be provided except on a community-wide or society-wide basis. As Paul Samuelson has best emphasized, the typical individual does not by his behavior normally reveal how much most public services or environmental amenities are worth to him. The reason, again, is that the individual citizen cannot take more or less of these goods, but rather has to accept whatever outcome is consciously or unconsciously chosen by his community.

If the outside observer cannot know what "price" people put on the satisfaction or goods their families, friendships, and social groups produce, or what value they place on the services of their government or environment, we cannot readily tell whether the satisfaction people get from these areas has deteriorated in a way that might make people less content after a period of economic growth than before. If economic growth has occurred, the goods we buy in the stores are available in even greater quantities. What of the "goods" we obtain from our families and friends? Or from government and from nature?

It seems probable that most people value at least reasonably stable or relatively continuous personal and group relationships. The evidence certainly shows that some degree of stability in the personal environment is necessary for children. What is the effect of economic growth on the continuity of personal relationships?

The Answer

Economic growth requires technological change or capital accumulation. It requires doing things in new ways. It means rearranging people in new work groups, often in new locations. It requires incentives that enable some to rise in the social order and others to fall. In modern times it often requires huge and therefore impersonal organizations and workplaces. The pervasive change—the recombination of work groups, and social and geographical mobility—that economic growth involves may therefore to some degree lessen the continuity of personal relationships. As a society we may purchase the goods we buy in the marketplace *partly* with the "goods" produced by stable personal relationships. This is, I believe, the main reason why economic growth is not regularly associated with political quiescence, or reduced suicide, or higher contentment ratings.

The possibility that the benefits from stable social relationships (or from the environment or the government) may diminish during periods of economic growth does *not* mean that economic growth is bad, as has sometimes mistakenly been suggested. The gains from economic growth normally vastly outweigh its costs. And even if in some cases they should not, the sensible remedy is to redirect the growth process in ways that will bring social, environmental, and governmental benefits as well as a greater supply of marketable goods.

It turns out that economic growth has some extraordinarily important benefits that also escape the measuring rod of money. The benefits of new technol-

(Continued on page 55)

INCOME



Note: Compensation means pay plus value of pension, health, and other employee benefits.

Source: All figures converted to constant dollars by using implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures, and converted to index figures. 1960 = 1 or 1980 = 1, as indicated. Basic data sources are as follows: Per capita income, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Median family income, U.S. Bureau of the Census; All other data, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Editors' calculations.

The income of Americans has gone up over the last three decades. That much is clear. But saying just how much depends upon how you measure it.

The yardstick beloved of candidates challenging political incumbents is Average Weekly Earnings of Non-Supervisory and Production Workers. The average weekly pay of lower-level workers has grown a little thinner since 1970. This, however, does not take into consideration that the work week has shortened, that a large portion of all workers are part-timers now, and that a bigger chunk of the work force is composed of women, youth, and other lower-earning workers.

The figure for Median Income of Males Working Full Time Year-Round adjusts for some of those factors, and it shows steadier growth. But it too misses some things, including the significant jump in female earnings in recent years.

Looking at hourly income avoids the distortions that shortened work periods create. The Labor Department has recently developed two indices to do that, the most sophisticated of which, Compensation Per Hour, includes not only cash pay but also the value of health insurance, pension, and other employee benefits. This recognizes that an increasing portion of all worker pay increases comes in the form of fringes rather than (taxable) cash.

Median Family Income is a longtime favorite measure of economic standing. It zoomed upward in the 1960s, slowed in the 1970s, and resumed substantial growth in the 1980s. One problem with looking at the median income of families is that the nature of those families has changed dramatically since 1960. There are a lot more single-parent families today, for one thing. Optimists point out that families have grown substantially smaller in recent years, and that there are consequently fewer people drawing upon the typical family income than in the past. Pessimists point out that one of the reasons family income has grown is because wives have been led—in some cases pushed—into the work force, with some consequent loss to family integrity and personal choice.

Another measure is Per Capita Income. This measure is biased upward because there are proportionally fewer children in the population. This simply takes the total amount of personal income in the country and divides it by the number of men, women, and children. This provides a figure for total resources available per head, never mind in what way it was earned. In constant, inflation-adjusted dollars (incidentally, for consistency, the same price deflator is used wherever possible in these pages), Per Capita Income in the United States has increased by 89 percent in twenty-seven years.

Karl Zinsmeister, an AEI adjunct research associate, assembled the data and wrote the text for this section.

Estimated underground GNP as a percentage of official GNP



Source: Economics Division, Congressional Research Service, "America's Underground Economy," using methodology based on currency aggregates as developed by Professor Peter Gutmann.

Evidence from a variety of sources—monetary figures, analysis of tax returns, governmental social program data, increasing rates of self-employment, more "moonlighting" by pensioners, declines in some labor-force participation rates, and so forth—indicates that an increased share of American income is earned today in the "informal" or "underground" sectors of our economy. The Census Bureau estimates that it captures only about 90 percent of all U.S. income in its official figures.

Depicted here is one widely cited estimate (middling within the wide range of appraisals) of the relative size of the "off-the-books" economy over time.

If unmeasured income were included in the national accounts, family and per capita income would be higher, and the poverty rate would be lower. And if, as it appears, underground activity has increased over time, the rate of improvement in the poverty and income figures may be understated in official statistics.

How We Use Our Income



Note: Figures for all years converted to constant dollars using implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures and converted to index 1874 = 100%.

Source: Basic data for 1874-1920 from John W. Kendrick, *Productivity Trends in the United States*, National Bureau of Economic Research. Basic data for other years are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Editors' calculations.

Reliable income figures do not go back very far in American history. But what people spend on themselves is a pretty good indicator of how much income is available to them, and Personal Consumption Spending is one economic series for which there are decent data going back more than one hundred years. What constitutes an improvement in the "standard of living" is a complicated question. Few people had to worry about traffic jams in 1874. On the other hand if you have tuberculosis, 1988 is clearly a better place to be, no matter what your income level. Still, it is interesting to note how much more contemporary Americans have than their ancestors did to spend on food, and transportation, and health care, and everything that money can buy.

GETTING BY

Question: What is the smallest amount of money your family needs each week to get along in this community?



	Median Estimate
1977	$152
1978	198
1979	199
1980	203
1981	248
1982	248
1983	249
1984	252
1985	298
1986	300

Note: The median estimate is the mid-point of the dollar amounts reported. One-half of the sample is above and one-half is below the median dollar amount.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 7-10, 1987.

Above is more evidence that economic status is at least as much psychology and perception as fact. Roughly five-sixths of this increase in stated needs can be accounted for by officially measured inflation. The rest (assuming the poll samples are chosen carefully) presumably reflects rising expectations on the part of American consumers.

Below we see some interesting figures relating to one of the points at issue in the recent presidential campaign. Namely, how much income are Americans now devoting to what has always been their favorite income sinkhole—housing?



Note: Purchase information pertains to individuals who have purchased home within the year indicated.

Source: Purchase information, The Chicago Title Insurance Company, *The Guarantor* © copyright. Rental information from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Censuses.



Note: Spending on "luxuries" as a fraction of all personal spending. "Luxury" defined as restaurant meals; jewelry and watches; personal care items (toilet articles, health club memberships, etc.); china and tableware; telephones; brokers' fees; recreation (books, toys, music, movies, sports, clubs, etc.); college education; foreign travel; religious and welfare donations.

Source: National Income and Product Accounts, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Editors' calculations.

Question: Here is a list of some different kinds of activities. (Card shown respondent). Would you read down that list, and call off each one you have done that often in the past month?



Note: Not all categories shown.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 88-6), May 14-21, 1988.

How Groups Are Faring

More and more American income is devoted to "non-essentials" (see above). More and more of the differences between various families' income is explained by their demographic structure (below). Put simply, most married-couple families are doing fairly well. Most single-headed families are not. A great many of the changes observed in American income statistics in recent years are accounted for not by economic fortune but by social transformations, particularly the rise of the single-parent family. That doesn't make these families' needs any less pressing, but it's important for policy makers to distinguish the true sources of the problems.

Below right, we note the growing importance of working wives' income. At the top of the next page, we see that much of the "earnings gap" between men and women disappears when one makes a few adjustments to look at comparable male and female workers. Still, a wage gap exists.



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.



Note: *Median percent of family income accounted for by earnings of wife in married couple families where the wife works.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Ratio of female to male average earnings, 1984*



Note: *Earnings per hour.

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Nonwhite families have stopped catching up to white families in median family income (see below). The causes of the stall are primarily demographic: black and white families have become very different. Sixty percent of all black children are now born out of wedlock (versus 15 percent of white children). The divorce rate is much higher for black than white couples. As a result a far greater fraction of black than white families now take less economically viable forms.

Examining the increased economic stress on black families, Census Bureau researchers Gordon Green and Ed Welniak have shown that if black family structure had not changed as it did over the period 1970 to 1980, median black family income would have risen by over 11 percent. Instead, because of the growing incidence of single-earner and non-working family classes, the official figure actually fell 5 percent.

One way to avoid the pitfall of comparing different circumstances of blacks and whites is to examine the figures for specific counterpart families. When one looks at the country's most common family configuration—the married couple in which the husband works full time year-round and the wife is also employed—one finds that the black-to-white median family income ratio is now over 89 percent.



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.



Source: Social Security Administration.

One group whose income has recently risen dramatically relative to the rest of the population is the elderly. Many more people are receiving social security, and their checks are bigger. Private pensions have also grown rapidly, giving retirees enlarged income streams and providing younger workers with income they can draw on in the future.

Health insurance coverage might also be thought of as proxy income, in that it substitutes for individual expenditures. Coverage increased significantly over the last couple of decades but peaked in the early 1980s. Apparently, steep jumps in the cost of health coverage have driven some individuals to drop their insurance and some companies to trim their health benefits.

RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL INSURANCE

	1974	1986
Families receiving social security or pension income	13.8 m	17.6 m
Median income of these families (from all sources)	$19,010	$23,077
Average income of families receiving social security or pension checks	$24,677	$29,680

Note: Constant 1986 dollars.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Number of workers with private pension coverage, 1985	49.0 m
Number of workers with IRAs or Keogh Plans, 1983	19.1 m

Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute and U.S. Bureau of the Census.

PERCENT OF POPULATION WITH HEALTH INSURANCE

Covered by private insurance	76.5%
Covered by private or government insurance	86.7
Not covered	13.3

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

CHANGE IN PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1960 TO 1986

	1960	1970	1980	1985	1986
Percent of population covered					
Hospital expense coverage	69%	79%	83%	75%	74%
Major medical	18	51	67	68	64
Surgical coverage	63	75	78	NA	NA
Physicians coverage	47	69	74	NA	NA
Dental coverage	NA	6	35	42	39

Source: Health Insurance Association of America.

Class Divisions

Question: Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1988.

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1980	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Family income is:															
Far below average	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	5%	5%	5%	6%	5%	6%	6%	5%	5%
Below average	22	19	21	23	25	23	22	23	26	23	23	23	24	24	23
Average	57	58	56	52	55	51	53	52	50	49	51	51	49	49	51
Above average	16	17	18	18	15	18	18	17	16	18	18	18	18	20	18
Far above average	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2

Fierce debate has raged in recent years over an apparent decline in the size of the middle class—America's great stabilizer—assumedly as a result of downward mobility. A recent major study by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (see below) confirmed that the middle class has indeed shrunk. But it found that the lower class has also shrunk. The only class that has grown is the upper class, suggesting Americans are graduating upward in income, on the whole. Other analysts maintain that people from the middle class have dropped into lower classes.

Percent of families falling into lower, middle, and upper classes: 1969 and 1986



Note: Classes are defined in a constant way over time. Lower class = families with income under the inflation-adjusted equivalent of $20,000 in 1986 dollars; middle class = $20,000 – $55,999; upper class = $56,000 and over. The fixed weight personal consumption index is used as the price deflator.

Source: Michael Horrigan and Steven Haugen, "The Declining Middle Class Thesis: A Sensitivity Analysis," *Monthly Labor Review*, May 1988, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

In addition to comparing income distribution against an absolute standard as in the previous chart, it is useful to see how top and bottom groups fare relative to each other. The figures at right show that the nation's highest earners are gaining a slightly higher percentage of national income of late, the bottom slightly less. These figures are pre-tax. The redistributive effects of our tax code bring the upper figure down somewhat and the lower figure up.



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

Income inequality is sharpest in the developing world. Surprisingly, in the industrial world there seems to be a rough "Iron Rule" establishing the income dispersion. Despite the wide range of cultural conditions (from Japan to Italy, for example) and the enormous variety of economic systems (from communist to capitalist), income distribution in modern nations does not vary greatly. These figures are after-tax.



Source: Figures for Soviet Union from Abram Bergson, "Income Inequality Under Soviet Socialism," *Journal of Economic Literature*, September 1984. All other figures from World Bank.

Assets and Liabilities


Total payments by households of the four major taxes, 1986: $635 billion


Fraction of household income absorbed by the four major taxes 1986


Percent of all taxes paid by households of various incomes, 1985

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

As shown above, taxes do have a considerable effect on household incomes. Obviously, they make most people's take-home income lower, but they also provide desired services. Indeed, they absorb about a quarter of all income. And they also have an effect on relative status because they fall predominantly on high earners.

Question: Thinking about the needs of you and your family, how much income per year would you say you and your family need to live in reasonable comfort? How much income per year do you feel you and your family would need just to get by? And how much income per year would you say you and your family would need to fulfill all your dreams?



Note: The median income for the four income groups shown is: $9,000 for those making less than $15,000; $20,000 for those making between $15,000-$24,999; $36,000 for those making between $25,000 and $49,999; and $69,000 for those making $50,000 and over.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the *Wall Street Journal*, mid-October 1986.

Portion of national net worth* held in various assets 1984



Note: *Includes must major tangible assets except: annuity value of social security and private pension, cash value of life insurance, jewelry, and home furnishings.

Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Assets of private and public pension funds*



Note: *Not including social security trust funds.

Source: Federal Reserve System.

When income accumulates over time, it translates into wealth. Americans have two favorite parking places for their wealth. Individually, we like to put it into homes (and other real estate). Collectively, we put much of it into pension funds, which now contain an enormous pool of our national wealth.

Household ownership of some common assets, 1984
(percent of all households that own)



Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Measuring Poverty



BELOW POVERTY LEVEL

	1959	1960	1970	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
All	22.4%	22.2%	12.6%	13.0%	14.0%	15.0%	15.3%	14.4%	14.0%	13.6%	13.5%
White	18.1	17.8	9.9	10.2	11.1	12.0	12.1	11.5	11.4	11.0	10.5
Black	55.1	NA	33.5	32.5	34.2	35.6	35.7	33.8	31.3	31.1	33.1
Spanish origin	NA	NA	NA	25.7	26.5	29.9	28.0	28.4	29.0	27.3	28.2
Market value approach*				8.1	9.3	10.3	10.6	9.8	9.3	8.8	8.5
Recipient value approach*				10.2	11.4	12.3	12.8	11.9	11.5	11.1	11.0

Note: *Including non-cash income. Market value approach — purchase price in the private market of the goods received by the recipient. Recipient value approach — amount of cash that would make the recipient feel just as well off as the in-kind transfer or would reflect the recipients' own valuation of the benefit. Both of the alternate approaches shown here include the value of food, housing, and medical care and exclude institutional expenditures.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Poverty rates are charted above. Since the early 1970s an increasing portion of all government efforts to increase the income of poor people have taken the form of *non-cash* benefits (for instance, food stamps, Medicaid, and so forth). In 1987 the federal government spent $147 billion on non-cash transfer payments.

The official poverty rate is calculated on a cash-only basis, ignoring these benefits. In recent years, however, the U.S. Bureau of the Census has begun calculating the poverty rate including the value of non-cash income. Those rates are significantly lower, as shown in the accompanying table, although there was no substantial drop last year.



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

One of the primary distinguishing features of poverty today is its inverse relationship with age. Broken families have greatly increased the exposure of children to poverty, while enormous social security and Medicare outlays have made the elderly one of the relatively protected groups in the nation.

Two other factors that relate closely to economic conditions today are family status and employment history. Of households with income in the top 20 percent nationally, 84 percent are married couples. Among those in the bottom fifth, however, only 22 percent are married, 78 percent are single-headed. And 83 percent of top-fifth householders worked full time year-round in the latest year versus 12 percent among the lowest fifth. Sixty-three percent of lowest-fifth householders did not work at all during the year.

How the Regions Compare



Note: Bureau of Economic Analysis regional groupings: *New England* = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island. *Mideast* = New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia. *Southeast* = Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana. *Southwest* = Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico. *Rocky Mountain* = Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Utah. *Far West* = Nevada, California, Oregon, Washington. *Plains* = Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas. *Great Lakes* = Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois. Not classified, Alaska, Hawaii.

Regional per capita incomes as a percent of U.S. average

Region	1900	1930	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985
New England	134	129	107	110	100	103	98	115
Mideast	138	143	117	116	113	109	110	112
Great Lakes	106	110	111	108	104	104	102	98
Plains	97	62	95	93	95	98	94	96
Southeast	48	50	68	73	82	86	83	86
Southwest	68	64	87	87	89	93	93	94
Rocky Mountain	145	86	97	94	91	94	94	92
Far West	163	131	120	116	111	111	109	112

Source: *Regional Growth: Historical Perspective*, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 1980, p. 11. 1985 figures supplied by ACIR.

Purchasing power of average citizens*
Various countries compared to the U.S.
(GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parities as percent of the U.S. level)



Note: Converting published income levels of various countries into a common currency using standard exchange rates is not a very good way to gauge their relative standards of living. This is because currency exchange rates between countries often become distorted and fluctuate widely over short periods of time.

In recent years, some economists working mainly through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations have begun to refine an alternative way of comparing real standards of living across nations. Using detailed price information, they have developed so-called Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs), which are the rates of currency conversion that equalize the purchasing power of different currencies. One hundred US dollars converted into Japanese yen at the PPP "rate of exchange," for example, will buy the same basket of goods and services in Japan as in the United States.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total output of goods and services produced by persons in a given country. Calculated on a per capita basis using PPPs, it is a good indicator of a nation's richness.

Source: Figures for industrial democracies are 1987 forecasts, based on economic conditions as of June 1987, from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *OECD Economic Studies*, Autumn 1987. Figures for developing and Eastern European countries from Irving B. Kravis, Alan Heston, and Robert Summers "New Insights into the Structure of the World Economy," *The Review of Income and Wealth*, December 1981. Figure for Soviet Union is not purchasing power parity but ratio of Soviet to U.S. GNP per capita from World Bank sources.

Americans seem particularly interested today in how they fare economically compared to the rest of the world. But converting published income levels of various countries to a common currency is not a very good way of gauging their relative standards of living. This is because currency exchange rates often become distorted and fluctuate widely over short periods of time.

In recent years economists have begun to compare real standards of living across nations in a much more sophisticated way, using Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs). (One hundred U.S. dollars converted into Japanese yen using PPPs will buy the same basket of goods and services in Japan as in the United States.) The PPP-derived figures above show that Americans still have substantially greater purchasing power than citizens of any other country. Another demonstration of that fact is reproduced below.

BUYING POWER

Work time required for average manufacturing worker to buy selected commodities
(in minutes, unless otherwise specified)

Item	Washington	Moscow	London	Munich
Bread, 1 kg.	16	17	16	27
Hamburger, 1 kg.	37	123	63	70
Sugar, 1 kg.	9	58	11	10
Butter, 1 kg.	55	222	50	52
Apples, 1 kg.	10	92	23	15
Tea, 100g.	10	53	5	10
Weekly food basket of items for family of four (hours)	18.6	53.5	24.7	23.3
Aspirin, 100, cheapest	5	246	9	64
Lipstick, 1	30	69	60	80
Tee shirt, white cotton	19	185	66	50
Men's shoes (hours)	8	25	7	5
Refrigerator, cheapest (hours)	44	155	40	42
Television, color 56 cm. (hours)	65	701	132	143
Gas, 1/12 annual bill	290	39	568	125
Small car, Ford Escort (months)	5	53	11	6
Gasoline, 10 liters regular	32	185	85	61
Bus fare, 2 miles	7	3	11	8
Morning paper	3	3	5	5

Note: Work time is based on average take-home pay: taxes and insurance deductions have been deducted from wages, and family allowances (not applicable in United States) have been added for a family of four.

Source: Copyright 1982 The NFIB Foundation. Selection reprinted with permission from "Retail Prices in Moscow and Four Western Cities, in March 1982", Keith Bush, Radio Liberty.

Interpreting Income Data

Herbert Stein:

Over the entrance to the Social Science Building at the University of Chicago was a quotation from Lord Kelvin that I remember from my student days as: "There is no knowledge without measurement." (What Kelvin actually said, according to *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, was longer, but the point was the same.) To this my professor, Frank Knight, added, "and if you can't measure it, measure it anyway."

Knowing Knight, I interpreted him as making a typically sardonic comment on the practice of social "scientists" to pretend to have measured something, or to measure something that they could measure when they were unable to measure what they wanted to measure. But one could more charitably, if less accurately, have interpreted him to mean that if you can't measure something now, you should keep trying.

I am reminded of all this by the set of charts and tables about income that is presented here. On the one hand, they clearly do not measure very well what we would like to measure. On the other hand, they provoke a desire to learn more and to try to do the measurements better or to try to measure more relevant things.

Interest in these income figures is mainly an interest in "relative well-offness." We look at these figures and get some impression of how well off Americans are compared with, say, Indians, or Americans today compared with Americans of 1974, or the richest 5 percent of Americans today with the poorest 5 percent of Americans today. But if that is what we are interested in, we are interested in states of mind. And states of mind are basically unmeasurable and incomparable among persons.

To illustrate the problem, consider the calculation shown here that per capita consumption in the United States in 1987 was 9.27 times as high as in 1874. Thus, per capita consumption in 1874 was $3.65 a day in today's prices. As it happens, I have just been to my local supermarket and bought a half-gallon of skim milk, three oranges, and twelve ounces of cranberries for $3.68. Does that give me any clue to what it was like to live in 1874 or, more narrowly, what consumption was like in 1874? No, it doesn't. I would learn more about 1874 by going to a museum of American history to look at the artifacts from that period, or by reading a novel about that period. And I would not be able to translate that learning into a single number comparing 1874 with 1987.

Suppose I had learned all I could about incomes in 1874. Would I be able to say how much better off people are today than people were in 1874, or even that they were better off at all? That is like asking whether Ferris Bueller is better off than Huckleberry Finn. If you asked Ferris Bueller, he would certainly say that he is better off, but we do not know what Huckleberry Finn would say. Probably most people today would say that they are better off, but there is no way to test that because no one today has the choice between living in 1988 and living in 1874. Anyway, the people who are living today and prefer the life of 1988 are the products of that life. Their tastes have been molded by that life. We do not know what would be said by some "third party"—some creature from outer space who had not been influenced by living in either 1874 or 1988.

One can probably make an argument that conditions are better in 1988 than they were in 1874 because people actually did choose not 1988 over 1874, but 1875 over 1874 and then 1876 over 1875, and so on. That is, the changes in the conditions of life came about gradually, as people made choices between actually available ways of living and working. Those people may be assumed to have preferred the new ways over the old. But these people who chose the new may not have been all the people. Those who preferred the old had their options limited by the choices made by the others. People who preferred the horse, for example, had their options radically changed after so many other people chose the automobile. In any case, even if most of us agree that people were better off in 1988 than they were in 1874, it would be impossible to say by how much they were better off, and certainly the figures on per capita consumption would not throw much light on the question.

Much the same can be said about international comparisons. It is certainly impossible to put much content into the notion that per capita income or consumption in the United States is sixteen times as high as in India. This, unlike the comparison of 1874 and 1988, is a case in which a real choice is possible. That is, people can choose to live in India or to live in America. Presumably a large number of people would like to move from India to the United States, but probably an even larger number would not. What are we to make of that? And for those who would prefer to move, "income" would not be the only consideration. And insofar as income is concerned, it would not be the per capita national averages that are relevant. An Indian doctor considering moving to the

(Continued on page 56)

Robert Kuttner:

The debate about whether the economic glass is half full or half empty is really a proxy debate about the virtues of a *laissez-faire* economy. If the economy is truly growing at an acceptable rate, if unemployment and inflation are under control, if American "competitiveness" is mainly a matter of getting fiscal policy right, then free-market capitalism essentially works fine. If, on the other hand, the middle class is shrinking, the rich getting richer and the poor poorer, the horizons of younger Americans declining, and American industrial leadership passing elsewhere, perhaps *laissez faire* is not always the best policy.

This, and not the current incumbency of Republicans, is why the left tends to emphasize statistics that show signs of trouble, while the right spotlights data that suggest all is well, or at worst that the economy is in trouble only because of nonrecurring phenomena like the baby boom.

But what do the data really show?

Not surprisingly, it depends on where you look. The overall rate of economic growth during the current recovery, about 2.3 percent, is just about average for postwar recoveries. Real incomes have indeed risen since the 1982 recession, on average, although as the tables show, discretionary income has declined slightly. Unemployment and inflation have both subsided simultaneously, bringing a long-overdue refutation of the simple Phillips Curve. Only time will tell how much of this short-term prosperity was purchased at the cost of budgetary and trade deficits whose due bill will come only later on.

But averages don't tell us very much, other than providing some assurance that the economy as a whole is not collapsing. A closer look at the income distribution, especially factoring in age, suggests signs of serious trouble. In the first place, during the past decade the rich have indisputably grown richer and the poor poorer. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the top one percent of the income distribution in 1977 had an average family income of $307,174 (in constant 1987 dollars). By 1988 this had risen to $429,845, an increase of 36 percent. During the same period the bottom 80 percent of the income distribution lost real income, and at even the 90th percentile, families just about held their own with average incomes of $54,254 in 1977 and $55,252 in 1988. Families in the second lowest

(Continued on page 56)

Fabian Linden:

In recent years a growing literature has maintained that we are experiencing an extensive polarization of income. With the rich and the poor both becoming more numerous, the middle class has become an endangered species. The literature further asserts that less of the nation's resources are going to the poor and more to the rich. Since these developments are presumably the consequences of changes in our economic structure, class polarization will, of course, become increasingly severe. This, we are cautioned, has potentially alarming political implications, as the middle class—"the glue that holds society together"—continues to wither away. These views are receiving ever-widening acceptance. In fact, in many segments of the community, they have become downright fashionable.

This scenario, however, seems curiously inconsistent with the messages of the principal indicators of our economic well-being. In the past fifteen years, for example, the U.S. economy generated more than 30 million new jobs, for an imposing growth of well over a third in the number of people earning a paycheck. Today, some 75 percent of all working-age men and women are holding down jobs, up from 68 percent in 1970. Over these years, real per capita income rose at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent—a rate that would double the living standard of the average American in thirty-five years, a single generation.

Certainly, these are not numbers that lend credibility to the often-cited view that "about half" of all middle-class families "fell" into the lower-income brackets between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, which adds up to more poor, more rich, and fewer in the middle.

Is the middle class in fact declining? If it is, then why? The latter is the critical question. Some suggest that structural changes in the economy are to blame for income polarization. Those changes, if left uncorrected, will eventually make for serious social turbulence. Others may even remind us of Karl Marx's warnings that polarization of the classes leads to revolution.

Those who are sounding the alarm about income polarization have advanced a parallel theory of labor-force trends. Briefly, they argue that we are losing middle-wage manufacturing jobs, especially in steel and autos, and that new jobs that have become available are mostly in lower-paying service establishments, such as hamburger joints. But this is only anecdotal evidence. In fact steel and autos employ less than 2 percent of the nation's labor force. Actually, we

(Continued on page 57)

Marvin Kosters:

How well have American workers and their families been faring? Interest in the answer is always heightened during presidential election years when voters are asked to choose between broad policy approaches. The choice may be viewed as particularly significant this year because economic policies pursued during the past eight years are generally perceived to have placed more emphasis on market forces—more than during the 1970s, and certainly more than the approach proposed by leading critics of the Reagan years.

On the surface it might seem especially difficult to argue that recent performance has been poor in view of the long and continuing economic expansion, the extraordinary growth in jobs, and the marked reduction in inflation that was achieved. Criticisms relying on that old standby, the "misery index," certainly ring hollow—at 9.5 percent it is now less than half its level in 1980. The main lines of criticism have been less direct.

Critics say that the quality of jobs has deteriorated—they pay less on average, the middle class is under pressure because new jobs have been predominantly low-wage jobs, and incomes have consequently become more unequal. To evaluate these criticisms it is necessary to ask not only what the facts show but also how they should be interpreted.

Although it is not easy to evaluate some of these aspects of labor market performance, it is much more difficult to establish linkages between differences in policies and results. Broad assessments of recent performance in relation to our own experience and comparisons with other countries where different policies were followed probably offer the best guide.

For most workers, what they earn is their main source of livelihood. Whether the typical worker's pay has increased or not, after taking inflation into account, is a critical question. Pay has in fact increased for the typical worker, but this unequivocal statement may surprise many who have heard assertions to the contrary, backed by data that seem to support them. Those who argue that average pay has declined support their view by looking only at cash wage payments, without reference to supplementary benefits.

Cash wages are only part of the typical worker's pay; supplements to wage and salary payments, primarily employers' payments for health and retirement benefits, have been a rapidly growing component. During the

(*Continued on page 58*)

Larry Mishel:

Since 1979 the rich have grown richer, the poverty rate has increased by 25 percent, and those who are poor are deeper in poverty. The broad middle class has been squeezed, increasingly relying on two earners and longer hours of work to stay even. The typical family's standard of living has, at best, risen far more slowly than in earlier years, and by some measures the typical family in 1987 was no better off than in 1973.

Economists agree that, because our economy is cyclical, comparisons should be made between years that are business-cycle peaks. For this reason I base my conclusions on a comparison of current economic conditions with those at the end of the last full business cycle in 1979. To determine changes in underlying trends, I compare income growth since 1979 with that between the two prior cyclical peaks, between 1973 and 1979.

A more optimistic economic picture can be obtained by comparing current conditions to those that prevailed at the bottom of the recent recession in 1982. Such analysis, however, is grossly misleading, since it confuses growth due to a cyclical recovery with growth due to long-term changes in an economy's productive capabilities.

The driving force behind recent income shifts and stagnation is the recent deterioration in economic performance. How can that be, given the relatively low current rates of inflation and unemployment? The official unemployment rate masks serious problems of underemployment. In 1987 more than five million people were stuck in part-time jobs but wanted full-time jobs. Another one million workers wanted jobs but were too discouraged to seek them. Incorporating these people along with those officially unemployed into a measure of underemployment shows that one to one and one-half percent more of the work force are underemployed today than in 1979. Another not well-measured problem is that there has been a surge of employment in "temporary jobs," leaving far too many people in temporary jobs who want permanent jobs.

Our current unemployment rate does not reflect a superior record of job creation. In fact, jobs have grown at a rate one-third slower than in the 1970s. Unemployment has fallen despite slow job growth because population growth has also slowed down. That is, the coming of age of the "baby bust" generation meant fewer demands on the economy for providing first jobs. The true "job creation miracle" was in the 1970s when the economy accommodated the baby boomers.

The tight money policies pursued by Paul Volcker, a Carter and then a Reagan appointee, did bring us the low inflation of which the current administration is so proud. Of course, these policies did so by giving us double-digit unemployment and the deepest recession since the 1930s. The recent import surge helped to lower inflation, but it also zapped our industrial base. Despite low inflation, however, our economy has failed to gener-

(*Continued on page 60*)

LOOKING AT THE UNION LABEL



VOTE FOR PRESIDENT

	Rep.	Dem.	Other
1952			
National	55%	45%	—
Union fam.	39	61	—
1956			
National	58	42	—
Union fam.	43	57	—
1960			
National	49	50	—
Union fam.	35	65	—
1964			
National	39	61	—
Union fam.	27	73	—
1968			
National	43	43	14%
Union fam.	29	56	15
1972			
National	62	38	—
Union fam.	54	46	—
1976			
National	48	50	1
Union fam.	36	63	1
1980			
National	51	41	7
Union fam.	43	50	5
1984			
National	59	41	—
Union fam.	48	52	—

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 1984.



	Bush	Dukakis
8/19–21, 1988		
National	48%	44%
Union HH	33	58
Nonunion HH	51	41
9/9–11, 1988		
National	49	41
Union HH	30	59
Nonunion HH	52	38
10/7–9, 1988		
National	49	43
Union HH	33	58
Nonunion HH	53	39
10/21–23, 1988		
National	50	40
Union HH	37	52
Nonunion HH	53	37

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of October 21-23, 1988.

Out

Question: We'd like to know about the things on this list whether you feel generally optimistic about them as far as the future is concerned, or generally pessimistic about them, or uncertain about them?



Note: * = less than .5%. Union members = 11% of the sample.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 88-3), February 13–27, 1988.

Question: (1–3) I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the *people running* these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?


(1) Confidence in people running the executive branch of government.

(2) Confidence in people running organized labor.

(3) Confidence in people running banks and financial institutions.

Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 28% of the sample.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.

look

Question: (1–2) On these cards are some opinions about the government and the economy. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (3–5) Here are different opinions about social differences in this country. Please tell me for each one whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (6) Does everyone in this country have an opportunity to obtain an education corresponding to their abilities and talents?

(1) All in all, one can live well in America.

(2) If someone has a high social or economic position, that indicates the person has special abilities or great accomplishments.

(3) In the United States traditional divisions between owners and workers still remain. A person's social standing depends on whether he/she belongs to the upper or lower class.



(4) In the United States there are still great differences between social levels, and what one can achieve in life depends mainly upon one's family background.

(5) America has an open society. What one achieves in life no longer depends on one's family background, but on the abilities one has and the education one acquires.

(6) Does everyone in this country have an opportunity to obtain an education corresponding to their abilities and talents?



Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 28% of the sample.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.

Question: (1) Some people earn a lot of money while others do not earn very much at all. In order to get people to work hard, do you think large differences in pay are . . . (2–3) On these cards are some opinions about the government and the economy. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.


(1) In order to get people to work hard, large differences in pay are . . .

(2) The economy can run only if businessmen make good profits. That benefits everyone in the end.

(3) Generally speaking, business profits are distributed fairly in the United States.

Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 28% of the sample.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.



©1982 DAYTON DAILY NEWS
Mike Peters
COACH
62
10
41
12
OK, LISTEN UP... FIRST THE UNION STEWARD HANDS OFF TO THE PLAYERS REP... THUS ALLOWING THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE TO KNOCK OUT A MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATOR WHILE THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL GOES FOR THE EXTRA POINT...

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In the Next Issue

Election Wrap-up

Government's Role

Question: I'm going to read off a number of different things. For each would you tell me whether you think it is a privilege that a person should have to earn, or a right to which he is entitled as a citizen?



Note: Union members = 11% of the sample.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 88-3), February 13–27, 1988.

Question: (1–3) On these cards are some opinions about the government and the economy. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.

(1) The government must see to it that everyone has a job and that prices are stable, even if the rights of businessmen have to be restricted.

(2) It is the responsibility of government to meet everyone's needs, even in case of sickness, poverty, unemployment, and old age.

(3) If social welfare benefits such as disability, unemployment compensation, and early retirement pensions are as high as they are now, it only makes people not want to work anymore.



Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 28% of the sample. **Source:** Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.

Question: (1) I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctor and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. (2) Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. (3) some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself, they are at point 5. (4) Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families, or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7 . . . What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel? (5) For some time there have been discussions about how concerned the government should be about the social welfare of people. We have listed here two different opinions. With which opinion do you agree the most? (6) Here are different opinions about social differences in this country. Please tell me for each one whether you . . .





Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 29% of the sample. **Source:** Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.

Social Attitudes

Question: (1) What about sexual relations between two *adults* of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? (2) Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools? (3–4) Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . .(5) Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? (6) Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

(1) Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are . . .



(2) Sex education in public schools.



(3) Should it be possible to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason?



(4) Should it be possible to obtain a legal abortion if the woman's health is seriously endangered by pregnancy?



(5) A law which requires people to obtain a police permit before buying a gun.



(6) Death penalty for persons convicted of murder . . .



Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 28% of the sample.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.

Class

Question: (1) If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class? (2) Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?



Note: Union households = 18% of the sample; Blue-collar, nonunion households = 28% of the sample.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1983–1988, selected years.

DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES: NATIONAL, UNION HOUSEHOLDS, AND BLUE-COLLAR, NONUNION HOUSEHOLDS

	Total population	Less than 35 years	35 years and over	Union Households			Blue-collar nonunion households
				All	Less than 35 years	35 years and over	
By education							
Less than high school	27	18	33	24	12	29	45
High school graduate	33	35	31	39	45	37	36
Some college	21	27	18	21	27	18	15
College graduate	19	20	18	16	16	15	5
By income							
Less than $15,000	35	35	34	22	24	21	53
$15,000–34,999	38	43	35	46	51	43	35
$35,000 and over	27	22	30	32	25	36	12
By residential status							
Own/Is buying	66	45	77	74	54	81	58
Rent	34	55	23	26	46	19	42
By ideology							
Liberal	26	30	24	29	32	27	25
Moderate	39	39	40	40	36	42	43
Conservative	35	31	37	31	32	31	32

Note: Unless otherwise noted, all data for pages 21-29 are from The National opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1988 combined.

Business Issues

Question: There a number of things that can affect the products people buy. We'd like to know what effect some of these things have on your impression of the quality of a product. Would you read down that list and tell me if each one makes you feel the quality of that product is likely to be superior, fairly good, not very good, or poor?



Note: Union members = 11% of the sample.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 88-3), February 13-27, 1988.

Question: On balance, do you think trade with Japan, both buying and selling products, is good for the United States economy, or is it bad for the United States economy, or does it have no effect?

Trade with Japan is . . .



Question: Do blue-collar workers in the United States or Japan work harder or are they about the same?

Blue-collar workers work harder in . . .



Question: If you were going to buy a new car today, which country's car would you buy — the United States's, Japan's, South Korea's, Germany's, or some other country's?

I would buy a new car from . . .



Note: * = less than .5%

Question: Which of the following comes closer to your opinion—Japanese companies are competing unfairly with American companies, or the United States is blaming Japan for its own economic problems?



Question: What's the main reason more United States goods are not sold in Japan? Is it *mainly* because the Japanese government restricts the importing of American goods, or is it mainly because American goods are of lower quality than Japanese goods, or is it mainly because American companies have not tried hard enough to sell their goods in Japan?

More U.S. goods are not sold in Japan because . . .



Question: Do you think the increase in foreign investment in the United States poses a threat to American economic independence, or is it a development that will strengthen the American economy?

The increase in foreign investment . . .



Question: Which of the following statements comes closer to your opinion — trade restrictions are necessary to protect domestic industries, or free trade must be allowed even if domestic industries are hurt by foreign competition.



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 14-18, 1988.

CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM

A National Review

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?



	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
1974	29%	38%	28%
1975	28	38	28
1976	27	37	30
1977	27	37	31
1978	26	36	31
1980	24	40	33
1982	26	39	31
1983	22	40	35
1984	23	39	35
1985	24	37	35
1986	23	39	34
1987	27	37	30
1988	27	35	34

Note: Liberal = pts. 1-3, Moderate = pt. 4, Conservative = pts. 5-7.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February–April 1988.

Question: How would you describe your views on most political matters? Generally, do you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or conservative (1985—present)?



	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
1976	25%	33%	33%
1977	20	39	30
1978	23	27	42
1981	18	39	37
1983	17	41	35
1984	17	44	32
1985	19	42	32
1986	21	38	36
1987	21	40	33
1988	21	41	33

Note: Question wording varied before 1985. The first asking in each year is shown. From 1985 on that occurred in January.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of January 1988.

Question: Now, thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your general outlook—as being very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal?



	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
1974	22%	29%	42%
1975	25	29	41
1976	22	32	41
1977	25	30	40
1978	24	30	43
1979	22	32	43
1980	20	33	40
1981	19	29	47
1982	21	30	44
1983	22	32	43
1984	20	34	42
1985	19	32	45
1986	21	31	43
1987	22	31	43
1988	20	32	44

Note: "Conservative" = very + moderately conservative, "Liberal" = moderately + very liberal.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of January 9–23, 1988.

Question: What about American society in general—do you think it is more liberal now than it was twenty years ago, more conservative, or about the same?



Question: Compared to twenty years ago, are you generally more liberal now, more conservative or about the same?



Source: Survey by Media General for the Associated Press, April 29-May 8, 1988.

Question: Looking back to the 1960s and early 1970s, would you describe your political views at the time as being . . .



Question: Do you think of yourself (now) as being . . .



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 15-17, 1986.

Question: How would you characterize your political views? Mark one: Far left, liberal, middle-of-the-road, conservative, far right.



Entering freshmen at all institutions	Liberal	Middle-of-the-road	Conservative
1970	37%	45%	18%
1971	38	47	15
1972	35	48	17
1973	35	51	15
1974	30	55	15
1975	31	54	15
1976	28	56	16
1977	27	57	16
1978	25	58	17
1979	25	58	18
1980	22	60	18
1981	20	60	21
1982	21	60	19
1983	21	60	19
1984	22	57	21
1985	22	57	21
1986	24	56	20
1987	25	56	20



Entering freshmen at predominantly black public colleges	Liberal	Middle-of-the-road	Conservative
1973	42%	40%	18%
1974	35	50	15
1975	34	49	17
1976	32	50	18
1977	31	50	19
1978	32	49	20
1979	30	49	22
1980	28	50	22
1981	32	46	22
1982	28	51	21
1983	30	48	22
1984	31	50	19
1985	29	45	26
1986	30	50	20
1987	33	46	21

Note: "Liberal" = "Far left" + "Liberal," "Conservative" = "Conservative" + "Far right."

Source: *American Freshmen: National Norms for Fall 1987*, Cooperative Institutional Research Program, American Council on Education, and the University of California, Los Angeles, latest that of 1987.

Question: When a man in politics is referred to as a (liberal/conservative) what does that mean to you?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 26-31, 1950

Question: People have different images of liberals and conservatives, although in some respects they may see no difference between them. We'd like to know how you see liberals and conservatives. Here is a list of words and phrases. First, would you read down that list and call off all the words and phrases that you associate with conservatives today? What about liberals today?



Note: Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 85-10) October 26-November 1, 1985.

Question: All in all, do you think the Reagan administration has been too conservative, or not conservative enough?

The Reagan administration has . . .



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, July 31-August 3, 1988.

Question: If you had to choose, for the next four years would you prefer a president who is a conservative, a moderate, or a liberal?

Would prefer a president for the next four years who is . . .



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for *Business Week*, August 4-9, 1988.

Question: If a public figure were described as (liberal/moderate/conservative/a populist/progressive), would that make a difference in the way you feel about that person? (If yes, ask:) Would it make you feel more favorable or less favorable?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of September 8-11, 1988.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Question: In politics, do you think of (Michael Dukakis/George Bush) as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?

George Bush/Michael Dukakis is . . .



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of October 1-3, 1988.

"Should anyone inquire, Harrington, our portions are generous, not liberal."

Question: Are (George Bush's/Michael Dukakis') views too liberal for you, too conservative for you, just about right for you, or aren't you sure?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of September 21-October 10, 1988.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Michael Dukakis is too liberal to be a good president? Do you think George Bush is too conservative to be a good president or don't you think so?



Note: July and August polls are among registered voters; September and October polls are among likely voters.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of October 14-16, 1988.

GEORGE BUSH AN
HOW THEY STAND IN NATIONA

NATIONAL/REGIONAL TRIAL HEATS

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
Harris	4/10-15/87	55%	39%	+ 16	LV
Harris	5/8-12/87	51	43	+ 8	LV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/17-23/87	61	29	+ 32	Adults
Penn + Schoen	10/30-11/5/87	50	30	+ 20	Adults
Los Angeles Times	12/10-14/87	49	23	+ 26	Adults
Roper for *U.S. News*/CNN	12/14-16/87	48	30	+ 18	Adults
Harris	2/18-23/88	47	50	– 3	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	3/9/88	44	38	+ 6	RV
Harris	3/9-13/88	47	50	– 3	RV
Gallup	3/10-12/88	52	40	+ 12	RV
Time/YCS	3/10/88	42	37	+ 5	RV
ABC News/*W.Post*	3/17-21/88	45	50	– 5	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	3/19-22/88	46	45	+ 1	RV
Gallup/*Newsweek*	3/30-31/88	49	44	+ 5	RV
Roper for *U.S. News*/CNN	3/30-31/88	44	43	+ 1	RV
Harris	4/1-5/88	45	50	– 5	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	4/5-7/88	43	48	– 5	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	4/20-21/88	43	45	– 2	RV
Time/YCS	4/20-21/88	39	50	– 11	RV
Gallup	4/21-23/88	45	43	+ 2	RV
Bruskin	4/29/88	40	42	– 2	Adults
Harris	5/5-10/88	43	50	– 7	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	5/9-12/88	39	49	– 10	RV
Bruskin	5/13/88	39	37	+ 2	Adults
Gallup	5/13-15/88	38	54	– 16	RV
Gallup for Times Mirror	5/13-22/88	40	53	– 13	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	5/19-26/88	40	53	– 13	RV
Harris	6/1-6/88	44	49	– 5	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	6/7-9/88	38	45	– 7	RV
Darden Poll*	6/8-13/88	42	45	– 3	RV
Hamilton Frederick and Schneiders for AMPAC	6/8-19/88	41	50	– 9	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	6/9-12/88	34	49	– 15	RV
Gallup	6/10-12/88	38	52	– 14	RV
McKeon and Assoc.	6/14-15/88	34	52	– 18	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	6/15-19/88	39	51	– 12	RV
ABC News/*Money*	6/22-26/88	42	45	– 3	Adults
AP/Media General	6/22-7/2/88	42	48	– 6	LV
Bruskin	6/24/88	39	45	– 6	Adults
Gallup	6/24-26/88	41	46	– 5	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	7/5-8/88	39	47	– 8	RV
Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune**	7/5-9/88	39	50	– 11	RV
Los Angeles Times	7/5-10/88	38	49	– 11	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	7/6-10/88	47	44	+ 3	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	7/7-11/88	42	48	– 6	RV
Harris for *Business Week*	7/7-12/88	47	50	– 3	LV
Gallup	7/8-10/88	41	47	– 6	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	7/8-11/88	36	46	– 10	RV
ABC News	7/11/88	42	48	– 6	RV
Darden Poll*	7/12-17/88	48	43	+ 5	RV
Bruskin	7/15/88	40	44	– 4	Adults
ABC News	7/17/88	46	45	+ 1	RV
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION	7/18-21/88				
ABC News	7/20/88	41	53	– 12	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	7/20-21/88	40	50	– 10	RV

MICHAEL DUKAKIS: AND REGIONAL POLLS

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
Gallup for Newsweek	7/21-22/88	38	55	– 17	RV
Bruskin	7/22/88	37	47	– 10	Adults
Gallup	7/22-24/88	37	54	– 17	RV
Harris	7/22-25/88	39	57	– 18	LV
NBC News/*WSJ*	7/23-25/88	32	50	– 18	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	7/31-8/3/88	33	50	– 17	RV
Bendixen and Law/Univision Poll	8/2-8/88	39	52	– 13	RV
Harris/*Business Week*	8/4-9/88	45	51	– 6	RV
Gallup	8/5-7/88	42	49	– 7	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	8/5-8/88	36	50	– 14	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	8/5-8/88	40	52	– 12	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/10-16/88	46	49	– 3	RV
KRC for New Orleans *Times-Picayune*	8/12-18/88	42	42	0	RV
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION	8/15-18/88				
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	8/17-18/88	45	44	+ 1	RV
Gallup/*Newsweek*	8/18-19/88	51	42	+ 9	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	8/19-21/88	46	40	+ 6	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/17-23/88	48	46	+ 2	RV
Gallup	8/19-21/88	48	44	+ 4	RV
Harris	8/19-22/88	49	47	+ 2	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	8/20-22/88	44	39	+ 5	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/24-30/88	47	48	– 1	LV
Time/YCS	8/29-30/88	47	42	+ 5	LV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/31-9/6/88	51%	43%	+ 8	LV
Harris/*Business Week*	9/1-6/88	50	44	+ 6	LV
Harris	9/1-19/88	47	46	+ 1	LV
KRC/APN	9/2-4/88	46	43	+ 3	RV
KRC/APN	9/3-5/88	44	43	+ 1	RV
KRC/APN	9/4-6/88	44	42	+ 2	RV
KRC/APN	9/5-7/88	45	41	+ 4	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	9/5-8/88	48	46	+ 2	LV
KRC/APN	9/6-8/88	47	39	+ 8	RV
KRC/APN	9/7-9/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/7-13/88	45	48	– 3	LV
Roper for MD Public TV	9/8-10/88	40	48	– 8	RV
KRC/APN	9/8-10/88	46	39	+ 7	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	9/8-11/88	47	39	+ 8	RV
Gallup	9/9-11/88	49	41	+ 8	RV
Los Angeles Times	9/9-11/88	47	47	0	RV
KRC/APN	9/9-11/88	44	42	+ 2	RV
Gallup/Times Mirror	9/9-14/88	50	44	+ 6	RV
KRC/APN	9/10-12/88	45	42	+ 3	RV
KRC/APN	9/11-13/88	46	42	+ 4	RV
KRC/APN	9/12-14/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
KRC/APN	9/13-15/88	49	38	+ 11	RV
KRC/APN	9/14-16/88	49	38	+ 11	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/14-19/88	50	46	+ 4	LV
KRC/APN	9/15-17/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
KRC/APN	9/16-18/88	46	40	+ 6	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	9/16-20/88	45	41	+ 4	LV
KRC/APN	9/17-19/88	46	40	+ 6	RV
KRC/APN	9/18-20/88	44	40	+ 4	RV
KRC/APN	9/19-21/88	45	39	+ 6	RV
KRC/APN	9/20-22/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	9/21-23/88	46	40	+ 6	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/21-27/88	49	46	+ 3	RV
KRC/APN	9/21-23/88	50	38	+ 12	RV
KRC/APN	9/22-24/88	50	38	+ 12	RV
KRC/APN	9/23-25/88	50	38	+ 12	RV
KRC/APN	9/24-26/88	48	41	+ 7	RV
Harris	9/24-29/88	49	46	+ 3	LV

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
FIRST DEBATE	9/25/88				
CBS News/*NYT*	9/25/88	52	43	+ 9	RV
Los Angeles Times	9/25/88	46	46	0	RV
KRC/APN	9/25-27/88	47	42	+ 5	RV
KRC/APN	9/26-28/88	46	41	+ 5	RV
KRC/APN	9/27-29/88	47	41	+ 6	RV
Gallup	9/27-28/88	47	42	+ 5	RV
Time/YCS	9/27-28/88	48	41	+ 7	LV
KRC/APN	9/28-30/88	47	40	+ 7	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/28-10/4/88	51	44	+ 7	LV
Los Angeles Times	9/29/88	45	46	− 1	RV
KRC/APN	9/29-10/1/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
KRC/APN	9/30-10/2/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
KRC/APN	10/1-3/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	10/1-3/88	48	46	+ 2	RV
*Atlanta Journal/Constitution**	10/1-7/88	43	37	+ 6	RV
KRC/APN	10/2-4/88	49	39	+ 10	RV
KRC/APN	10/3-5/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
KRC/APN	10/4-6/88	48	39	+ 9	LV
University of Iowa "Heartland Poll"*	10/5-18/88	48	42	+ 6	LV
CBS News/*NYT*	10/5/88	51	46	+ 5	LV
ABC News/*W. Post*	10/5-9/88	50	47	+ 3	LV
KRC/APN	10/5-7/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	10/5-11/88	51	45	+ 6	LV
KRC/APN	10/6-8/88	48	42	+ 6	RV
Harris	10/6-10/88	50	48	+ 2	LV
KRC/APN	10/7-9/88	48	41	+ 7	RV
Gallup	10/7-9/88	49	43	+ 6	RV
Gallup	10/7-9/88	52	41	+ 11	LV
Los Angeles Times	10/8-9/88	44	41	+ 3	RV
KRC/APN	10/8-10/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	10/8-10/88	47	42	+ 5	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	10/8-10/88	48	45	+ 3	LV
KRC/APN	10/9-11/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
KRC/APN	10/10-12/88	47	41	+ 6	RV
KRC/APN	10/11-13/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
KRC/APN	10/12-14/88	47	39	+ 8	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	10/12-18/88	52	45	+ 7	LV
Los Angeles Times	10/11-13/88	47	40	+ 7	RV
SECOND DEBATE	10/13/88				
Los Angeles Times	10/13/88	52	42	+ 10	RV
KRC/APN	10/13-15/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	10/14/88	54	44	+ 10	RV
KRC/APN	10/14-16/88	47	40	+ 7	RV
Opinion Research Co.	10/14-16/88	55	37	+ 18	Adults
Harris	10/14-17/88	53	44	+ 9	LV
NBC News/*WSJ*	10/14-16/88	55	38	+ 17	LV
KRC/APN	10/15-17/88	49	39	+ 10	RV
KRC/APN	10/16-18/88	49	39	+ 10	RV
KRC/APN	10/17-19/88	50	39	+ 11	RV
KRC/APN	10/18-20/88	51	38	+ 13	RV
KRC/APN	10/19-21/88	52	39	+ 13	RV
KRC/APN	10/19-21/88	52	39	+ 13	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	10/19-25/88	52	44	+ 8	LV
KRC/APN	10/20-22/88	51	38	+ 13	RV
Gallup/*Newsweek*	10/20-21/88	50	41	+ 9	RV
KRC/APN	10/21-23/88	50	40	+ 10	RV
KRC/APN	10/22-24/88	51	40	+ 11	RV
Gallup	10/21-23/88	50	40	+ 10	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	10/21-24/88	54	41	+ 13	RV
KRC/APN	10/23-25/88	50	39	+ 11	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	10/23-26/88	51	42	+ 9	LV
Gallup/*Times Mirror*	10/23-26/88	52	41	+ 11	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	10/24-26/88	54	42	+ 12	LV
KRC/APN	10/24-26/88	49	37	+ 12	RV

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
KRC/APN	10/25-27/88	49	36	+ 13	RV
***Time*/YCS**	10/25-26/88	50	40	+ 10	LV
KRC/APN	10/26-28/88	49	37	+ 12	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	10/26-31/88	55	42	+ 13	LV
KRC/APN	10/27-29/88	50	36	+ 14	RV
KRC/APN	10/28-30/88	49	38	+ 11	RV
Harris	10/28-30/88	52	45	+ 7	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	10/28/88	54	42	+ 12	LV
KRC/APN	10/29-31/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	10/29-31/88	53	41	+ 12	LV
KRC/APN	10/30-11/1/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
Atlanta Journal/Constitution*	10/30-11/4/88	50	36	+ 14	LV
KRC/APN	10/31-11/2/88	47	39	+ 8	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	11/1-5/88	48	43	+ 5	LV
KRC/APN	11/1-3/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
KRC/APN	11/2-4/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	11/2-5/88	52	42	+ 10	RV
Harris	11/2-5/88	50	45	+ 5	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	11/3-6/88	52	42	+ 10	RV
Gallup	11/3-5/88	53	41	+ 12	RV
KRC/APN	11/3-5/88	49	40	+ 9	RV
KRC/APN	11/4-6/88	49	40	+ 9	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	11/4-5/88	51	42	+ 9	RV

Note: *Denotes a regional poll, or a poll taken in a cluster of states. Darden polled voters in 9 southern states: AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, and VA. The *Atlanta Journal/Constitution* polled in AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TX, VA, and WV. The 11/4 *Atlanta Journal/Constitution* poll was conducted in: AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, NC, TX, and TN. The University of Iowa "Heartland Poll" is conducted in IL, IA, MN, MO, NE, SD, and WI. Hart polled voters in 5 states: CA, FL, IL, NY, and TX.

HOW THEY FARE IN STATE POLLS

	Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
CA	NBC News	9/6-8/88	44	42	+ 2	RV
	Field	9/6-12/88	45	46	− 1	RV
	Teichner/*San Francisco Examiner*	9/15-17/88	40	44	− 4	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	9/17-20/88	46	43	+ 3	RV
	KRC for KTVU/*San Francisco Examiner*	9/25-27/88	45	45	0	RV
	KRC for KTVU/*San Francisco Examiner*	10/5-6/88	45	44	+ 1	RV
	Teichner/*San Francisco Examiner*	10/5-8/88	40	44	− 4	RV
	Field	10/10-16/88	50	41	+ 9	RV
	CBS News	10/10-12/88	50	45	+ 5	LV
	KRC for KTVU/*San Francisco Examiner*	10/13-14/88	49	42	+ 7	RV
	Los Angeles Times	10/20-23/88	53	42	+ 11	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	10/24-26/88	48	40	+ 8	RV
	ABC News	10/29-30/88	51	44	+ 7	LV
FL	Mason Dixon	8/26-28/88	53	37	+ 16	LV
	University of So. Fla. *N.Y. Times* Florida Newspaper Group	8/27-29/88	51	38	+ 13	RV
	Orlando Sentinel et al "Fl. Newspaper Poll"	8/28-30/88	53	41	+ 12	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	9/17-20/88	54	37	+ 17	RV
	Mason Dixon	9/26-27/88	54	37	+ 17	LV
	Atlanta Journal/Constitution	10/1-7/88	56	30	+ 26	RV

	Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
	Finkelstein for Mack (R)	10/6-7/88	58	35	+ 23	LV
	Mason Dixon	10/17-18/88	57	37	+ 20	LV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	10/22-23/88	56	35	+ 21	RV
IL	Midwest Television Poll	8/24-29/88	42	42	0	LV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	9/17-20/88	40	47	− 7	RV
	Gallup/*Chicago Sun-Times*	9/27-28/88	44	44	0	RV
	Midwest Television Poll	10/10-16/88	46	39	+ 7	LV
	Gallup/*Chicago Sun-Times*	10/21-25/88	46	40	+ 6	RV
	Peter Hart for *Chicago Tribune*	10/24-26/88	47	42	+ 5	RV
MI	KRC for American Political Network	9/6-7/88	44	41	+ 3	RV
	KRC for WJBK-TV	9/6-8/88	44	41	+ 3	RV
	Gordon Black for *Detroit News*	9/7-9/88	47	43	+ 4	LV
	Charles Hakes Research for *Detroit Free Press*/WXYZ-TV	9/8-10/88	42	43	− 1	RV
	Detroit News	9/25/88	50	43	+ 7	LV
	KRC for WJBK-TV	10/6-7/88	40	45	− 5	RV
	Detroit News	10/14/88	54	41	+ 13	RV*
	KRC for WJBK-TV	10/25-26/88	47	41	+ 6	RV
NJ	Eagleton Institute for *The Star-Ledger*	9/16-22/88	47	44	+ 3	Adults
	Eagleton Institute for *The Star-Ledger*	9/26-29/88	47	40	+ 7	RV
	RL Assoc. for *The Record*	9/27-10/5/88	48	40	+ 8	LV
	Political/Media Research for WCAU et al.	10/1-3/88	47	43	+ 4	LV
	Eagleton Institute for *The Star-Ledger*	10/17-25/88	52	38	+ 14	RV
NY	Marist Institute	9/12-15/88	40	48	− 8	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	9/17-20/88	40	48	− 8	RV
	Diversified Research/Finkelstein for *New York Post*	9/17-19/88	46	46	0	RV
	Political/Media Research for *Buffalo News*/WUTR	10/10-11/88	40	49	− 9	LV
	Marist Institute	10/20-25/88	42	47	− 5	LV
	New York Post	10/22-23/88	46	44	+ 2	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	10/24-26/88	46	42	+ 4	RV
OH	*The Columbus Dispatch*	9/3-8/88	48	43	+ 5	RV*
	The Akron Beacon-Journal	9/6-15/88	43	39	+ 4	RV
	Univ. of Cincinnati/WCPO-TV and *The Cincinnati Post* "The Ohio Poll"	9/6-19/88	47	41	+ 6	RV
	MOR for Hamilton County Republican Party	9/23-24/88	58	30	+ 28	RV
	Political/Media Research for WEWS, WFMJ, WSYX, WDTN	9/30-10/2/88	46	44	+ 2	LV
	Columbus Dispatch	10/1-6/88	47	43	+ 4	RV*
	Akron Beacon-Journal/WKYC	10/3-13/88	47	36	+ 11	LV
	KRC for the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*	10/11-12/88	45	41	+ 4	RV
	KRC for the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*	10/18-20/88	49	37	+ 12	RV
	Mason Dixon	10/21-23/88	49	42	+ 7	LV

* People who watched the second presidential debate.

*These surveys are conducted by mail. 9/88 sample size was 1,057 RV; 10/88sample size was 1,571 RV.

Optimism, Pessimism, and Policy

by Samuel Popkin

Is the American Dream dead? Have Americans stopped believing in the bountiful future? And how are these perceptions affecting our politics? The American Dream actually has two versions, and the answers to the questions depend upon which version of the dream you have in mind—the dream that it is possible to go from poor to rich, or the dream that the future is bright for all Americans. The CBS News/*New York Times* poll has asked about both. You *can* still go from poor to rich, most Americans say, but they no longer believe that everyone is going to be better off in the future than he is today.

More than two-thirds are convinced that it is possible to go from poor to rich, and nearly as many believe that it is as possible today *as when they were young*. But if the American Dream is the belief that everyone will live better than his parents did, that the United States possesses endless frontiers with gains for all who work hard, then the dream is fading. Americans feel that the next generation will have a more difficult time and will be burdened with more problems than this generation.

This unease about the future will be a driving force behind the next president's agenda. A squeezed middle class will be looking to the government for support in the next four years, and this means demands for social spending, a trade of "guns for butter." The Republican party, despite peace and prosperity, has not become the party of the middle class. It will not become the majority party, I argue, until it becomes the party the middle class turns to when they are in trouble. On the issues that are associated with concern about the future—education, foreign economic competition, drugs, and the deficit—the Democrats are the party in which the public places its support. If a neoconservative is a liberal who has been mugged, then perhaps a neo-Democrat is a conservative who cannot find affordable day care or whose child cannot afford a house or who is losing business to the Japanese.

Concerns about the future include long-term worries about America's ability to maintain the current standard of living, but apprehensions go beyond the solely economic. Americans no longer take it as axiomatic that their standard of living will continue to climb, but they have also lost confidence that they are the best in the world, that they are world leaders in science and technology or manufacturing. Americans' attitudes about their work ethic and their moral standards also reflect this lack of self-confidence.

Part of the uneasiness seems to come from a growing sense of inferiority to Japan. Given the mass exodus of consumer electronics from U.S. plants to Japan and East Asia, it is not surprising that Americans believe, by 38 to 22 percent, that the Japanese make more technologically advanced consumer products, or that they are also convinced that the Japanese work harder than Americans do, by 58 to 28 percent. Democrats, Republicans, union members, young, and old—every segment of the American population says that Japanese workers work harder than American workers.

Americans also feel that moral values in their own society have declined, just one more reason to be concerned about the future. Three-quarters of the voters believe that there has been a decline in moral values in the last twenty years.

At no time since CBS News and the *New York Times* first asked about concerns for the next generation in 1984 have a majority of Americans thought the next generation will have a good future. From 1986 until this fall, twice as many thought the next generation would

Table 1

CONCERNS ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION

Question: If things continue the way they are going now, do you think the future of the next generation of Americans will be a good one, or will it be bogged down by too many problems left behind for them?

	Oct. 1984	Sept. 1986	Nov. 1987	July 1988	Sept. 1988	Oct. 13, 1988	Oct. 25, 1988
Future of the next generation will be . . .							
A good one	42%	31%	30%	28%	34%	40%	34%
Bogged down by too many problems	47	63	61	58	56	48	57

Source: All surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of October 1988.

be bogged down, as thought the next generation would have a good collective future.

A person's outlook on the future is central to his policy preferences and voting. Voters who see clouds on the horizon think differently about parties and government than do voters who see a good future. Those who are anxious about the future are more oriented toward social programs and government action, while voters who see a rosier future support a more limited role for government. People concerned about the future are also less willing to forgo services in order to cut the deficit, more willing to cut defense spending to fund domestic spending, more supportive of government programs to provide insurance and day care, less supportive of the use of the American military in foreign conflicts, and less willing to spend money to support anti-Communist forces around the world. Democrats are more pessimistic than Republicans, and women are more pessimistic than men. Worries about the future are associated with more concern about government action that will cushion that future and less with fiscal restraint, defense spending, or militant anticommunism abroad (see table 2).

Both expectations for the future and support for government services bore a relationship to candidate preferences before the 1988 election. Even among Democratic identifiers who voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984, George Bush's preelection support was confined almost entirely to *optimistic* Reagan Democrats. Further, in the 1988 Republican primaries George Bush was more popular and ran more strongly among Republicans who expected a good future than among Republicans who expected the next generation to be bogged down.

Changing Priorities for Government

When Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in 1980, there were two strong arguments against government domestic spending—inflation and the perception of an increasingly hostile world exemplified by the hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Whatever the actual causes of inflation, public opinion

Table 2

PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE: HOW THEY AFFECT ATTITUDES

Questions: In order to reduce the federal budget deficit, are you willing or not willing for the government to provide fewer services, even in areas like health and education? (November 1987) Should defense spending be reduced in order to provide for needed domestic programs? (July 1988) Do you think the federal government should require employers to make health insurance available to all their workers, or don't you think the federal government should require employers to do this? (October 1988) is supporting anti-Communist forces around the world something the federal government should or should not be doing? (November 1987)

	Total			Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
	All	Good future	Bogged down	All	Good future	Bogged down	All	Good future	Bogged down	All	Good future	Bogged down
Fewer services to reduce deficit?												
Willing	35%	46%	30%	30%	38%	26%	30%	44%	24%	46%	52%	44%
Not willing	59	51	64	65	60	69	66	52	72	47	45	49
Reduce defense spending to provide for domestic programs												
Yes	46	38	52	45	42	61	47	37	52	39	34	44
No	43	54	38	34	50	29	45	54	40	53	58	47
Fed. govt. should require employers to make health insurance available to all their workers												
Yes	64	60	69	74	71	76	60	60	61	57	54	63
No	29	36	25	20	26	18	32	35	31	33	44	31
U.S. should support anti-Communist forces around the world												
Yes	53	64	49	49	60	46	48	56	45	64	70	61
No	40	32	44	44	36	48	45	40	47	30	26	34

pointed to government spending as the number one culprit. Inflation is no longer seen as a big problem; where it once was mentioned most often as the "most important problem facing the country," it now trails behind drugs, the deficit, the environment, and a host of other national concerns. Relaxation of international tensions has similarly dampened the public's earlier ardor for defense spending, and reduced cold war tension reflects itself in a decreased level of wariness about communism in Central America. As the threat of inflation and the Soviet menace have both abated, support for government services has increased.

These numbers indicate just how different, indeed aberrant, the climate of 1980 was compared to earlier years or to 1988. About the same percentage of people wanted more government services in 1976 and 1988, even with the growth in government that implies, and those proportions are nearly even with the percentage wanting fewer services and a smaller government. Yet in 1980 voters who wanted less government outnumbered voters who wanted more government by two to one!

Table 3

DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Question: In general, government grows bigger as it provides more services. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?

	June 1976	March 1980	May 1988	October 1988
Would rather have . . .				
Smaller government	44%	57%	47%	45%
Bigger government	41	28	41	38

Accompanying the new support for more government services is increased attention to the environment. This is an issue that has grown in salience throughout the Reagan years, a possible reaction to a sense of defeat on some environmental fronts. The post-World War II expansion of higher education and the transformation of the nation into a white-collar society has resulted in the growth of widespread worry about toxins, poisons, wastes, additives, and potential carcinogens. I have labeled this anxiety about environmental health threats "ecofear." After eight years of administration efforts to persuade Americans to trust industry and to stop tying corporations up in red tape, support for environmental action is stronger than ever before. Cancer, toxic waste spills, and Chernobyl have raised more concerns about the planet's ecology than all Ronald Reagan's arguments could overcome.

Table 4

PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and continuing improvements must be made regardless of cost.

	Sept. 1982	April 1983	Jan. 1986	July 1988
Agree	52%	57%	65%	65%
Disagree	41	35	27	22

Changing Images of the Political Parties

From January 1987 through May 1988, whenever the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked "Which party's candidate do you think you will vote for in 1988?" more respondents said Democrats than Republicans. Voters' worries about the future and their changing priorities help explain that and also shed light on why Michael Dukakis, an unknown challenger, ever came close to becoming the heir of the party that has delivered peace and prosperity. Michael Dukakis had a chance—although only a brief, early one—because the Republican party, despite peace and prosperity, has not yet become the party that middle-class America fully trusts or depends upon. An examination of the images of the two parties and their perceived abilities to deal with the country's problems makes this clear.

The most important indicator of the relative positions of the parties is found in answers to the question, "Which political party do you think can do a better job of handling the [most important problem facing the country] you just mentioned?" In both 1980 and 1984 the Republicans were ahead of the Democrats on this measure, even though Democrats outnumber Republicans in the electorate. In 1987 the Democrats moved ahead, and by May 1988 they had an eleven-point lead.

Table 5

PARTY BEST ABLE TO HANDLE COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

	Rep.	Dem.		Rep.	Dem.
Aug. 1980	42%	29%	April 1984	34%	34%
Oct.	40	32	June	36	33
Sept. 1981	37	23	Sept.	40	30
Jan. 1982	30	34	Oct.	40	31
May	29	36	April 1986	33	31
Oct.	32	39	Sept.	35	30
June 1983	29	34	Oct. 1987	32	34
Jan. 1984	35	34	May 1988	29	40

The Democratic lead on ability to handle the country's most important issue is due, I argue, to two factors. First, confidence in the future dropped between 1984 and 1986. Second, a series of GOP initiatives failed, including drug wars, school prayer, antiabortion campaigns, and the Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork. These initiatives have harmed the party's overall image. Despite its record on peace and prosperity, the GOP has lost popular confidence in its ability to deal with many other domestic issues. On drugs, education, foreign economic competition, and on handling the deficit, the Democrats lead the GOP.

Internationally, the Republicans have scored a spectacular double in the last eight years. They are

Table 6

PARTY BEST ABLE TO HANDLE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

	Oct. 1980	April 1981	May 1982	Oct. 1982	June 1983	Oct. 1984	June 1985	Sept. 1986	May 1988	Aug. 1988
Party best able to . . .										
Make sure U.S. defenses are strong										
Rep.						62%			53%	54%
Dem.						18			24	28
Keep the country out of war										
Rep.	31%	37%		32%		36		39%		
Dem.	37	34		34		35		32		
Handle unemployment										
Rep.	38	36	23%	29	30%	44		37	32	
Dem.	32	31	51	51	38	37		40	49	
Deal with foreign economic competition										
Rep.					38			36	32	
Dem.					32			33	45	
Handle drug problem										
Rep.								38	24	
Dem.								18	39	
Improve education										
Rep.					25					23
Dem.					49					55
Reduce the deficit										
Rep.						42	46%			30
Dem.						30	25			41

ahead of the Democrats on both war and peace, which means they are better as hawks and better as doves! By at least two to one, Americans have assumed since the 1970s that the Republicans will do a better job of maintaining a strong defense. Now the opening to the Soviet Union has also given the GOP a new image as the party that can "keep the United States out of war." In 1980 when Ronald Reagan was railing at Jimmy Carter for his weak response to Soviet aggression, criticizing arms control, and after he made his "Evil Empire" speech, the Democrats led as the party of peace. By 1986 the GOP was ahead, and since the last summit the edge has grown. In October 1988 the GOP led the Democrats 42 to 30 percent.

Party images reflect both recent performance by the incumbent party and the long-standing records of the parties. Even though unemployment is at a record low, the Democrats have regained their historic edge on unemployment. In May 1988 the Democrats led the GOP 49 to 32 percent.

The GOP is far and away the party of strong defense, and the party to "keep us out of war." At the same time the Democrats have become the party best able to deal with foreign economic competition. This is important because fully half of all adult Americans say their communities have been hurt by foreign trade.

Even more striking than the movement toward Democrats on foreign economic competition is the movement to the Democrats on handling drugs. And education is as much a Democratic stronghold as national defense is a Republican strength. The survey shown here was taken after the Democratic convention, so it was subject to the momentary inflation of all post-convention data. Still, education appears to be a firmly Democratic issue. The Republican party is no longer seen as the only party that can reduce the deficit. Party images from the summer of 1988 are subject to the momentary boost of convention euphoria, but GOP talk of deficit reduction has far less credibility than in previous years.

In September 1986 the CBS News/*New York Times* survey respondents were asked "Which political party cares about people like you?" and "Which party is the party of family values?" By 52 to 26 percent, respondents picked Democrats over Republicans as the party that cared about people like them, and by 44 to 33 percent respondents said Democrats were the party of family values. In October 1988 the poll asked which party would do a better job of "making sure all Americans have a chance for a good life," and respondents picked Democrats over Republicans by 45 to 33 percent. These numbers indicate the extent to which the Republicans have been unable to create a permanent majority despite peace and prosperity. They have not succeeded on family values or concern for the average person. Americans vote for Republican presidential candidates without giving the party their hearts.

The Democrats entered and finished the primary season as the party of the middle class, or at least the party that treats everyone alike. The Republican party is still not thought of as the party of the middle class, despite all its efforts to appeal to this group. Both recently and in October 1987 before the primaries began, the Republican party has been viewed by nearly

60 percent of the electorate as a party that favors the rich. Three-fifths of the electorate view the Democrats as either a party that favors the middle class or a party that treats everyone alike. The Republican primaries failed to enhance the party's image, and the Democratic primaries failed to hurt their party's image.

Table 7

PARTY BEST FOR THE RICH, THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND THE POOR

Question: In general, do you think the (name party) favors the rich, favors the middle class, or favors the poor, or does it treat them all pretty much the same?

	Republican party		Democratic party	
	Oct. 1987	May 1988	Oct. 1987	May 1988
Favors the . . .				
Rich	59%	64%	13%	14%
Middle class	9	9	24	24
Poor	1	1	18	17
All same	27	20	39	39

Apprehension about the future is widespread. Despite low unemployment, low inflation, and low international tension, half the electorate believes that the next generation will be burdened with more problems than this generation. It is not surprising that voters who are worried about the future are more willing to see money invested in social programs. It seems perfectly plausible to buy more "insurance" when the future looks uncertain than when the future looks good. It also makes sense to invest in programs that can avoid the future problems or cushion their impact, programs such as improved education to remain competitive, day care for working parents, drug wars to protect children, or regulation of toxic wastes. No surprise, then, that George Bush said he wanted to be the "education president," and that he wanted a "gentler America." Instead of promising "four more years" of the Reagan agenda, he repeatedly told voters, "I am the change."

In the early 1980s the term "safety net" became synonymous with saving the New Deal: it meant protection for the unemployed, the homeless, and the elderly. At present the middle class isn't unemployed, homeless, or retired, but it is concerned about a future fraught with problems. The party that will dominate the next decade will be the party that successfully finds the programs and terms that carry the same resonance to the middle class that "safety net" carries to the presently or likely unemployed and needy. ☑

A longer version of this paper was presented at the 1988 American Political Science Association Convention.

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Olson

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ogies that increase the efficiency with which firms produce marketable output are captured in the National Income and Product Accounts, for the obvious reason that they lead to more outputs that are marketable and therefore come under the measuring rod of money. But the benefits of new products for consumers that make consumers' lives better, without necessarily making them produce more on the job, are not usually captured in the statistics on real per capita income growth. To see the importance of this, perform the following thought-experiment: ask whether one would rather have an income of $25,000 in 1932 dollars, with which one could buy the products available in 1932 at the prices that prevailed then, or $25,000 of today's much-depreciated dollars and the products available in the markets today. The price level has risen about eight times since 1932, so a $25,000 income then would be the "equivalent" of an income of $200,000 today—it would make one so well off that one could readily afford a Rolls Royce, the best seats in the theater, and the care of the best physicians in the country. But the 1932 Rolls Royce, for all its many virtues, does not embody some desirable technologies available today in the humblest Ford. Nor would the imposing dollar of 1932 buy a TV set or a home video. And if one got an infection, the best physicians in 1932 would not be able to prescribe an antibiotic.

So economic growth entails many colossally important benefits as well as costs that escape measurement in the national income statistics. Many important developments for our well-being vary independently of our money incomes.

The Need for a Bird's-Eye View

To come to sensible conclusions about how society is doing and to make intelligent public decisions, we need to take account of what readily falls under the measuring rod of money and also of what does not. This means that we need the best information we can get about both. That information has to be brought together in a way that permits integrated, balanced decisions. Society is not divided into departments the way universities are, so it's all too easy to make decisions without realizing that they are artifacts of unintended omissions or inadvertent double counting.

Today we have a compelling need for a new social indicators project, something along the lines the American Enterprise Institute is considering. Though AEI represents a vastly wider array of beliefs than is sometimes supposed, neither they (as they have pointed out) nor anyone else ought to have a monopoly. I welcome this promising innovation and also the related initiatives of other institutions that we must hope will also emerge. ☑

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Stein

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United States would be interested in the relative incomes of doctors in the two countries, not in the national averages. Even as outside observers, what we would like to know is the relative incomes of similar people in the two countries, and the national averages tell us little about that.

Are We Really Better Off?

These examples of the difficulties of comparing "well-offness" may seem extreme, because the differences between 1874 and 1987 or between America and India are so great. But the difficulties appear in even more straightforward comparisons. The current disagreement, probably not resolvable, about whether we have become better off or worse off during the Reagan administration illustrates the problem.

Interestingly, when Candidate Reagan asked his famous question in 1980, "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" the answer was immediately assumed to be negative. No income statistics were dissected to discover it. Such an analysis would at least have shown the answer to be uncertain and arguable. If any statistic was used to make the case, it was "The Misery Index," which combines unemployment and inflation but not income.

This time the statistics are being analyzed. They show that the answer to the question, "Are we better off?" turns out to be more questions. Who is "we"? What do you mean by "better off"? Compared to what, or when? Whether "we" are better off depends on whether we are young or old, male or female, white or black, skilled or unskilled, a skilled auto worker or a skilled computer programmer, and so on *ad infinitum*. Averaging all this does not tell us much, because the averages depend on the changes in the composition of the population in all these respects, which have been unusually great in recent years.

It is possible, for every item in an average to increase but for the average to decrease if the proportions of the items change enough. Moreover, averages treat every item equally, whereas in the respects that concern us they are not all equal. We may be more concerned about what happens to old people than to young, poor than rich, heads of families than single individuals.

Demographic changes have affected the significance of income substantially. We may see that family income has increased by a certain percentage, for example, but also that the proportion of families in which both spouses earn income outside the home has increased.

Should we consider that a subtraction from the value of the income, in terms of the well-offness it yields, and if so by how much? Should we be comparing today's income, assuming that we have measured it somehow, with the income of some earlier period or with the income that would have resulted from the continuation of a previous trend, which may be taken as a proxy for expectations? The list of such questions is very long. They mean that no single-valued, objective answer can be given to the question whether, or how much, we are better off than we used to be a few years ago, that a large number of variables would have to be considered, and that different people can legitimately give different weights to the different elements in the story and come to different assessments of what has happened.

Our most serious effort to measure relative incomes objectively and precisely is made for the income tax, and this effort illustrates how difficult—indeed, impossible—it is to do that. For the purposes of the income tax, there are thousands of pages of laws, regulations, and judicial decisions devoted to defining "income." But no one thinks that the result is a "true" definition of income. No one thinks that the numbers on line 22,"total income," of the tax form (or should it be line 30,"adjusted gross income," or line 36,"taxable income"?) are an accurate representation of the relative incomes of different taxpayers in any sense that measures their well-offness or ability to pay. The definition of that number is only a convention that legislators, regulators, and courts have agreed upon because they consider it the best they can do and because they have to do something to make the system work. The definition is argued about and complained about constantly and changed from time to time.

The Need to Know More

I do not intend these skeptical remarks to suggest that we should not collect or pay attention to income statistics. I suggest only two lessons. First, we should be exceedingly cautious in drawing conclusions from the existing data. Second, we should try to learn much more about how we and other people live. We should try to build up a richer body of information about the consumption, work, housing, education, family life, health conditions, and so on of the sectors of the American population and of other populations. We will never be able to summarize this information in a single figure to represent how well off we and they are. But it will help us to understand the world we live in and help future generations to understand us. Recognizing how little we know should be a stimulus to finding out more.

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Kuttner

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10 percent—the second decile—by 1988 had lost 8.3 percent of their 1977 income. Families in the bottom decile had lost 15.1 percent of incomes that were already meager.

Given that the income distribution is normally remarkably stable over time, it is an epochal shift when the top one percent gains 36 percent and the bottom 10 percent loses 15 percent in just a decade. Taking a closer look at income distribution by age, the trends are even more disturbing. The greatest falloff has been among younger families, and the decline is even more dramatic among families with children, where expenses are higher and the squeeze on discretionary income greater.

Measured in constant 1987 dollars, median family income among families whose head-of-household was twenty-five to thirty-four years old declined from $30,307 in 1979 to $27,876 in 1986. Middle-aged families about held their own. Families aged fifty-five and older gained, while the youngest households of all (head under age twenty-five) lost the most —a decline from a median income of

$20,380 in 1979 to $15,491 in 1986. The rising prevalence of female-headed households explains some, but not all, of the widening inequality. Even among two-income households, younger families have lost income since the late 1970s. Among families with children where the head-of-household was under age thirty, income has declined in real terms 39.2 percent since its peak in 1973, and nearly all of that decline has occurred since 1979.

Homeownership, a traditional badge of membership in the middle class, has declined slightly for the population, more dramatically for younger families, and most strikingly of all for young families with children. Among families where the head-of-household was thirty-five to thirty-nine, homeownership declined from 70.8 percent in 1980 to 63.8 percent in 1987. Among families where the head-of-household was thirty to thirty-four, it declined from 43.3 percent to 35.9 percent. And among the youngest group, homeownership dropped from 21.3 percent to 16.1 percent. Among renters the rent burden of all married families with children, as a percent of median income, increased from 19 percent in 1974 to 28 percent in 1987. The squeeze on single parents was, of course, worse, but "intact" families with children fell behind, too.

Spreading Family Wealth

I have argued that even these gross statistics understate the seriousness of what is occurring, because they fail to capture the intergenerational wealth that is transferred within families.[1] During the past decade people over fifty-five have generally become better off relative to the rest of the population, thanks to several factors: increasing property wealth, mostly in the form of inflated values of homes acquired cheap; rising real social security benefits; and increasing investment earnings. But old people don't take it with them when they eventually die. For the most part, they leave their money to their children or advance them money while they are still alive.

A $20,000 down payment as the ticket of admission to one's first home may be prohibitive to a young household without family wealth, but it is not so hard to come by if mother and father have enjoyed a $200,000 run-up in the value of the family homestead. The rising cost of college education relative to income (the other great ticket of entry to the middle class), likewise, is less an insuperable barrier than a reflection of the hardening of class lines between the children of haves and the children of have-nots.

I have argued in another article that the hardening of class lines in the 1980s has multiple causes: the stagnation of wage income relative to salary income and income from capital, which in turn reflects industrial restructuring; the decline in the real value of the minimum wage; the weakening of trade unions;[2] the shift to a service economy; the entry of the baby-boom generation; the Reagan economic program, which cut taxes for the rich and transfer payments to the poor; the one-time bull market of the mid-1980s and the high real interest rates, both of which benefit owners of capital whose ownership is highly concentrated. All these things played a part.

The fair question to ask of these numbers is not whether the income distribution has worsened (it undoubtedly has). The real debate is whether most of the phenomenon can be dismissed as the result of one-time demographic factors like the influence of the baby-boom generation on wages; unfortunate social forces such as female-headed households; and misguided government policies (oversubsidizing the affluent old; overtaxing the working young).

I suspect that some of the declining middle can be fairly attributed to all of the above, but that wage and salary income, which accounts for the vast bulk of personal earnings for all but the richest Americans, have also been becoming somewhat more unequal, and that this piece of the problem will not cure itself. As baby boomers have aged, their incomes have not risen nearly as rapidly as their parents' income did when they were the same age, and all of this stagnation is not the result of slower growth generally. Some of it reflects long-term structural shifts in the wage, salary, and wealth distribution of the economy. The shift toward *laissez faire* and away from the mixed economy of the postwar boom era is likely to intensify these trends.

Scholars, whether liberal or conservative, owe it to their colleagues and their conscience to cease their habit of massaging the data until it confirms the desired hypothesis and to dig harder for the uncomfortable truth.

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[1] "The Patrimony Society," *The New Republic*, May 11, 1987.

[2] "The Declining Middle," *The Atlantic*, July 1983.

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Linden

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have lost more jobs in the low-paying textile and apparel industries than in steel and autos combined. Moreover, half of the new jobs were in relatively well-paying occupations, such as technicians, craftsmen, administrators, sales managers, and professionals. Neal Rosenthal of the U.S. Department of Labor conducted an extensive investigation of the changing occupational mix and found no evidence of job-wage polarization.[1]

Precisely how the fortunes of the nation's middle class have changed over the years varies considerably according to which earning brackets are selected to define middle income, which price deflator is used in adjusting for inflation, and which particular years are selected in defining the time interval. But whatever criteria are selected, the middle class is clearly not "disappearing." It has, in fact, been growing, but not as fast as the nation's total household population. Hence, its relative importance has declined. Meanwhile the proportions of homes in both the lower- and the upper-income brackets have grown. Thus, to assess what has happened to the middle class, we must take a closer look at what contributed to the faster growth of the lower- and the upper-income groups.

Explaining the Changes

The upper-income brackets have grown rapidly over the years, as many millions of families moved up from the middle brackets. Contributing significantly to this process was the growing prevalance of working wives. Last year, close to three out of every five wives worked, compared to only two out of five in the early 1970s.

With so many millions of homes moving from the middle to the upper brackets, the pertinent issue then is why so many households have crowded into the lower brackets. Social and demographic developments provide the explanation. With the aging of the baby-boom generation, we experienced a surge in the number of young adults, particularly in the years 1970-1985. That generation has been disposed to relatively late marriage: in 1985 more than 40 percent of all women aged twenty to thirty were still single, compared to only 25 percent in 1970. In that time, the number of U.S. husband-wife families increased by only 12 percent, but the number of single-person households went up an imposing 90 percent.

Thus, of the total increase in the lower-income bracket (those with incomes of $15,000 or less in 1985 dollars) between 1970 and 1985, close to 55 percent was accounted for by single-person households. Further, of the increase in the number of low-income *families*, over 70 percent was accounted for by female family heads, principally mother and child. Thus, demographic changes—the large number of young adults and their decision to marry late—and the rise in divorces and single-parent homes explain the rapid growth in the size of the lower-income brackets.

Similar developments have also contributed to the shift in the personal income distribution. Between 1970 and today, the share of total income accruing to the bottom fifth of the income curve dropped from 5.6 to 4.6 percent. The share available to the top fifth, meanwhile, rose from 40.6 to 43.7 percent. Had this not been the result of extensive social changes, this development would indeed augur badly for our future. But as already noted, the population composition of the lower-income brackets has shifted significantly—particularly the sharp rise in female family heads. The number of husband-wife families grew almost not at all, dropping from slightly more than two-thirds of all families in the lowest income quintile to only a little more than half. The decline in the prevalence of husband-wife families probably explains all of the erosion in the share of income flowing to this income segment.

The composition of the top quintile, meanwhile, changed hardly at all—some 95 percent of the families here continue to be husband-wife units. While slightly over half of all wives in this bracket were working in 1970, the figure had grown to almost 70 percent by 1987, adding substantially to average family income.

Clearly, the concern that structural changes in the economy have polarized income classes—and, by implication, less compassionate public policies—is hardly supported by the evidence. Whatever income polarization there may have been over the past decade and a half was primarily precipitated by shifts in the population age mix and changes in the way we live.

Our immediate future, however, will be markedly different from our recent past. By now, or within the next few years certainly, just about all of the baby-boom generation will finally march to the matrimonial altar. While in the past fifteen years the number of single households grew some seven times faster than the number of husband-wife families, in the next fifteen years married couples will increase a good deal faster than single-person households. With these developments, we can expect a vigorous revival of the middle class and a contracting lower-income bracket.

What the proponents of the income polarization thesis have demonstrated is that single-parent families generally experience financial stress and that two people working generally earn more than one.

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[1] Rosenthal, Neal. "The Shrinking Middle Class: Myth or Reality," *Monthly Labor Review*, March 1985.

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Kosters

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past fifteen years, these supplements have increased faster than wages, rising from less than 13 percent to about 16.5 percent of total hourly pay. Total pay per hour of work has increased gradually, albeit slowly, over the years—by about 12 percent since 1973.

The most commonly cited measure of average hourly wages supports the view that workers have lost ground. These data, however, cover only production workers, who account for only about 60 percent of the work force, and cash wages for salaried workers have increased more rapidly. Moreover, bonuses and lump-sum payments, such as those paid under auto workers' wage agreements, are not included. If these limitations are taken into account, and if consistent measures of price change are used to adjust for inflation, real cash wages have changed little during the past fifteen years. They are now at a level roughly comparable to the peaks they previously reached in 1973 and in 1979, after which they were quickly and substantially eroded by rising inflation.

Although the economic well-being of the typical worker has been rising over time, it has increased less rapidly than it did in the 1950s and 1960s because productivity growth has been slower since the early 1970s. Questions can be raised about whether conventional productivity measures are adequate, especially for the rapidly growing service industries, and thus about whether increases in real income might be understated. But given the measures available, productivity growth has been relatively slow since at least the early 1970s, and because most of the increase that has occurred has been devoted to increased benefits, real hourly cash wages have been quite stagnant.

Real cash incomes of families have increased gradually, however, reaching an all-time high in 1987. Some of this increase is accounted for by more workers per family, and this has led some to argue that women have been forced to work to maintain family living standards. This is belied by the data, however; real median income of husband-wife families in which the husband is the sole earner has exceeded its previous peak since 1986. Many families, including some with two earners, may still feel squeezed, but wives have not been compelled to work to keep family income from falling.

Measuring the Middle

Some critics have argued that many workers are worse off because a disproportionately large share of the growth in employment during the

1980s consisted of low-wage jobs. This argument draws its support in part from the fact that employment growth has been heavily concentrated in industries with relatively low average wages, especially services. One major shortcoming of this argument is that the growth in the importance of services did not begin in the 1980s, or even in the 1970s when the slowdown in productivity growth first became evident. Second, shifts in employment shares among industries by themselves can account for only a negligible share of the decline in measured productivity growth. Third, differences in employment growth trends among industries tell only part of the story; growth in employment has at the same time been heavily concentrated in occupations that pay above-average wages. Finally, despite widespread publicity about low-wage job growth, the evidence from my work and research by others shows that there has not been a disproportionate increase in jobs with either low hourly wages or annual earnings.

The view that the middle class is being undermined by disproportionate growth in low-wage jobs is not supported by the evidence. Although the share of workers in the middle has not changed much either, the share of workers with wages well above the average has increased some at the expense of those in the middle, a tendency that is more pronounced for family incomes than for workers' wages. It might be more appropriate to view this shift as an expansion of the middle class into a higher income range than as middle-class shrinkage.

Although the quality of jobs has not deteriorated for the work force as a whole, some significant changes in wage relationships within the work force did take place over the past twenty years. The central feature behind these changes is the maturation and entry into the work force of the baby-boom generation. The sheer numbers are impressive. During the past ten years, employment rose by more than 20 million workers, following an increase of about 17.5 million during the preceding ten years. By comparison total employment rose by only slightly more than 17 million workers during the entire twenty years from 1947 to 1967.

By the early 1970s the crowding effect of the wave of young people entering the work force began to raise the wage premium paid to older, more experienced workers. This decline in relative wages of young and relatively inexperienced workers was accompanied in the early 1980s by an increase in the wage premium paid to workers with more schooling—a response to more rapid growth of jobs in professional and technical occupations than for production workers. Higher wage premiums for more schooling and work experience have raised the economic returns to both kinds of investments. These shifts in relative wages facilitated creation of enough entry-level jobs to accommodate the surge of young workers and to provide them with work experience that will contribute to higher future earnings.

The change in the age composition of the work force that resulted is illustrated by the growth in the share accounted for by twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-old workers to 30 percent of the adult work force from about 20 percent in the late 1960s. As these young workers gain experience, their earnings can be expected to rise significantly; young male workers earn only about 80 percent of what they make in their peak earnings years (from thirty-five to fifty-four years old), and patterns for females are gradually becoming more like those for males.

Rely on Market Forces?

Reliance on the market provided flexibility for wage adjustments in response to pronounced changes in skill demands and in the age and schooling of workers, and this produced jobs and work experience for young American workers instead of the high unemployment experienced in European economies. The bulge in the share of the work force accounted for by young workers was not accompanied by a corresponding bulge in low-wage jobs, however, partly because relative wages of more experienced workers moved up in response. Moreover, average pay continued rising despite the surge in new entrants that by itself tends to depress it.

A sweeping assessment of twenty-year trends, of course, may obscure the effects on jobs and pay of policies that relied relatively more or less heavily on the market. Examining subperiods is more appropriate for analyzing the effects of policy change. Although some have argued that examination of experience before and after 1979 can provide relevant evidence, this is inadequate from both economic and policy perspectives. From the point of view of the economy, the expansion under way in 1979 produced accelerating double-digit inflation and proved to be unsustainable by 1980—conditions quite different from those in 1986 or 1987. From a policy standpoint, the Reagan administration assumed office in 1981, not 1979. For some policies, such as periodic boosts in the minimum wage, the most recent step came at the beginning of 1981. Some critics of more recent performance have been proponents of such policies, and their presumed favorable effects should accordingly be included in comparisons.

To focus more closely on experience under different policy approaches, I compare some of the most recent data generally available with those for 1977 and 1981, the first years of the Carter and Reagan administrations. The most commonly cited measure of real cash wages, for example, declined by almost one percent between 1981 and 1987—but this compares quite favorably with the 8 percent decline from 1977 to 1981. Total real hourly compensation provides a more realistic measure of pay; after rising less than one percent from 1977 to 1981, it rose by 3.3 percent by 1987.

Family incomes reflect changes in employment conditions in addition to changes in hourly pay for those who are employed. Real incomes for all households declined by 2 percent from 1977 to 1981, and then rose by 9 percent to 1987. It is true that more families now have more than one worker, but for husband-wife families where he is the sole earner, a 3.6 percent decline from 1977 to 1981 was followed by a 7.6 percent increase to 1987. These data are extremely discouraging for those who argue that retreat from the market-oriented policies of the 1980s could improve performance.

Extensive reliance on market forces has produced constructive results in terms of job creation and real wages and incomes. This approach has not only facilitated creation of a large number of jobs well-suited to the needs of the surge of new entrants into the work force during the past twenty years, but it has also provided constructive incentives that reward the acquisition of work experience and the higher levels of schooling that will be essential for a competitive U.S. economy. Moreover, it is difficult to argue on the basis of recent experience that turning away from the reliance that has been placed on the market during the 1980s can be expected to improve performance.

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ate higher wages for most workers, a clear sign of poor economic performance. After taking inflation into account, wages for most workers have fallen in three of the last four years.

Wage Growth

Overall wage and compensation growth since 1979, measured in inflation-adjusted dollars, has been disappointing. At best, hourly compensation (wages and benefits) has risen marginally, averaging just 0.4 percent annually since 1979, a growth rate just one-fourth as fast as in the 1973 to 1979 period. At worst, hourly compensation in 1987 was no higher than in 1979, especially if increased employer and employee social security taxes are not counted as "compensation" increases. When wages alone are examined, matters are worse. For the vast majority of the work force the average wage has fallen by at least 4 percent since 1979 and perhaps as much as 7 percent. Male hourly workers have been hit the hardest, suffering a 9 to 12 percent fall in pay. Wage gains have been the exclusive preserve of salaried, white-collar workers.

Given inferior wage growth, it should not be surprising that most people have seen no increase, or at best a moderate increase, in their standard of living. This can be seen in measures of overall income growth (including wages, interest, government cash benefits, pensions, and rent) per family or person. Official Census figures on family incomes adjusted for inflation show the typical (or median) family in 1987 with just $187 more in income than the typical family in 1979 and with only $33 more than the typical family in 1973. Even using a more conservative (lower) measure of inflation advocated by some economists, one finds only modest income growth, a rise of 2.6 percent, or $763, between 1979 and 1987. This implies a rate of growth just half that achieved between 1973 and 1979. Per capita income, the other major measure of our standard of living, tells the same story. Per capita income growth since 1979 has been one-third less than in the 1973 to 1979 period and one-half less than in the postwar years prior to 1973.

Recent income growth has been especially, and disturbingly, dependent on the increased hours worked by married women. The effect of the increased work effort of wives on income growth is documented in a recent Economic Policy Institute report by Stephen Rose and David Fasenfest. Their study adopts the most conservative methodologies: using experimental CPI inflation measure, adjusting for family size, and incorporating unrelated individuals along with families. Between 1979 and 1987 the number of married couple families with the wife in the labor force grew by 5.7 million, while married couple families where the wife was not in the labor force fell by 1.7 million. This development is important, because nearly three-fourths of the population live in these families. This type of income growth is not without cost: when wives enter the labor force, more expenses (such as child care) are incurred and, in most families, the total workload—both paid and unpaid—of wives dramatically increases. Moreover, this source of income growth has its limits—once both partners are full-time workers there can be no more income growth. Increased incomes based on higher wages rather than more work effort is the only feasible long-term strategy for most families and for the country.

A major reason for increased work by married women is that the average wage of husbands has fallen more than 4 percent since 1979. Partially in response, the average married woman worked 18 percent more hours in 1986 than in 1979: more married women entered the labor force, and others worked more annual hours. Had this increase in work effort not occurred, the bottom 60 percent of the population (with family incomes under $40,000) would have had less income in 1986 than in 1979, and families with incomes between $40,000 and $60,000 would have had their incomes grow by 3 percent rather than 7 percent.

Rich v. Poor

Not everyone has done poorly in recent years. Families with the highest incomes have maintained income growth comparable to that of earlier years. A major reason for this is the high interest rates, relative to inflation, which caused the incomes of the richest 20 percent (who hold most of the financial assets) to rise twice as fast as the average family's income.

The poverty rate, on the other hand, has risen by 25 percent since 1979, adding six million more persons to the poverty population. Half of the increase in poverty has occurred in households headed by men, and two-thirds of the increase in poverty was among whites. Contrary to some new myths about poverty, only one-fifth of the new poverty was in minority, female-headed households. Not only have the poor become more numerous, but they have also grown poorer. In 1987, the average poor family was 10 percent further below the poverty threshold than in 1979.

The prevailing philosophy of the Reagan administration was that poor people had too much money and rich people not enough. Policies were implemented which supplemented ongoing economic changes that work to make the rich richer and the poor poorer. In addition, market forces in this period were unleashed through privatization, reduced government, deregulation, and a free trade philosophy. These policies did not generate the promised investment, savings, or economic growth. As a result, increases in our standard of living have been either modest or nonexistent, and by any measure have been disappointing by historical standards. We need a change in philosophy. ☑

Larry Mishel, research director of the Economic Policy Institute, recently coauthored The State of Working America *with Jacqueline Simon.*

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WHAT THE VOTERS SAID: EXIT POLLS

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ELECTION '88

The House and The Senate

by Stuart Rothenberg

Eight years ago, the voters cast their ballots for change. They gave Ronald Reagan a decisive victory, and they gave the Republicans a thirty-three-seat gain in the House of Representatives plus the twelve Senate seats that put the GOP in control of that chamber. Whether voters were motivated by ideological conservatism or mere disapproval of President Carter, they clearly wanted something different.

This November the voters sent the opposite message. Continuity, not change, was the order of the day. Voters defeated only a handful of representatives and senators who sought reelection, maintaining Democratic control of Congress at the same time that they were providing George Bush with a resounding win in his race for the White House.

But by telling the winners that they want "more of the same," the voters have left it up to each congressman and senator, as well as to the new administration, to decide exactly what "more of the same" is.

The Senate: Winning the Popularity Contest

Historically, incumbents in the Senate are more vulnerable than those in the House. The percentage of representatives winning at least 60 percent of the vote almost always far exceeds the percentage of senators achieving that level of victory, and the overall House reelection rate usually exceeds the Senate rate. While that proved to be the case again in 1988, Senate incumbents demonstrated an unusual ability to hold their seats, and they did so by a greater margin. Twenty-three of the twenty-seven senators seeking reelection (85 percent) won, and in eighteen of thirty-three Senate races (55 percent) the winning candidate drew *at least* 60 percent of the vote (see table 1). That makes the 1980s the first decade in the postwar period when a majority of Senate victors broke the 60 percent barrier.

The drop in Senate race competitiveness in 1988 can be explained by the nature of the elections. Unlike 1978 and 1980 when national events and issues worked against one party and challengers ran strongly ideological campaigns, November's Senate campaigns turned on matters of personality, reputation, and strategy. Naturally, underdogs attacked incumbents' voting records and raised issues. But incumbents generally succeeded in portraying themselves as ideologically centrist, as well as responsive to constituent concerns. Combine that with a strong economy in most states, little public clamoring for change, and an increased understanding about campaign tactics, and you have a prescription for reelecting officeholders.

In three of the Republican Senate seats that fell, the Democrats nominated extremely popular sitting or former governors. At the beginning of the Nevada campaign, for example, about 80 percent of those surveyed had a favorable opinion of Democratic Governor Richard Bryan. Republican Chic Hecht was viewed favorably by just under 60 percent of those polled, a strong showing but one that paled against Bryan's. Similarly, former Governors Chuck Robb in Virginia and Robert Kerrey in Nebraska had high ratings, while their Republican opponents were far weaker. (Ne-

Table 1

SENATE INCUMBENTS REELECTED, DEFEATED, OR RETIRED, 1946-1988

Year	Retired	Total seeking reelection	Defeated in primaries	Defeated in general election	Total reelected	Reelected as percentage of those seeking reelection
1946	9	30	6	7	17	56.7
1948	8	25	2	8	15	60.0
1950	4	32	5	5	22	68.8
1952	4	31	2	9	20	64.5
1954	6	32	2	6	24	75.0
1956	6	29	0	4	25	86.2
1958	6	28	0	10	18	64.3
1960	5	29	0	1	28	96.6
1962	4	35	1	5	29	82.9
1964	2	33	1	4	28	84.8
1966	3	32	3	1	28	87.5
1968	6	28	4	4	20	71.4
1970	4	31	1	6	24	77.4
1972	6	27	2	5	20	74.1
1974	7	27	2	2	23	85.2
1976	8	25	0	9	16	64.0
1978	10	25	3	7	15	60.0
1980	5	29	4	9	16	55.2
1982	3	30	0	2	28	93.3
1984	4	29	0	3	26	89.6
1986	6	28	0	7	21	75.0
1988	6	27	0	4	23	85.1

Source: Data for 1946-1986 reprinted from Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1987-1988* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1987); 1988 data calculated by author.

braska's David Karnes had been appointed senator in 1987, and Virginia GOP nominee Maurice Dawkins was a political unknown who received the nomination when no serious candidate volunteered for the race.)

The two Senate upsets—Democrat Joe Lieberman's defeat of Connecticut's Lowell Weicker and Conrad Burns's victory over Montana incumbent John Melcher—had more to do with the campaign tactics and personalities of the incumbents than with ideology (see sidebar). Both incumbents assumed that they were stronger than they were, and they allowed their opponents to define the nature of the electorate's choice.

By contrast, senators like Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Pete Wilson (R-CA) recognized they were threatened and throughout the summer and fall sought to make their opponents the issue. Even before the Ohio race began in earnest, Metzenbaum used some leaked National Republican Senatorial Committee research to inoculate voters against charges from challenger George Voinovich. In California Pete Wilson answered Democrat Leo McCarthy's charge that he was a "country club Republican" by pointing out that it was McCarthy who owned a condominium on a posh country club golf course. Lautenberg waited until somewhat later to answer his opponent's charges, but he successfully undercut Republican Pete Dawkins's attacks by mining doubts about the challenger's veracity.

Tactically, Metzenbaum and Wilson may have run the best Senate races in the country. Their attacks kept their opponents on the defensive, allowing the incumbents to dictate the pace and issues of the campaign. Metzenbaum successfully portrayed himself as a populist rather than a liberal, and Wilson cut into the California Democratic base by reaching out to the state's Jewish, Hollywood, and gay communities.

While the Democrats have reason to be pleased that they added one more seat to their majority in a year when they held eighteen of the thirty-three seats up for election, the party failed to meet early expectations. One year before the election, three Republican Senate seats—Virginia, Nebraska, and Nevada—seemed all but lost as strong Democratic candidates built up early decisive polling leads. Republican incumbents in Minnesota, Rhode Island, California, and Washington all looked shaky at best. Democratic vulnerabilities were much rarer, with open seats in Florida and Mississippi, and arguably strong Republican challengers in Ohio and New Jersey topping the list of GOP opportunities. All in all, Republican losses of two or three seats seemed assured, and some partisans were concerned about even larger losses if the president's popularity did not return or if the economy began to stagger. The Democrats, everyone agreed, had recruited an exceptionally strong class of candidates.

Ultimately, the Republicans were able to minimize their losses because incumbents from both parties solidified their standings through strong campaigns and because two Republican Senate candidates, Trent Lott in Mississippi and Connie Mack in Florida, did something that southern Republicans have traditionally had trouble doing—defeat politically attractive Democrats.

The House: Hardly a Ripple

For the first time since 1960 and only the third time in the last eleven elections, the party that won the White House lost seats in the House of Representatives. But that was about the only change on November 8.

Of the 409 incumbent representatives who sought reelection, 402 were returned for another term, making it two consecutive elections that the House reelection rate exceeded 98 percent. Only nine congressional districts changed party control, with the Democrats netting three seats. If those figures don't yet convince you of the power of incumbency, consider this: 306 candidates—over 70 percent of the House—won with *more than 65 percent of the vote*, while a mere forty-nine incumbents (including two who were elected in special elections during 1988 and therefore could not use all of the benefits of the office) were held to under 60 percent of the vote (see table 2).

Five of the six losing incumbents had serious ethics problems, while the sixth was charged by his opponent with being touched by local party corruption. Georgia Republican Pat Swindall was under indictment, Florida Democrat Bill Chappell, Jr. was under a cloud from the Pentagon procurement scandal, and New York Republican Joseph DioGuardi was on the defensive for allegedly accepting illegal campaign contributions. The Justice Department found "substantial evidence of serious and sustained misconduct" by Rhode Island Democrat Fernand St. Germain, and Texas Republican Mac Sweeney had received bad press over the years for allegedly using congressional staffers on his campaign and for misstating his background.

Of course, a weak economy in Texas did not help Sweeney, and DioGuardi's district is a competitive one anyway, but most, if not all, of these incumbents would have been reelected without the appearance of wrongdoing and the negative media coverage that accompanied it.

Not all incumbents under a cloud were defeated. Maryland Democrat Roy Dyson was also touched by the Pentagon procurement scandal, as well as bad publicity about his top aide. Dyson narrowly beat his opponent, a college guidance counselor and house painter, by 1,500 votes. Also victorious was California Democrat Jim Bates, who was charged by newspapers with making sexual advances toward female staffers.

If there is a message in this year's House results, it is that incumbents are almost assured of reelection unless they are about to go to prison or look as if they

LESSONS FROM THE BIG UPSETS OF 1988

When the 1987-1988 election cycle began more than two years ago, few political handicappers thought that Republican Sen. Lowell Weicker of Connecticut and Democratic Sen. John Melcher of Montana would be forcibly retired by the voters. Weicker, finishing his third term, had a close call in 1982 against Rep. Toby Moffett, but the liberal Republican's strong appeal to Democrats seemed to make him invincible. Melcher, first elected in 1976, has been criticized by both the left and the right during his two terms, but he ran two strong campaigns and seemed secure in a state that had not sent a Republican to the Senate since 1946.

Both Weicker and Melcher lost, proving once again that campaigns *do* matter and that incumbents who don't engage their opponents early and often frequently find themselves with political headaches on election night.

Weicker chose to ignore his opponent, Connecticut Attorney General Joe Lieberman, throughout most of the campaign. Lieberman media attacked Weicker on taxes, social security, and other issues during the fall, but the Republican did not respond. Weicker finally answered back only after being hurt by a series of Lieberman spots that depicted Weicker as a growling bear holed up in his den. (Even then, Weicker had let the ads go unanswered for two weeks.) Weicker ultimately attacked Lieberman's veracity and record (particularly on taxes) as a state legislator, but by that time the months of unanswered attacks had cut the incumbent's fifteen-point lead to zero. Still, the Republican's response was effective. Weicker jumped back up to a ten-point lead, though he remained well under 50 percent in a hypothetical ballot test with Lieberman. Apparently sensing victory, Weicker pulled his negative commercials and returned to the same positive media that had gotten him in trouble earlier. Lieberman, on the other hand, combined positive spots with a new commercial that contrasted their positions on taxes and attendance.

While Connecticut voters respected Weicker and clearly liked his political independence, they never had affection for him—the sort of reservoir of personal attachment that could have helped him weather charges that he thought more about his image than about his constituents. "Weicker's loss," argues Lieberman pollster Stanley Greenberg, "proves that if you don't stay in touch back home, and you become too taken with national issues and yourself, you end up paying the price."

In Montana challenger Conrad Burns attacked Melcher's record early during the campaign, and Melcher responded immediately by challenging the Republican's truthfulness and charging that outsiders were trying to defeat him. But in September and October, with polls showing the Democrat twenty points ahead, Melcher altered his strategy and ignored Burns. Burns, a county commissioner and former farm broadcaster, continued to attack Melcher's record as too liberal, tying him to Dukakis. The challenger charged that Melcher's proposed wilderness legislation would not create the jobs that the senator claimed, and President Reagan's veto of the bill made Melcher seem ineffective.

Like Weicker, Melcher had developed a reputation in Washington as someone difficult to get along with. Back in the state, however, he was generally popular, though the voters did not have a strong commitment to him. Republican polling in July 1987 showed that 70 percent of those polled viewed Melcher favorably, while only 19 percent had an unfavorable view of him. But at the same time only 37 percent said he should be reelected, while 42 percent preferred someone new. Three weeks before Election Day Melcher's favorable to unfavorable ratings were 67 to 26 percent, and a majority of those polled said he should be reelected. Those are excellent numbers and suggest that Melcher should have been reelected easily.

Republican attacks on the incumbent during October made Melcher look less attractive. Just a few days before the election, Melcher's favorable rating had dropped to 52 percent, and a plurality opposed his reelection. As the race drew to a close, Melcher ran a hard-hitting commercial attacking Burns. But it was too little, too late. While the Republicans relied on a strong statewide organization that made late-breaking decisions, Melcher's Montana political operation was amateurish. In the end Melcher's complacency cost him the election. "If Melcher had worked at driving our negatives up the way we drove his up, he would have won," maintains a GOP insider familiar with the race.

S. R.

Table 2

HOUSE ELECTIONS WON WITH 60 PERCENT, 1956-1988

Year	Number of incumbents running in general election	Percentage of incumbents reelected with at least 60 percent of the major party vote
1956	403	59.1
1958	390	63.1
1960	400	58.9
1962	376	63.6
1964	388	58.5
1966	401	67.7
1968	397	72.2
1970	389	77.3
1972	373	77.8
1974	383	66.4
1976	381	71.9
1978	377	78.0
1980	392	72.9
1982	383	68.9
1984	406	74.6
1986	391	86.4
1988	408	87.9

Source: Data for 1956-1986 reprinted from Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1987-1988* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1987); 1988 data calculated by author.

should go to prison. Only a few incumbents not embroiled in legal problems had difficult races, and all of them emerged victorious, however narrowly. An astounding seventy incumbents[1] (17 percent of all representatives seeking reelection) did not have major party opposition in November. Members of the House are now less vulnerable politically than members of the Soviet Politburo.

Short Coattails

The 1988 elections once again demonstrate how difficult it is to prove that presidential coattails exist. George Bush ran substantially ahead of twenty-three GOP Senate candidates, behind ten, and virtually even with two. His victories in Maine, Maryland, and Michigan had no effect on GOP Senate hopefuls, all of whom were crushed. Bush probably helped Connie Mack in Florida and Trent Lott in Mississippi, though it is probably incorrect to talk of coattails in those states. In addition Michael Dukakis's campaign almost certainly hurt Democrat Richard Bryan against Chic Hecht in Nevada, although Bryan did win.

Lott, running a populist campaign, annihilated opponent Wayne Dowdy among white conservative swing voters. Dowdy was a "good ole boy" Democrat who would have won in a nonpresidential year, but he lost the whites who voted Democratic in 1986. Mack made his Senate race a statewide version of the presidential contest, and his political advertising tried to link Democratic Senate candidate Buddy MacKay to Dukakis in the minds of the voters. The results in both states strongly suggest that in the South, at least, the presidential race said something to swing voters about the makeup of the two parties, and that message worked to the detriment of Dowdy and MacKay.

In Montana and Wyoming, two states where local economic problems helped challengers, coattails may have existed but cannot be documented. Republicans Bush, Senate challenger Conrad Burns, and gubernatorial candidate Stan Stephens each carried Montana with a nearly identical vote total (189,000 votes), suggesting that voters were making a general statement about the parties. But in fact Burns and Stephens put together slightly different coalitions, and Burns's campaign—not Bush's appeal—was decisive in the Senate race.

Wyoming Republican Sen. Malcolm Wallop surely survived because of the general Republican nature of the state, but it is impossible to credit a particular portion of his vote to George Bush at the top of the ticket.

In House races Bush's strong national showing, combined with high incumbent reelection rates, makes an argument about coattails implausible. If coattails had been significant, Republican congressional candidates in places like North Carolina, Texas, and Indiana would have done better than they did.

The Outlook for 1990 and Beyond

George Bush's victory in November was good news for the Republican party and the thousands of job-seekers who hope to find wealth and happiness in the administration, but it is a serious blow to Republican prospects for increasing the party's representation in Congress.

In the House individual representatives have learned the tricks of reelection—keep in touch with the folks back home, provide good constituent services, avoid addressing controversial issues (and when that's impossible, vote on both sides of the question), raise a huge campaign war chest, and stay out of jail.

Money, of course, has become a major advantage of incumbents. According to mid-October Federal Election Commission (FEC) figures, forty of the top fifty candidates in terms of campaign receipts were incumbents, while only two were challengers running against sitting representatives. Many incumbents no longer wait for a serious challenge before accumulating an intimidating war chest. The same FEC data show that thirty-eight congressmen had over $400,000 on hand three weeks before the election, even though none of them faced serious electoral threats.

Still, the advantages of incumbency usually cannot completely insulate a representative from dramatic changes in the national mood. Indeed, with incumbency's increased advantages, sitting representatives are vulnerable primarily to major swings in the electorate, as occurred in 1974, 1980, and 1982. But even that possibility does not help the GOP in the near future.

If history is any guide, the Republican party will be on the defensive in 1990. Only once since the Civil War has the party holding the White House gained seats in

(*Continued on page 59*)

ELECTION '88

Registration and Turnout

by Ruy A. Teixeira

The 1988 votes are in, and two things stand out: (1) the Republicans won the presidency yet again, albeit by a more modest margin than in 1984; and (2) voter turnout continued its post-1960 downward trend. At just about one-half of the voting-age population (VAP), the 1988 turnout is the lowest since 1924 and dips below a low turnout mark set by the 1948 Dewey-Truman election.

The votes had barely been counted before we heard a familiar refrain from the losing side: "If only turnout had not been so low, if only more people had been registered, if only more blacks/Hispanics/poor people had voted—then we could have won the election." To the extent this claim is believed, it suggests a Democratic strategy focused on "more of the same, but more voters." The other interpretation of the election assumes that the Democrats lost because people didn't support them, so a different sort of politics is in order. A lot rests on which version of recent events is the accurate one.

If Only More Blacks and Hispanics Had Voted. . .

We know that overall turnout in November was about 50 percent. That figure is easily arrived at by dividing the number of votes cast by the VAP. The turnout of different groups *within* the population is more difficult. Election officials do not count "black votes" and "white votes" and "rich votes" and "poor votes"; they count "votes." This makes it impossible to calculate black turnout or white turnout, for example, in a straightforward way.

Exit poll data, though, make it possible to calculate indirect estimates of these different turnout rates. First, we assume that the demographics of a given exit poll reflect the demographics of actual voters (10 percent black, 85 percent white, for example). Then, based on the overall number of votes cast, we infer the number of actual voters who were black, white, and so on. This can be compared to the size of these groups in the voting-age population to derive specific group turnout rates.

This procedure and final exit poll data from the CBS News/*New York Times* survey allows us to estimate 1988 turnout rates by race and by different income groups in the population. Whites had the highest estimated turnout at about 52 percent, while blacks were at 46 percent, and Hispanics at 23 percent. It is worth noting that this black-white turnout differential of six points is no larger than the black-white differential in the 1984 election, and in fact, closely approximates it.

The high turnout groups were those with $25,000 or more in family income: 64 percent for those with between $25,000 and $35,000; and 57 percent each for those with between $35,000 and $50,000 and those with over $50,000 in family income. The low turnout groups were those with under $25,000 in family income: 46 percent for those with between $12,500 and $25,000 and only 31 percent for "the poor," those with under $12,500 in family income.

Thus, there appear to have been substantial turnout differentials between different races and income groups in the 1988 election. It should be emphasized that these estimates are based on a highly imperfect procedure that is subject to a number of sources of error (especially sampling error), and that these results cannot be regarded as definitive. The definitive results are not available until the Census Bureau releases results from its November survey. This said, it is still the best, and virtually the only, procedure we have to compare the turnout rates of different groups immediately after an election.

Assuming for the moment that these estimated differences in turnout are close to the real differences, it would appear that the "if only" analysts have a case. There *were* substantial differences in turnout between different racial and income groups, with the low turnout groups tending to be the ones that voted heavily Democratic. Blacks, for example, voted about 85 percent for Dukakis, while Hispanics cast 69 percent of their ballots for Dukakis, and the poor, 62 percent (the next lowest income group split about evenly between Bush and Dukakis).

The real question, however, is how many additional votes the Democrats would have gained if these groups had voted in larger numbers. It is necessary to look at race and income separately because of the considerable overlap between the poor and blacks/Hispanics. The net Democratic gain is shown below under three different higher turnout scenarios: (1) if black and Hispanic turnout had each been the same as that of the general population; (2) if black and Hispanic turnout had each matched white turnout; and (3) if black and Hispanic turnout had each been *higher* than white turnout by ten percentage points.

Table 1
NET DEMOCRATIC GAIN FROM INCREASED BLACK AND HISPANIC TURNOUT

	Blacks	**Hispanics**
Matching turnout in general population	610,000	1,396,000
Matching turnout among whites	862,000	1,483,000
Exceeding white turnout by 10 points	2,349,000	1,991,000

Source: Author's estimates based on final 1988 CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll data and Census Bureau's *Projections of the Population of Voting Age, for States: November 1988* (Series P-25, No. 1019).

If black turnout had matched turnout in the general population, the Democrats would have netted about 610,000 additional votes. If black turnout had matched that of whites, the net Democratic gain would have been about 862,000 votes. And if black turnout had somehow been ten points higher than whites, the Democratic gain would have amounted to about 2,349,000 votes.

Dukakis lost the election by over 6,900,000 votes, which means that even if blacks had turned out in much larger numbers than they did or even much larger numbers than they are ever likely to, Dukakis still would have lost. This suggests that Dukakis's problem was not turnout but his overall level of support among the population.

This story is borne out by the figures for Hispanics. If Hispanic turnout had matched turnout among the general population, the net gain for the Democrats would have been about 1,396,000 votes. If Hispanic turnout had matched that of whites, the Democrats would have netted 1,483,000 votes. Finally, under the unlikely scenario that Hispanic turnout exceeded white turnout by ten points, the Democrats would have gained 1,991,000 votes. (These estimates are probably high since they are based on a turnout gap between Hispanics and other races that is inflated by the large number of Hispanic aliens. If only citizen-eligible Hispanics were taken into account, the turnout gap would be much smaller and so would the effects of closing that gap.)

Hispanics could not have won the election for Michael Dukakis either. In fact, if both Hispanics *and* blacks had voted at rates ten points higher than whites, the overall net gain for the Democrats, 4,340,000 votes, would still have fallen far short of the number Dukakis needed for victory.

Class and the 1988 Election

It could still be argued that the Democratic turnout problem was not so much a race problem as a class problem. Only an estimated 31 percent of poor people voted in the 1988 election. But they voted for the Democratic ticket at a 62 percent rate, the only income group that voted solidly Democratic (partially a reflection of the large number of blacks and Hispanics included in this category). What if the poor had turned out at higher levels? Specifically, what if poor people's turnout had followed these three scenarios: (1) poor turnout matched turnout in the general population; (2) poor turnout matched turnout among the "rich," those with $50,000 or more in family income; and (3) poor turnout actually exceeded turnout among the rich by ten points.

The net gain for the Democrats under these scenarios appears in table 2. If turnout among the poor had been 50 percent, the same as among the general population, the Democrats would have netted about 1,898,000 voters. If poor turnout had matched rich turnout, the net gain would have been 2,566,000 votes. Finally, if the poor had managed to turn out at a level ten points higher than the rich, the Democrats would have gained about 3,549,000 voters. This is still far short of the 6,900,000 needed to overtake the Republicans.

Once again the results are clear. Even if poor people had turned out at much higher rates, Michael Dukakis would still have lost the 1988 election. Some

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ELECTION '88

WHERE DO THESE NUMBERS COME FROM?: VOTE COUNTS

by Evans Witt

More than 90 million Americans dutifully trooped to the polls November 8 to select their leaders. Later that day the nation found out who had won. Millions of votes for thousands of offices cast in thousands of church basements and school gymnasiums all wound up on TV screens in a matter of a few hours. This is a remarkable feat, and one that would never happen if we had to rely on the government.

The government does count the votes on Election Day, and it does figure out who won—eventually. By mid-December, to be exact. Hundreds of thousands of workers and volunteers count the votes at the precinct or county level. A government official can tell you how many votes Bush and Dukakis received in Polk County, Tennessee, for example.

But no state official tallied the presidential vote total for Tennessee on November 8. Nor did any federal official tally the national presidential vote total that week or the next or even the next.

You see, the government counts the vote—but it doesn't add the numbers up.

It is the news media that collect all the vote totals from precincts and counties and add them up for a national presidential total—as well as state totals on statewide races and legislative contests in most states.

In a handful of states—such as California and Kentucky—the state governments add up votes on election night. But for most states it is only the news media who are adding up the numbers quickly. Of course, every state eventually produces an official count of the votes. But it takes them a month or more.

The media's massive and expensive vote-counting takes place at two levels. At the national level it is the News Election Service that adds up the votes nationally for president, Senate, House, and governor. This largely anonymous organization was set up in the 1960s by the three television networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC—and the two wire services—the Associated Press and United Press International—to add up the votes in those major races.

This unique cooperative effort of competitive news organizations brought order out of the chaos of vote tallying in the 1960s, when the television networks first began pouring millions of dollars into election night coverage. The five news organizations all tallied the vote independently then, creating enormous duplication at tremendous cost—not to mention slightly different vote totals.

NES operates most of the time with just a few employees. But on a presidential election night, its staff balloons to more than 100,000—most of them stringers stationed at over half of the 185,000 precincts across the nation and at county election boards calling in vote tallies to central reception centers. Those centers—four scattered across the country—are manned by hundreds of telephone clerks and data entry operators madly inputting the votes from around the nation.

A central computer in New York City adds all the numbers up and feeds them at very high speed to computers at the networks and the wire services. From there the numbers go out to the nation. Those numbers flashing up on the television screens come from NES.

State Results

But NES covers only a small fraction of the races across the country. And state governments are no better at adding up their state legislative races than they are at the presidential contest.

At the state level this task falls to the Associated Press, the larger of the two wire services. UPI, after years of financial troubles, has not made a major national vote tallying effort as the AP has.

Counting the votes outside of NES had been a slapdash operation in many states, with various news organizations forming short-term cooperatives—called "pools"—to gather the votes, add them up, and distribute them in some way. These pools varied from sophisticated computer operations to a bunch of adding machines with vote totals being written on a blackboard.

In 1985 the AP developed a computer system to add up all the votes in one or several states and churn out tables of votes ready for the newspaper or the television screen. Twenty-five computers are now installed in forty states.

The system is mostly a county-based one, with stringers in every county calling in election-night totals to the AP bureau in the state. There, telephone clerks and data entry operators push the numbers into the computer, while staffers are writing the breaking story of the election developments. In addition these regional AP computers also receive a computer feed of NES vote totals, providing for consistent numbers nationwide.

The AP also operates a national election computer system in New York, linked to all the state systems as well as NES. In the event of an NES problem or computer failure, the AP state and national computers can step in to provide vote returns to a waiting nation.

Having the news media play a role in tabulating election returns has an enormous benefit for our democracy. Unlike Mexico or the Philippines or many other countries, the politicians on the ballot don't control the vote tabulation in the country. The media serve a crucial role in ensuring fair returns on a national scale, a role no party or candidate can manipulate. ☑

Evans Witt is a political writer and director of election planning for the Associated Press.

ELECTION '88

REFERENDUMS

by Austin Ranney

I have written brief summaries for *Public Opinion* on initiatives and referendums in the American states in every even-numbered election year since 1978. But 1988 was different—not because of anything that happened nationally, but because I voted in California and found out what true democracy (or, as old-fashioned political scientists used to call it, the "long ballot") is *really* like.

On November 8, I, like every Berkeley voter, was called upon to vote on twenty-nine state propositions (we had already voted on twelve propositions in June), five Alameda County propositions, and eight city propositions. But that was not all: I was also asked to make choices for president, U.S. senator, U.S. representative, state senator, state representative, and a number of county and city offices. In the manner of political scientists of my generation, I made a simple count and found that I had a grand total of *sixty-one* decisions to make! Moreover, according to California law, no voter is allowed to stay in the voting booth for longer than ten minutes; but that law may have to be amended if direct legislation in California continues to metastasize.

That is how things were in Berkeley in 1988. How were they in the nation? Forty-one states had at least one initiative or referendum measure on their ballots, and in all a total of 230 propositions were voted on (two fewer states but four more propositions than in 1986). As usual most of the propositions were measures (mostly constitutional amendments) put before the voters by the state legislatures. Fifty-four, however, were on the ballots because of petitions signed by the voters.

Fifty-four propositions in twenty-seven states seem to me the most interesting for a national audience, and I shall concentrate on them here. The average turnout on these propositions was 48.3 percent of the persons of voting age, which was only slightly below the national turnout in the presidential election. The high-turnout championship of 1988 was won by Minnesota, where 65.1 percent of the age-eligible population cast votes on the question whether the legislature should be permitted to establish a state lottery (59 percent voted "yes"). Georgia had the nation's lowest turnout, 31.3 percent, on a proposition to authorize the legislature to compensate crime victims (58 percent voted "yes").

The list of fifty-four propositions appended shows that in 1988 as in the days of the great "Tax Revolt" of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the issues most often raised concerned the power of state and local governments to impose new taxes, increase rates of existing taxes, or incur debt; but in 1988 such measures won only in Missouri and Nevada, and lost in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, South Dakota, and Utah (3 propositions). Several other issues made repeat appearances: a proposition to prohibit the funding of abortions by state funds narrowly won in Arkansas, but similar measures lost by wider margins in Colorado and Michigan. Four states, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, and Minnesota, all voted to allow the establishment of state lotteries.

Three more states, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, followed California's lead in declaring English to be their official language. In 1988 California may have taken yet another lead in what may come to be called the "Insurance Revolt" by considering no fewer than five propositions regulating the conditions and rates of automobile insurance and limiting the size of awards and lawyers' contingency fees in personal injury cases. The insurance industry took a major beating: despite its heavy advertising campaigns, all the propositions it favored lost, and two requiring rate reductions won. California also provided strong support for the generalization, advanced by most political science professors and rejected by most political science students, that money is not an absolute weapon in politics and that outspending one's opponent even by a huge margin is no guarantee of victory: Proposition 99 proposed to raise the cigarette tax by 25 cents a pack, the tobacco industry spent more than ten times the amount on its television campaign attacking the measure than its supporters (notably Ralph Nader) spent supporting it, and yet the proposition won with 58 percent of the votes.

One other proposition attracted considerable national attention: the triumph of Maryland's proposition to prohibit the manufacture and sale of certain handguns, which won by 58 percent, constituted the first statewide victory for the gun-control movement and the first major defeat for the National Rifle Association.

A few other propositions deserve at least brief mention. One especially watched by members of the Pac Ten athletic conference was the proposal in Oregon to increase the taxes on malt beverages by 10 cents per gallon and dedicate the proceeds to improving the sports programs at the state's institutions of higher learning; it lost, with 63 percent saying "no." Fifty-three percent of Oregon voters voted to *revoke* the governor's order banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in executive branch employment.

Finally, what was the liberal-conservative scorecard in 1988? Each time I prepare one of these initiative and referendum reviews, I decide that those categories fit so few of the propositions unambiguously that I will drop the scorecard once and for all; but each time the editors persuade me that it is valid and useful enough that I should repeat it. I suppose this year is no exception, so, for whatever it is worth, it seems to me that in 1988 thirty-five issues could be coded as "conservative wins" or "liberal wins," and the scorecard is given in the box at the end. I note in conclusion that the 1988 score was eighteen for the conservative side and seventeen for the liberals. ☑

I am grateful to Christopher Holmes and Graham Hueber for their assistance in compiling these data.

Austin Ranney is an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

RL: referred by legislature
I: initiative

Government/Political Reform

☑ **Arkansas** (I) Require lobbyists to register and to disclose their activities and their gifts to public officials

Yes	427,972	62.3%
No	258,674	37.3%
	686,646	Turnout = 39.0%

☑ **Iowa** (RL) Allow governor and lieutenant governor to run as a team

Yes	541,645	66.6%
No	271,331	33.4%
	812,976	Turnout = 25.7%

☑ **Kansas** (RL) Require legislature to reapportion general assembly seats after each census

Yes	451,818	63.4%
No	260,567	36.6%
	712,385	Turnout = 38.9%

☑ **South Dakota** (RL) Repeal present requirement that petitions for popular initiatives must be certified by legislature before votes can be conducted

Yes	152,893	52.2%
No	139,942	47.8%
	292,835	Turnout = 57.5%

☑ **Hawaii** (RL) Allow high school students to serve as nonvoting member of state board of education

Yes	212,174	67.1%
No	103,961	32.9%
	316,135	Turnout = 38.4%

Public Morality

☑ **Arkansas** (I) Ban use of state funds for abortions except to save mother's life

Yes	397,971	51.9%
No	368,053	48.1%
	766,024	Turnout = 43.5%

☒ **Colorado** (I) Prohibit state from using public funds for abortions

Yes	534,070	39.8%
No	809,078	61.2%
	1,343,148	Turnout = 54.0%

☒ **Michigan** (I) Restrict use of state funds for abortions for women receiving public assistance

Yes	1,481,459	43.2%
No	1,950,955	56.8%
	3,432,414	Turnout = 50.5%

☑ **Idaho** (RL) Create state lottery

Yes	212,877	51.8%
No	198,062	48.2%
	410,939	Turnout = 58.6%

☑ **Indiana** (RL) Remove constitutional ban against state lottery

Yes	1,123,911	62.3%
No	679,911	37.7%
	1,803,822	Turnout = 44.3%

☑ **Kentucky** (RL) Establish state lottery

Yes	692,977	60.9%
No	446,354	39.1%
	1,139,331	Turnout = 41.5%

☑ **Minnesota** (RL) Permit a state lottery

Yes	1,214,032	59.0%
No	843,307	41.0%
	2,057,339	Turnout = 65.1%

☒ **Massachusetts** (I) Impose regulations to protect farm animals from inhumane treatment

Yes	713,989	28.6%
No	1,781,172	71.4%
	2,495,161	Turnout = 55.0%

☑ **Nebraska** (RL) Allow race tracks to show races from other states on closed-circuit TV and accept parimutuel wagering on them

Yes	256,847	67.7%
No	152,692	32.3%
	409,539	Turnout = 35.1%

☑ **Virginia** (RL) Allow parimutuel betting on horse races

Yes	1,086,996	55.9%
No	858,850	44.1%
	1,945,846	Turnout = 42.8%

Taxes and Expenditures

☒ **Arizona** (I) Place limits on local governments' debts

Yes	452,446	44.1%
No	573,259	55.9%
	1,025,705	Turnout = 39.4%

☒ **Arkansas** (I) Repeal personal property tax on household goods, require 60% majority in legislative or referendum vote on any proposal for tax increase

Yes	284,344	37.6%
No	471,903	62.4%
	756,247	Turnout = 42.9%

☑ **California** (I) Raise cigarette tax 25 cents per pack

Yes	5,268,983	57.8%
No	3,839,259	42.2%
	9,108,242	Turnout = 43.6%

☒ **Colorado** (I) Require popular consent for all tax increases of more than 1%

Yes	567,884	42.2%
No	778,975	57.8%
	1,346,859	Turnout = 54.1%

☒ **Missouri** (RL) Impose new earning tax to finance medical insurance program to cover working poor, uninsured, and catastrophic illness

Yes	549,451	28.7%
No	1,367,974	71.3%
	1,917,425	Turnout = 50.2%

☑ **Nevada** (I) Prohibit state personal income tax

Yes	276,976	82.2%
No	59,803	17.8%
	336,779	Turnout = 43.2%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Increase tax on malt beverages by 10 cents per gallon, proceeds to go to sports programs at state colleges

Yes	449,797	37.2%
No	759,360	62.8%
	1,209,157	Turnout = 58.9%

☒ **South Dakota** (I) Limit property tax to 2.5% of 1984 true value

Yes	116,115	38.7%
No	183,723	61.3%
	299,838	Turnout = 58.9%

☒ **Utah** (I) Allow income tax credit for private school tuition

Yes	290,193	40.0%
No	439,090	60.0%
	729,283	Turnout = 67.6%

(I) Limit property taxes

Yes	242,883	38.6%
No	386,098	61.4%
	628,981	Turnout = 58.3%

(I) Reduce rates of state income, sales, and other taxes

Yes	239,284	38.0%
No	390,627	62.0%
	629,911	Turnout = 58.4%

Environment

☒ **Montana** (I) Require refundable deposits on beverage containers

Yes	78,509	21.4%
No	287,461	78.6%
	365,970	Turnout = 62.4%

Crime

☑ **Georgia** (RL) Authorize legislature to compensate victims of crime

Yes	840,266	57.6%
No	618,716	42.4%
	1,458,982	Turnout = 31.3%

☑ **Oklahoma** (RL) Increase power of judges to deny bail if accused is deemed a threat to security

Yes	935,168	84.4%
No	172,675	15.6%
	1,107,843	Turnout = 46.1%

☑ **Oregon** (I) Require certain repeat felony offenders to serve full sentences without parole or other reduction

Yes	947,805	78.9%
No	252,985	21.1%
	1,200,790	Turnout = 58.5%

☑ **Rhode Island** (RL) Expand list of drug offenses for which judges can deny bail

Yes	211,865	71.2%
No	85,849	28.8%
	297,714	Turnout = 39.0%

☑ **Utah** (RL) Allow judge to refuse to set bail if he/she considers accused person dangerous or likely to flee

Yes	470,519	77.0%
No	140,296	23.0%
	610,815	Turnout = 56.7%

Civil Liberties/ Civil Rights

☑ **Arizona** (I) Make English the official state language

Yes	577,698	50.5%
No	566,939	49.5%
	1,144,637	Turnout = 43.9%

☑ **Colorado** (I) Declare English to be the official state language

Yes	829,617	61.1%
No	527,053	38.9%
	1,356,670	Turnout = 54.5%

☑ **Florida** (RL) Make English the official state language

Yes	3,457,039	83.9%
No	664,861	16.1%
	4,121,900	Turnout = 42.9%

☑ **Maine** (R) Authorize $70,000 to rewrite state Constitution in gender-neutral language

Yes	292,335	55.7%
No	232,456	44.3%
	524,791	Turnout = 58.8%

☒ **California** (I) Require doctors, blood banks, and others to report people carrying AIDS virus to local health officers; restricts confidential testing

Yes	3,027,119	34.3%
No	5,786,664	65.7%
	8,813,783	Turnout = 42.2%

☑ **California** (I) Allow testing for AIDS without consent

Yes	5,431,189	62.3%
No	3,289,373	37.7%
	8,720,562	Turnout = 41.8%

☑ **Oregon** (I) Overturn governor's executive order prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals

Yes	626,751	52.7%
No	561,355	47.3%
	1,188,106	Turnout = 57.9%

Regulation

☒ **California** (I) Require 20% good driver auto insurance discount

Yes	3,649,381	41.0%
No	5,250,998	59.0%
	8,900,379	Turnout = 42.6%

☒ **California** (I) Limit pain and suffering awards in car accidents

Yes	1,161,440	13.3%
No	7,583,729	86.7%
	8,745,169	Turnout = 41.9%

☑ **California** (I) Require rate reduction for all property and casual insurance by minimum of 20%

Yes	4,580,818	51.1%
No	4,376,916	48.9%
	8,957,734	Turnout = 42.9%

☒ **California** (I) Establish "no fault" car insurance and curb future rate regulations

Yes	2,253,691	25.3%
No	6,641,051	74.7%
	8,394,742	Turnout = 42.6%

☒ **California** (I) Limit lawyers' contingency fees in injury awards

Yes	4,039,697	46.7%
No	4,607,842	53.2%
	8,647,539	Turnout = 41.4%

☒ **Florida** (RL) Limit to $100,000 civil damages for such economic losses as pain and mental anguish

Yes	1,837,041	43.4%
No	2,394,932	56.6%
	4,231,973	Turnout = 44.0%

☑ **Maryland** (I) Prohibit manufacture and sale of certain handguns, establish commission to determine which guns will be prohibited

Yes	880,255	58.0%
No	637,459	4[illegible].0%
	1,517,714	Turnout = 43.5%

☒ **Massachusetts** (I) Repeal law requiring state and local governments to pay union wage rates on public projects

Yes	1,063,324	41.8%
No	1,479,319	58.2%
	2,542,643	Turnout = 56.1%

☒ **Montana** (I) Repeal compulsory seat belt law

Yes	155,481	42.4%
No	211,098	57.6%
	366,579	Turnout = 62.6%

☑ **Nebraska** (I) Guarantee people's right to keep arms, prohibit towns from banning handguns

Yes	346,601	63.9%
No	195,766	36.1%
	542,367	Turnout = 46.5%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Expand no-smoking laws to cover workplaces and public buildings

Yes	480,147	39.4%
No	737,779	60.6%
	1,217,926	Turnout = 59.4%

☒ **Oregon** (RL) Require safety belt use by motor vehicle drivers, and passengers over 16

Yes	528,324	43.5%
No	684,747	56.5%
	1,213,071	Turnout = 59.1%

☒ **California** (I) Create public corporation to fund emergency food, shelter, other services for hungry and homeless and to fund low-income housing

Yes	3,870,882	45.2%
No	4,[illegible]9,046	54.8%
	8,559,928	Turnout = 41.0%

Nuclear Power

☒ **Massachusetts** (RL) Stop electric power generation by commercial nuclear power plants that produce waste

Yes	770,800	32.1%
No	1,626,402	67.9%
	2,397,202	Turnout = 52.9%

☒ **Nebraska** (I) Allow state to withdraw from 5-state compact for coordinating facilities for radioactive waste; require voter approval of proposed sites for waste facilities

Yes	154,484	35.1%
No	286,068	64.9%
	440,552	Turnout = 37.7%

CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL SCORECARD, 1988

Issue Category	*Conservative Wins*	*Liberal Wins*
Govt. Political Reform		HI, KS, SD
Public Morality	AR, MA	CO, MI
Taxes/Expenditures	MO, NV	AZ, AR, CA, CO, SD, UT (3)
Environment	MT	
Crime	OK, OR, RI, UT	
Civil Liberties	AZ, CO, FL, CA, OR	ME, CA
Regulation	CA, NE	MA, MD
Nuclear Power	MA, NE	
TOTAL WINS	18	17

ELECTION '88

MEDIA COVERAGE

by S. Robert Lichter, Daniel Amundson, and Richard E. Noyes

If George Bush won the election, it must be the media's fault. That's the conventional wisdom that has poured forth from op-ed pieces, news talk shows, and "news analysis" articles ever since Election Day. TV news, we are told, was seduced by Bush speechwriter Peggy Noonan's sound bites, manipulated by media strategist Roger Ailes's photo-ops and attack ads, and shunted away from serious reporting by its own fascination with the horse race. Ever since the polls closed, the campaign has been depicted as a shallow and superficial process that manipulated, misinformed, and misled the electorate, an affair as nasty and brutish as life in Hobbes's state of nature (though not, alas, as short).

In a *New York Times* op-ed column, former network correspondent Marvin Kalb charged that television news was "so preoccupied with photo opportunities and sound bites, so manipulated by media experts, so driven by polls that it lost sight of its journalistic responsibilities. . . ." As a result "the overall tone of the coverage was shallow and distinctly timid." The bottom line: "TV news made no sustained effort to challenge (Bush). . . ."

Under the headline "How the Media Blew It," *Newsweek* complained about the heavy horse-race coverage and "the decision of reporters to censor themselves" from criticizing Bush. Meanwhile, another *New York Times* op-ed piece, by writer Mark Crispin Miller, complained of "TV's antiliberal bias." According to Miller, "Coverage of Dan Quayle was chilled," "Bush's background, too, was sanitized," and "reporters (bent) over backwards not to seem at all critical of Republicans." Finally, in a speech to his peers at the Washington Journalism Center, *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis cited numerous "press failures in the campaign," among them a "fascination with. . .process, not substance" and an "inability to deal with lies" coming from the Bush campaign.

These postmortems seem to be dissecting a different campaign from the one monitored by the Center for Media and Public Affairs this year. After analyzing all 735 general election stories that appeared on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news from August 19 through November 7, we found that the networks' coverage was notable for its balance, toughness, and focus on the issues—precisely the opposite of the critics' charges.

The charge of "horse racism" is a hardy perennial, but its bloom may finally be fading. In their study of television's 1984 general election coverage, Maura Clancey and Michael Robinson noted a shift away from the usual prevalence of horse-race stories. The new beneficiary of media attention was not policy issues ("enduring disputes about how *government* should behave") but campaign issues ("short-term concerns about how *candidates* or their *campaigns* should behave").[1] As table 1 shows, 1988 coverage was cast in the same mold. Campaign issues like disputes over Dan Quayle's National Guard service, negative ads, and mudslinging barely edged out discussions of strategy and tactics as the most frequent topic of campaign news. Policy issues came in third, and horse-race news ran a distant fourth.

In fact the general election witnessed a dramatic reversal of the primary season in this regard. Throughout the primary campaign, over twice as many stories focused on the candidates' positioning for the nomination as their issue positions. This fall that ratio was nearly reversed, with 282 stories on policy issues and

Table 1

TOP TEN STORY TOPICS

			Number of Stories
Campaign issues	339	The debates	103
Strategy and tactics	338	Vice presidential choices	23
Policy issues	282	Media coverage	22
Horse race	168	Past campaigns	20
The electorate	108	Reagan's role	18

only 168 on the horse race. As table 2 indicates, crime, defense, and the economy were each covered in over 100 stories. Between forty and eighty stories apiece dealt with unemployment, drugs, taxes, the environment, education, and the budget deficit. (Many stories covered more than one issue.)

Table 2

TOP TEN POLICY ISSUES

			Number of Stories
Crime	142	Taxes	70
Defense	121	Environment	54
The economy	121	Education	46
Unemployment	77	Budget deficit	45
Drugs	74		

Critics of this year's horse-race coverage usually focus on the profusion of poll reports, many of them commissioned by the networks themselves. The real issue here is the propriety of such coverage, not its preponderance. The horse-race coverage was heavily poll driven, but the polls didn't drive the issues off the air.

A Supine Press?

The other major complaint is that the networks let Bush and his image makers make patsies out of them. This passivity in the face of Republican skills at media manipulation allegedly gave Bush free rein to get his chosen message out each day. Thus, Kalb bitingly termed Roger Ailes a "de facto producer of the evening news," and *Newsweek* called for a return to "the days when reporters and editors picked the sound bites."

Table 3

GOOD PRESS

	Bush	Dukakis	Number of Sources
Source			
All sources	34	34	1137
Partisans	32	35	795
Nonpartisan	38	31	342
Networks			
ABC	34	36	372
CBS	30	33	414
NBC	37	32	345
Topic			
Issues	31	27	221
Job performance	22	32	168
Candidate performance	34	36	418
Character	43	45	18
Time period			
Post convention (8/19-8/28)	75	26	78
Pre first debate (8/29-9/25)	23	28	288
Between debates (9/26-10/13)	28	31	216
Post second debate (10/14-11/7)	36	40	555

Note: Data based on clearly positive or negative source evaluations on ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly newscasts 8/19-11/7/88.

Once again, it is hard to square this portrayal with the data presented in table 3. This fall 1,137 judgments from all sources were aired on the personal character, public records, campaign styles, issue stands, or other attributes of George Bush and Michael Dukakis. The result was mainly bad news for both men. Negative judgments outweighed positive ones by the same two-to-one margin (66 to 34 percent) for both candidates. Even the number of evaluations was virtually identical —564 for Bush and 573 for Dukakis.

Media criticism outweighed praise by roughly the same two-to-one margin among both partisan sources (the candidates and their supporters) and nonpartisan ones (reporters, pundits, and ordinary voters) on all three networks, and on the major dimensions along which the candidates were evaluated—their issue stands, records in office, and performance on the campaign trail.

So Bush was *not* allowed to deliver his sound bites without challenge. On November 4, for example, he attacked Dukakis for financial mismanagement, while holding up a *Boston Herald* headline that read, "What a Mess!" CBS's Eric Engberg identified the *Herald* as a "pro-Bush Boston tabloid" and commented tartly, "Bush, without taking note of the fact that the federal deficit is now $155 billion, *acted* like an outraged prosecutor." Engberg closed by noting that the Bush campaign had "trotted out" some Massachusetts Republicans who said "with straight faces" that the vice president was surprised at this state of affairs.

Bush may have gotten the sound bite he wanted that night, but the *story* was about the act he was putting on, and the tone was one of unmistakable sarcasm. Similarly, in his September 15 report about an earlier Bush attack on the "Massachusetts miracle," ABC's Brit Hume commented acidly, "Bush says he wants a kinder, gentler America, but there's nothing kind or gentle about the way he's campaigning."

CBS's reporting was even more aggressive on September 16. After Bush claimed that Massachusetts had lost thousands of jobs, Engberg stated flatly, "Wrong!" He then rebutted Bush point by point. On October 19, ABC's Richard Threlkeld performed a similar vivisection on Bush's notorious "tank" ad that painted Dukakis as dovish on defense. Such stories could hardly have done more to inoculate viewers against the candidate's intended message.

Of course Dukakis didn't fare any better. The airwaves were increasingly filled with complaints about his dullness, arrogance, and disorganized campaign techniques. For every story that protested Bush's newfound pugnacity, another ripped Dukakis's ineptitude as a counterpuncher. On November 6, NBC's Tom Pettit summed up one line of criticism: "While Bush was burning up the campaign trail, Dukakis was fiddling with state functions." After a shot of Dukakis posing with children (and looking distinctly unpresidential), Pettit noted sarcastically, "Remember, this is

(*Continued on page 52*)

THE 1988 ELECTION RESULTS



	Democratic	Republican
1932	57%	40%
1936	61	37
1940	55	45
1944	53	46
1948	50	45
1952	44	55
1956	42	57
1960	50	50
1964	61	39
1968	43	43
1972	38	61
1976	50	48
1980	41	51
1984	41	59
1988	46	54

COMING FROM BEHIND

The Truman Comeback

		Dewey	Truman	Difference (D-T)	Gap
Gallup	Late August	49%	36%	− 13	
	Final Result	45.1	49.5	+ 4.4	17.4

The Bush Comeback

		Bush	Dukakis	Difference (B-D)	Gap
Gallup	Late July	37%	54%	− 17	
	Final Result	54	46	+ 8	25

Source: 1932–1984, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. 1988, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, November 12, 1988, p. 3246.

THE SENATE



	1932	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58	60	62	64	66	68	70	72	74	76	78	80	82	84	86	88
Democratic	63%	72%	79%	72%	68%	60%	58%	47%	56%	51%	49%	50%	51%	65%	65%	67%	68%	64%	57%	54%	56%	60%	61%	58%	46%	46%	47%	55%	55%
Republican	36	26	16	24	29	39	40	53	44	49	50	49	49	35	35	33	32	36	43	44	42	37	38	41	53	54	53	45	45

Note: In 1987 Gov. Kay Orr appointed David Karnes (R) to replace Ed Zorinsky (D) who had died. The 1988 campaign began with the Republicans holding 46 seats, the Democrats 54.

Source: For 1932 to 1986, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* for 1988; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, November 12, 1988, p. 3239.

* = incumbents

	WINNERS	LOSERS	
81%	Mitchell (D-ME)*	Wyman (R-ME)	19%
79%	Matsunaga (D-HI)*	Hustace (R-HI)	21%
71%	Robb (D-VA)	Dawkins (R-VA)	29%
69%	Jeffords (R-VT)	Gray (D-VT)	31%
68%	Hatch (R-UT)*	Moss (D-UT)	32%
68%	Danforth (R-MO)*	Nixon (D-MO)	32%
68%	Lugar (R-IN)*	Wickes (D-IN)	32%
67%	Moynihan (D-NY)*	McMillan (R-NY)	32%
67%	Heinz (R-PA)*	Vignola (D-PA)	33%
66%	Kennedy (D-MA)*	Malone (R-MA)	34%
66%	Sasser (D-TN)*	Andersen (R-TN)	34%
65%	Byrd (D-WV)*	Wolfe (R-WV)	35%
63%	Bingaman (D-NM)*	Valentine (R-NM)	37%
62%	Roth (R-DE)*	Woo (D-DE)	38%
62%	Sarbanes (D-MD)*	Keyes (R-MD)	38%
61%	Riegle (D-MI)*	Dunn (R-MI)	39%
60%	Burdick (D-ND)*	Strinden (R-ND)	40%
60%	Bentsen (D-TX)*	Boulter (R-TX)	40%
58%	DeConcini (D-AZ)*	DeGreen (R-AZ)	42%
57%	Durenberger (R-MN)*	Humphrey (D-MN)	41%
57%	Kerrey (D-NE)	Karnes (R-NE)*	42%
57%	Metzenbaum (D-OH)*	Voinovich (R-OH)	43%
54%	Wilson (R-CA)*	McCarthy (D-CA)	46%
54%	Lautenberg (D-NJ)*	Dawkins (R-NJ)	46%
54%	Chafee (R-RI)*	Licht (D-RI)	46%
53%	Lott (R-MS)	Dowdy (D-MS)	47%
52%	Burns (R-MT)	Melcher (D-MT)*	48%
52%	Kohl (D-WI)	Engeleiter (R-WI)	48%
51%	Bryan (D-NV)	Hecht (R-NV)*	47%
51%	Gorton (R-WA)	Lowry (D-WA)	49%
50%	Lieberman (D-CT)	Weicker (R-CT)*	50%
50%	Mack (R-FL)	MacKay (D-FL)	50%
50%	Wallop (R-WY)*	Vinich (D-WY)	50%

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



	1932	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58	60	62	64	66	68	70	72	74	76	78	80	82	84	86	88
Democratic	55%	54%	56%	49%	51%	46%	51%	44%	52%	49%	50%	53%	51%	56%	54%	52%	57%	51%	50%	53%	52%	58%	56%	54%	50%	55%	50%	53%	**53%**
Republican	41	42	40	47	46	51	47	53	46	49	49	47	49	43	45	47	42	48	48	45	46	41	42	45	48	45	50	47	**47**

Source: 1932–1970, *Historical Abstract of the U.S.: Colonial Times to 1970* Part 2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975), p. 1084. 1972–1984, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. 1988, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports.

Competitiveness of the U.S. House of Representatives' Districts

	1960		1980		1988	
	Number of districts in which winner's margin is:	Percent of all districts in which winner's margin is:	Number of districts in which winner's margin is:	Percent of all districts in which winner's margin is:	Number of districts in which winner's margin is:	Percent of all districts in which winner's margin is:
Winner is Unopposed	54	12.4%	27	06.2%	57	13.1%
75-99%	43	09.9	94	21.6	91	20.9
70-74%	27	06.2	64	14.7	94	21.6
65-69%	49	11.3	60	13.8	62	14.3
60-64%	59	13.6	50	11.5	66	15.2
55-59%	112	25.7	61	14.0	36	08.3
52-54%	56	12.9	39	09.0	17	03.9
51% or less	35	08.0	40	10.0	12	02.8

Percent of House Incumbents Seeking Reelection 1946-1988 Who Were Reelected

1946	82.4%
1948	79.3
1950	90.5
1952	91.0
1954	93.1
1956	94.6
1958	89.9
1960	92.6
1962	91.5
1964	86.6
1966	88.1
1968	96.8
1970	94.5
1972	93.6
1974	87.7
1976	95.8
1978	93.7
1980	90.7
1982	90.1
1984	95.4
1986	98.0
1988	98.3

The Exit Poll Results

CBS News/*New York Times* 1976

Question: In the presidential election, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 15,199 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*NYT*, November 2, 1976.

CBS News/*New York Times* 1980

Question: In the presidential election, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 12,782 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*NYT*, November 4, 1980.

CBS News/*New York Times* 1984

Question: In the presidential election, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 8,671 voters as they left voting booths. The survey was not conducted in the states of Washington, Alaska or Hawaii. Someone else/No vote for president (both 1% or less) calculated out for comparison purposes.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*NYT*, November 6, 1984.

CBS News/*New York Times* 1988

Question: In the presidential election, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 11,645 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*NYT*, November 8, 1988.

ABC News/*Washington Post* 1988

Question: For whom did you vote for president?

	Dukakis/Bentsen (National = 46%)	Bush/Quayle (National = 54%)
By party:		
Democratic = 44%	84%	16%
Republican = 36%	8%	92%
Independent = 18%	46%	54%
By political philosophy:		
Liberal = 27%	86%	14%
In between = 32%	58%	42%
Conservative = 41%	18%	82%
By sex:		
Male = 47%	45%	55%
Female = 53%	53%	47%
By race:		
White = 86%	44%	56%
Black = 8%	91%	9%
Hispanic = 3%	70%	30%
By union household:		
Union = 10%	65%	35%
Nonunion = 90%	44%	56%
By region:		
East = 26%	51%	49%
Midwest = 25%	46%	54%
South = 30%	40%	60%
West = 19%	50%	50%
By income:		
Under $5,000 = 6%	69%	31%
$5,001 – $9,999 = 7%	62%	38%
$10,000–$19,999 = 16%	46%	54%
$20,000–$29,999 = 19%	51%	49%
$30,000–$39,999 = 18%	46%	54%
$40,000–$49,999 = 13%	42%	58%
$50,000 and over = 21%	41%	59%
By age:		
18–24 years = 10%	51%	49%
25–29 years = 12%	45%	55%
30–39 years = 27%	49%	51%
40–49 years = 20%	49%	51%
50–59 years = 14%	47%	53%
60 years and over = 17%	52%	48%

Note: Sample size = 23,030 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 8, 1988.

NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* 1988

Question: For whom did you just vote in the presidential election?

	Dukakis/Bentsen (National = 46%)	Bush/Quayle (National = 54%)
By party:		
Democratic = 37%	86%	14%
Republican = 33%	7%	93%
Independent = 23%	42%	58%
By political philosophy:		
Liberal = 21%	80%	20%
Moderate = 31%	54%	46%
Conservative = 36%	21%	79%
By sex:		
Male = 49%	45%	55%
Female = 51%	52%	48%
By race:		
White = 85%	43%	57%
Black = 9%	89%	11%
Hispanic = 4%	69%	31%
By union household:		
Union = 26%	59%	41%
Nonunion = 72%	44%	56%
By region:		
East	NA	
Midwest	NA	
South	NA	
West	NA	
By income:		
Less than $20,000 = 21%	58%	42%
$20,000–$49,999 = 52%	47%	53%
$50,000 and over = 23%	41%	59%
By age:		
18–24 years old = 10%	51%	49%
25–49 years old = 35%	49%	51%
50–64 years old = 20%	48%	52%
65 years and over = 12%	47%	53%

Note: Sample size = 11,703 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, November 8, 1988.

Los Angeles Times 1988

Question: In the presidential election, whom did you just vote for?

	Dukakis/Bentsen (National = 46%)	Bush/Quayle (National = 54%)
By party:		
Democratic = 30%	90%	10%
Republican = 31%	5%	95%
Independent = 37%	43%	57%
By political philosophy:		
Liberal = 24%	82%	18%
Moderate = 37%	43%	57%
Conservative = 39%	18%	82%
By sex:		
Male = 50%	41%	59%
Female = 50%	51%	49%
By race:		
White = 85%	42%	58%
Black = 8%	89%	11%
Hispanic = 4%	62%	38%
By union household:		
Union = 31%	56%	44%
Nonunion = 69%	40%	60%
By region:		
East = 25%	54%	46%
South = 28%	41%	59%
Midwest = 30%	47%	53%
West = 17%	44%	56%
By income:		
Under $10,000 = 10%	66%	34%
$10,000–$19,999 = 17%	54%	46%
$20,000–$29,999 = 21%	48%	52%
$30,000–$39,999 = 20%	39%	61%
Over $40,000 = 32%	37%	63%
By age:		
18–24 years old = 11%	44%	56%
25–29 years old = 12%	45%	55%
30–39 years old = 23%	47%	53%
40–49 years old = 19%	44%	56%
50–59 years old = 12%	42%	58%
60 and over = 23%	48%	52%

Note: Sample size = 6,043 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by Cable News Network/*Los Angeles Times*, November 8, 1988.

Decision Time

TICKET SPLITTING

Question: How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?



Note: The response categories varied slightly over the years. "Other" excluded - 2% or less each year.
Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies, latest that of 1984.

Question: When did you decide for sure which presidential candidate you would vote for?



Note: 11,645 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 8, 1988.

Question: Who did you vote for in the election for president? Who did you vote for in the election for the House of Representatives in Washington?

	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Democrat for president/ Democrat for Congress	45%	59%	40%	31%	42%	34%	36%
Democrat for president/ Republican for Congress	4	9	7	5	9	8	6
Republican for president/ Democrat for Congress	10	6	11	25	16	20	20
Republican for president/ Republican for Congress	41	26	42	40	34	38	39

Note: Figures are based on contested and uncontested races.

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies, latest that of 1984.



Note: Voters as they left voting booths. Someone else, No opinion, and No House vote are calculated out.

Patterns in Group Voting

Age

Vote for president/Historical trend



Vote for House of Representatives



Party identification



Sex

Vote for president/Historical trend



Vote for president, 1988



Vote for House of Representatives



Religion

Vote for president



Vote for president/Historical trend



Vote for House of Representatives



Party identification



Occupation/Union Membership

Vote for president



Vote for president/Historical trend



Vote for House of Representatives



Party identification



Ethnicity

Vote for president/Historical trend



Vote for House of Representatives



Party Identification





Worth Noting

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Question: Which of these two statements comes closer to your own views?



Note: 23,030 voters as they left voting booths. There were substantial differences by subgroups. For example, men preferred the Reagan direction by 57%, women preferred change by 52%.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 8, 1988.

ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS

Question: Are you better or worse off financially than you were eight years ago when Reagan took office?



Note: 23,030 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 8, 1988.

READ OUR LIPS

Question: Do you think it will be necessary for the next president to increase federal taxes to help reduce the federal budget deficit?



Note: 11,703 voters as they left voting booths.

In a CBS News/*New York Times* survey conducted November 10-16, 1988, 66% of respondents thought George Bush would "ask Congress to increase taxes in the next four years." Twenty percent said he would not. In another question, 31% said he "should ask Congress to increase taxes in the next four years," 64% said he should not.
Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, November 8, 1988.

CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS AND ISSUE STANDS

Question: Please put a checkmark next to the *one* characteristic below which *best* describes why you voted for your presidential candidate:

Characteristic that best describes why you voted the way you did

What Republicans said		What Democrats said	
Experience	46%	Cares about people like me	26%
Strong leader	15	Strong leader	14
Has good judgment	12	Has good judgment	14
Has vision for the future	6	Has vision for the future	12
Cares about people like me	5	Experience	10
Is honest	2	Is honest	6
Can be trusted in a crisis	2	Can get things done	3
Can get things done	1	Can be trusted in a crisis	2

Question: Please put a checkmark next to the *one* issue where you *most* liked the stand of the presidential candidate you voted for:

Issue stand that you liked most about your candidate

What Republicans said		What Democrats said	
National defense	27%	Problems of the poor	20%
		Health care	
National economy	19	Federal Budget deficit	10
Taxes	15	National economy	16
Foreign affairs	9	Taxes	8
Federal budget deficit	5	National defense	7
Crime	5	Creating jobs	7
Health care	4	Crime	4
Creating jobs	3		
Problems of the poor	2	Foreign affairs	3

Note: 23,030 voters as they left the voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 8, 1988.

THE SOUTH AND THE NATION

Historical Trend
Party Identification

Southern Whites	**D**	**R**
1937	78%	16%
1940	79	11
1944	75	17
1948	67	20
1952	69	14
1956	60	25
1960	56	21
1964	50	17
1968	40	22
1972	35	26
1976	51	19
1980	43	28
1984	37	29
1988	46	27

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 8-June 27, 1988.

Historical Trend Presidential vote
Southern Whites

	D	**R**
1976	47%	53%
1980	35	62
1984	28	72
1988	33	66

Source: CBS News/*NYT*, latest that of November 8, 1988.

Southern blacks	91% D	8% R
Nonsouthern blacks	86	12
Southern whites	33	66
Nonsouthern whites	45	54

Source: ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 8, 1988.

Presidential Vote
Selected Groups

Southern whites by age:

	D	**R**
18-24	30%	70%
25-29	27	72
30-39	32	67
40-49	31	68
50-59	33	66
60 +	40	60

Southern white Protestants:

	27%	72%

GENDER DIFFERENCES 1988

Presidential vote

HS grads — Male			HS grads — Female			Gap
47% D	52% B	+ 5	49% D	50% B	+ 1	4
Post grads — Male			Post grads — Female			
43% D	56% B	+13	59% D	40% B	−19	32

1988 PRESIDENTIAL VOTES SELECTED GROUPS BY INCOME

	Whites		Blacks		Jews		Asians		Hispanics	
Less than $30,000	46%D	53%B	90%D	8%B	70%D	28%B	46%D	51%B	70%D	30%B
$30,000-49,999	38	61	86	13	67	32	50	50	61	38
$50,000 and over	35	64	81	17	70	29	31	66	56	41
National	41	58	88	10	69	30	43	55	66	33

Note: 23,030 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 8, 1988.

SATISFACTION WITH THE CAMPAIGN AND ITS COVERAGE

Question: During this campaign, did you feel you learned enough about the candidates and the issues to make an informed choice between Bush and Dukakis, or did you find it difficult to choose because you felt you did not learn enough from the campaign?



Question: If you were the editor of your local newspaper four years from now, would you increase, decrease, or devote the same amount of space to coverage of the presidential campaign? How about the amount of space devoted to state and local campaigns? Would you increase it, decrease it, or leave it about the same?

The presidential race would be . . .



State and local races would be . . .



Question: Now that the campaign is over, how satisfied were you with the choice of presidential candidates? Would you say that you were very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all?



Question: As you may know, news people were conducting polls on Election Day by interviewing voters as they were leaving the polling place. *Before you voted*, did you hear the results of any of these polls?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, November 9-10, 1988

REAGAN AND HIS



PREDECESSORS



REAGAN AND HIS



PREDECESSORS



CLOSING THE BOOK ON THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of president) is handling his job as president?

Approval

	Truman (4/45)	Eisenhower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)	Reagan (1/81)
Month took office	—	—	—	—	59%	71%	—	51%
After 1st month	—	68%	—	79%	61	50	71%	55
After 2nd month	—	59	73%	80	63	55	72	60
After 3rd month	87%	74	83	75	61	48	63	67
After 4th month	—	74	76	73	65	42	64	68
After 5th month	—	—	74	77	63	39	63	58
After 6th month	—	71	71	75	65	39	67	60
After 7th month	75	—	73	74	62	37	66	60
After 8th month	—	75	75	—	58	39	59	52
After 9th month	—	65	76	—	56	51	51	56
After 10th month	63	—	77	—	68	52	56	54
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57	49
After 12th month	50	68	77	69	61	46	52	47
After 13th month	—	71	78	69	56	47	50	47
After 14th month	—	68	79	71	53	44	48	46
After 15th month	43	—	77	—	56	41	41	44
After 16th month	—	64	73	69	59	39	43	45
After 17th month	—	61	71	67	55	46	42	44
After 18th month	32	—	69	64	55	48	39	41
After 19th month	—	71	66	70	56	50	43	42
After 20th month	—	65	67	69	—	48	48	42
After 21st month	35	64	62	65	58	47	49	42
After 22nd month	48	57	—	65	57	45	50	43
After 23rd month	60	63	74	63	52	—	51	41
After 24th month	—	69	76	64	56	—	43	35
After 25th month	—	71	70	63	50	—	37	40
After 26th month	54	66	67	61	50	—	42	41
After 27th month	—	68	66	56	50	—	40	41
After 28th month	—	69	64	57	49	53	32	46
After 29th month	55	—	61	54	48	—	29	47
After 30th month	—	72	61	51	50	—	29	42
After 31st month	—	71	63	48	49	—	32	43
After 32nd month	—	—	56	56	—	—	30	48
After 33rd month	—	—	58	47	52	—	31	46
After 34th month	—	77	58	46	49	—	38	53
After 35th month	—	75	—	44	50	—	54	54
After 36th month	36	77	—	49	50	—	58	55
After 37th month	—	76	—	44	52	—	55	55
After 38th month	39	72	—	46	53	—	39	54
After 39th month	—	69	—	45	—	—	39	52
After 40th month	—	—	—	45	62	—	38	54
After 41st month	—	—	—	49	57	—	31	54
After 42nd month	—	69	—	45	—	—	21	52
After 43rd month	—	67	—	51	—	—	32	54
After 44th month	—	—	—	47	—	—	—	57
After 45th month	69	—	—	39	—	—	—	58
After 46th month	—	75	—	38	62	—	—	61
After 47th month	57	79	—	38	59	—	34	59
After 48th month	—	73	—	42	67	—	—	64

	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Ford	Carter	Reagan
After 49th month	—	72	—	46	65	—	—	60
After 50th month	57	72	—	49	—	—	—	56
After 51st month	—	67	—	41	48	—	—	52
After 52nd month	—	62	—	—	44	—	—	55
After 53rd month	51	—	—	50	44	—	—	58
After 54th month	—	63	—	41	39	—	—	63
After 55th month	—	—	—	43	36	—	—	65
After 56th month	—	59	—	40	33	—	—	60
After 57th month	45	57	—	35	27	—	—	63
After 58th month	—	—	—	—	27	—	—	65
After 59th month	—	—	—	42	29	—	—	63
After 60th month	—	58	—	43	26	—	—	64
After 61st month	37	54	—	44	27	—	—	—
After 62nd month	37	50	—	59	26	—	—	63
After 63rd month	46	54	—	—	26	—	—	62
After 64th month	43	53	—	—	26	—	—	68
After 65th month	—	54	—	—	25	—	—	64
After 66th month	39	52	—	—	24	—	—	63
After 67th month	—	56	—	—	24	—	—	—
After 68th month	—	54	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 69th month	36	58	—	—	—	—	—	63
After 70th month	26	52	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 71st month	—	57	—	—	—	—	—	48
After 72nd month	28	57	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 73rd month	24	59	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 74th month	25	58	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 75th month	29	62	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 76th month	31	60	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 77th month	32	60	—	—	—	—	—	53
After 78th month	29	61	—	—	—	—	—	51
After 79th month	23	66	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 80th month	—	66	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 81st month	25	66	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 82nd month	—	64	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 83rd month	—	76	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 84th month	—	66	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 85th month	28	64	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 86th month	32	64	—	—	—	—	—	50
After 87th month	—	65	—	—	—	—	—	50
After 88th month	—	65	—	—	—	—	—	48
After 89th month	—	57	—	—	—	—	—	51
After 90th month	32	63	—	—	—	—	—	51
After 91st month	—	61	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 92nd month	31	65	—	—	—	—	—	53
After 93rd month	—	58	—	—	—	—	—	54
After 94th month	—	59	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 95th month	—	59	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 96th month	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Note: In months in which more than one approval poll was conducted, the last results of the month are presented.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 25-October 1, 1988.

An UnRuly House: A Republican View

by Richard B. Cheney

One day during the last Congress, about six or seven months ago, a member of the Democratic leadership approached me on the House floor to say he hoped we could work together to help restore a greater spirit of comity to the U.S. House of Representatives. I hope that we can. But before a real change can occur, we need to be clear about what the problem is.

We Republicans have been complaining for some time about the way the Democrats run the House. Our complaints often are dismissed as being just sour grapes. I have to acknowledge, they must often sound that way. We usually complain about procedures after we lose a vote we consider important for its substance. To people outside Congress the rules produce big yawns: it is the substance that matters. It takes a sustained effort to make people see the connection. Sometimes we succeed. One good example was when the House Republican leadership collectively spoke for one hour and a half last May 24th to show that our grievances were not isolated examples, but represented an underlying pattern.[1]

What we need to do next is explain why this pattern is, or should be, disturbing. The beginning of the bicentennial Congress is a good time to draw out these larger implications. I shall begin this article by reviewing some specific examples from the last Congress to show why we Republicans were upset. The next section will use quantitative data to show the underlying pattern. Third will be a historically based statement of principles that I believe ought to guide judgments about congressional procedure. Fourth, and finally, will be suggestions for breaking the pattern and improving the performance of Congress.

Two Days in One

Perhaps the single most glaring example of how the arrogance of power can work occurred on October 29, 1987—a day the Republicans still call "Black Thursday." Ten days earlier the Dow Jones Industrial Average had dropped more than 500 points. House and Senate leaders from both parties began meeting with the administration almost immediately to see if they could work out a bipartisan deficit-reduction package to help restore confidence in the financial markets. In the middle of the negotiations, Speaker Jim Wright tried to strengthen his bargaining position by scheduling a vote on an omnibus budget-reconciliation bill favored by House Democrats.

Reconciliation bills are supposed to control excess spending. This bill was loaded with special-interest, pork-barrel projects for leading House Democrats, as well as a pay raise for Congress, and a tax increase. All of this was to be protected by a "closed rule" that prohibited any floor amendments to the bill, casting everything in terms of a single up or down vote. Anyone who wanted a pay raise, or any of the supporters of the bill's embarrassing spending provisions, would not have to worry about how the vote would look to the voters back home: the closed rule would protect them from being held accountable.

Then, to top it off, the rule contained nine different "self-executing" provisions, provisions that amend the underlying legislation upon adoption of the rule, without needing a separate vote. Included in the self-executing provisions was a massive $6 billion welfare-reform package that was not available for members to see until 10:00 o'clock the morning of the 29th. House and Senate committee members had been working for months on a major revision of the welfare system. Now the House was being asked to adopt the most expensive version of welfare reform that was under consideration, and to do so without amendment, without debate, and without even a separate vote.

This was just too much for the House to swallow whole. The rule was defeated 203 to 217, as all 169 Republicans were joined by 48 Democrats in opposition. Then matters turned even worse. Bob Michel, the minority leader, took the floor immediately after the vote to plead with the speaker to let the issue sit for a while to give the bipartisan negotiating team a chance to come up with an overall budget compromise. The request was unusual; the response was even more so. Speaker Wright, in essence, told the minority leader where to get off. He announced that the Rules Committee would meet in a special session immediately to report a new rule for the same reconciliation bill, without welfare reform attached.

Under the standing rules, the House is not supposed to bring up a Rules Committee report on the same day it is issued unless two-thirds of the members agree to do so. But the speaker decided to treat the standing rules as if they were made to be broken. The Rules Committee reported a new rule for the reconciliation bill within minutes. The speaker then adjourned the House for the day, reconvened it fifteen minutes later, and declared the new session to be a new "legislative day." This fiction of turning one day into two allowed him to bring reconciliation back to the floor for a second time on the 29th. But making two days out of

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A Democrat Responds

one still was not enough to get this bill through. When the fifteen minutes allowed for a roll call had elapsed, the vote stood at 205 to 206 against final passage. This was a major embarrassment to the speaker, so he held the vote open, came down from the chair, and began working the floor—trying to find one Democrat who would switch from no to yes. After about ten minutes, no one had switched. There seemed to be nothing left for the speaker to do. He returned to the chair, picked up the gavel, and announced that all time had expired. Just then, freshman Democrat Jim Chapman from Texas was brought back onto the floor by one of the speaker's aides. Chapman indicated that he was changing his vote. The speaker immediately brought down his gavel and announced that the bill had passed, 206 to 205.

It is hard to see what the speaker achieved with this legerdemain. With bipartisan negotiations going on at the same time, it was premature to bring reconciliation to the House floor at all. Even from the speaker's point of view, I cannot understand why he held such an exercise without being confident of the vote in advance. Having lost once, he still could have saved face by accepting Bob Michel's olive branch. Instead, he escalated the cost, making it necessary to take ever more partisan steps to avoid embarrassment. The narrow "victory" gained him nothing in the ongoing negotiations; the way he won it produced long-term resentment that has yet to be overcome.

Patterns of Abuse

Black Thursday was an extreme but far from isolated example. At the beginning of last year's second session of the 100th Congress, the speaker hosted a lunch in Bob Michel's honor to mend fences. He pledged cooperation in the coming year, and everyone left hoping a new leaf had been turned. The first test came over aid to the Nicaraguan resistance, the Contras. The president's request for military aid was defeated on February 3 by a narrow 211 to 219 margin. The speaker had opposed the president and secured his victory by promising that members would be able to vote for a purely humanitarian aid package within a few weeks. Michel then approached the speaker to ask for his assurance that he would get a vote on a Republican alternative when the issue came up again. The speaker gave Michel his word, and the minority leader began working on a package that would not have given immediate military aid to the Contras but would have assured a future vote on such aid if the president deemed that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua was not negotiating in good faith with the Contras.

At this point the speaker went back on his word. Instead of giving Michel a clean vote, he had the Rules Committee set up procedures that treated Michel's amendment as if it were the basic bill, treated his own bill as if it were an amendment to Michel's, and permitted no other amendments to be offered. Under these procedures, once Wright's amendment was adopted on March 3, 215-210, Michel's version was dead without a vote. (The Democratic package was defeated on final passage, 208 to 216.) Thus, the speaker permitted Democrats from conservative districts to support him without having to vote openly against the president. "In over thirty years as a member of this institution, I have kept my word," Michel said in a remarkable statement afterwards. "I expect others to do the same."

The procedure the Rules Committee adopted on Contra aid is known as a "modified closed rule." (A closed rule is one that permits no amendments; a modified closed rule permits only specific amendments.) Restrictive rules of varying descriptions have been used creatively in recent years to shut off debate and produce results that the Democrats favor. For example, the Rules Committee permitted only one amendment —a single take-it-or-leave-it substitute—to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988 (the "Grove City" bill) on March 2, 1988. Remarkably, the Democrats were putting these restrictions on a Senate bill that had never been passed by the House, thus completely bypassing the committee system as well as the House floor as forums for deliberation.

The Rules Committee was not much better when welfare reform came back to the House floor as a separate bill in December 1987. Although the leadership-controlled committee did give Republicans a chance to offer a substitute, it refused a request from eighty *Democrats* to allow a vote on an alternative sponsored by Thomas Carper (D-DE) and Charles Stenholm (D-TX). The problem (from the Democratic leadership's point of view) was that the cost of the Carper-Stenholm bill was about halfway between our bill and theirs. If the committee had allowed a vote on the Carper-Stenholm substitute, it would have stood a good chance of passing. The leadership apparently thought it was better to allow no vote than to give something they opposed a fair chance to pass.

Examples such as these could be spun out forever. But the pattern becomes even more clear when we move away from examples to look at some numbers. The following tables were inserted into the *Congressional Record* at the end of the last Congress by Trent Lott of Mississippi, who was then the House Republican whip. The first shows the sharp increase in the use of rules restricting the right of members to offer amendments to legislation. The table begins with 1977-1978, Tip O'Neill's first Congress as speaker.

In his remarks accompanying the table, Lott noted that when he entered Congress in 1973 restrictive rules were rare and were limited almost exclusively to tax bills. Restrictive rules have become increasingly common over the course of the past decade, but the major explosion has occurred over the past four years.

Our initial example also highlighted a second and even more outrageous technique for restricting debate: self-executing rules. Table 2 outlines their use.

As with restrictive rules more generally, the data show a marked increase in self-executing rules over the past four years. The pattern is confirmed in our final table, which is about rules that have prohibited the minority from offering a motion to recommit a bill with instructions. Traditionally, the motion to recommit with instructions has been the minority's method for getting a final vote on its alternative legislative package. As with restrictive and self-executing rules, the data show a marked shift in the 99th and 100th Congresses.

Table 1

OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES, 95TH-100TH CONGRESS

Congress (years)	Total Rules Granted	Open Rules		Restrictive Rules	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
95th (1977-78)	241	213	88	28	12
96th (1979-80)	198	161	81	37	19
97th (1981-82)	112	90	80	22	20
98th (1983-84)	145	105	72	40	28
99th (1985-86)	101	65	64	36	36
100th (1987-88)	138	79	57	59	43

Table 2

SELF-EXECUTING RULES, 95TH-100TH CONGRESS

Congress (years)	Total Rules Granted	Number of Self-Executing Rules	As Percent of Total Number of Rules
95th (1977-78)	256	1	0
96th (1979-80)	259	0	0
97th (1981-82)	152	2	1
98th (1983-84)	190	5	3
99th (1985-86)	164	20	12
100th (1987-88)	165	26	16

Table3

RULES PROHIBITING INSTRUCTIONS ON MOTIONS TO RECOMMIT, 95TH-100TH CONGRESS

Congress (years)	Total Rules Granted	Rules Denying Recommital Instructions	As Percent of Total Number of Rules
95th (1977-78)	241	0	0
96th (1979-80)	198	1	1
97th (1981-82)	112	0	0
98th (1983-84)	145	0	0
99th (1985-86)	101	12	12
100th (1987-88)	138	18	13

Notes for tables 1-3: Total rules granted: all rules reported from the Rules Committee which provide for the initial consideration of legislation, including rules on appropriations bills. Not included are special rules on conference reports, Senate amendments, etc. In table 2, **Total rules** granted: all rules granted by the Rules Committee. This is a broader definition than tables 1 and 3 because self-executing rules can be offered on a wider variety of legislative motions than ordinary amendments.
Open rules: rules that permit any member to offer any germane amendment to a measure so long as it is otherwise in compliance with House rules.
Restrictive rules: rules that limit the number of amendments that can be offered; includes so-called modified open and modified closed rules as well as completely closed rules.
Self executing rules: order of business resolutions which provide for the automatic adoption of an amendment (or other matter) upon the adoption of the rule, thus eliminating the need for a separate vote on the substance of the matter, for example, "Upon the adoption of this resolution the amendment provided in section 2 of the report to accompany the resolution shall be considered to have been adopted in the House and in the Committee of the Whole. Rules containing more than one self-executing provision are counted only once for purposes of this table.
Rules denying instructions: confined here to those which prohibit motions to recommit with instructions to report back "forthwith" with a further amendment to the measures.

Tables prepared by Donald Wolfensberger, Minority Counsel, Subcommittee on Legislative Process, Committee on Rules.

Sources: Survey of Activities, Committee on Rules, 95th-99th congresses, Notices of Action Taken, Committee on Rules, 100th Congress (as of October 21, 1988). Published in *Congressional Record*, daily edition, October 21, 1988, E 3656-7.

The use of restrictive rules and other techniques to limit debate are sometimes justified as being necessary to assure the orderly flow of business. But it is impossible to defend the idea that the House floor has been too backed up to allow for an orderly debate on amendments. At the time of the Civil Rights Restoration Act—a major piece of legislation that raised implications for religious freedom as well as for civil rights—the House had no other major business on the schedule. Moreover, the House Democrats seem to have no problem finding the time for amendments when it suits their purpose. The Rules Committee permitted more than 200 amendments to the Department of Defense authorization bill in 1988. Why? Because the amendments gave liberal Democrats a chance to press for arms-control measures that could not make it through the relatively more centrist Armed Services Committee.

The general pattern seems to be this: restrictive rules are used to protect committee bills when a committee reports legislation that a majority of House Democrats support and when there is a danger that the committee's approach may fall victim to a more conservative bipartisan majority on the House floor. In other words the increase in restrictive rules reflects an assertive attempt to sidestep debate, avoid publicly accountable votes, and control the final result.

Historical Principles

The procedures of recent years distort two of the three attributes the Constitution's framers thought Congress needed to do its job well. These attributes can be summarized in just three key words: action, deliberation, and accountability. The contemporary dispute turns on whether the majority's desire to act should be allowed to run roughshod over debate and accountability.

Action was the first (but not the only) one of the three features the framers considered to be crucial for Congress. Under the Articles of Confederation, one-third of the states could kill any important bill, and one state by itself could kill an amendment. The result during the 1780s was paralysis. To make constitutional government effective Congress had to be able to levy taxes, regulate commerce, raise and support armies, and so forth. Small minorities had to be deprived of the power they had under the articles to stymie the government's ability to reach decisions for the good of the country.

Despite the efforts of the Constitution's framers, small minorities throughout the history of Congress have found ways under the rules to frustrate the majority's desire to bring ripe issues to a legislative decision. Many of the important rules battles over the years have been about efforts to permit a majority decision without cutting off the minority's right to offer amendments and force a debate. The new rules often ended up strengthening the hand of the speaker. It is important to make clear, therefore, that I think many of these historical reforms were helpful. The acid test is: did a particular reform or practice help Congress serve all of its constitutional functions, or did it hurt?

The underlying justification for the various time-limit House rules of the 1840s (ending unlimited debate) was to protect the ability of Congress to act. The same reason lay behind the famous ruling by Speaker Thomas B. Reed in 1890 to defeat "disappearing quorums"—the minority tactic of preventing votes by refusing to answer quorum calls. It was also why Sam Rayburn was willing to put his prestige on the line seventy-one years later to enlarge the Rules Committee and thus weaken its ability to bottle up bills that the House leadership and president wanted to schedule for floor debate.[2] And it is also why the two-party caucuses now give their leaders the power to appoint and reappoint all of the members of this crucial gatekeeping committee.

But being able to act never was supposed to be the whole story. The House also was supposed to encourage deliberation, and its members were supposed to be held accountable for their decisions. In recent years the House Democratic leadership has behaved as if deliberation and accountability were not very important. If a majority can act, and especially if the procedures can be skewed to make it easier for a majority to come together behind one policy rather than another, then debate and deliberation can be treated as unneeded luxuries. And if all of this can be done without clean votes on the major policy alternatives, then the majority can manage to act as it wishes, avoid debate, and obscure accountability, all at the same time.

Breaking the Pattern

If someone wanted to defend the way the House has been run lately, he or she might hark back to Reed and Rayburn and ask what is wrong with procedures that let the majority work its will. After all, this defender might say, majorities in other national legislatures exercise even more control over the agenda than do congressional Democrats. The problem with the analogy is that in other countries, majority power goes together with a party-based electoral system that holds power accountable in the next election. In the United States majority control over the rules is used not to enhance partisan accountability but to screen members from being accountable for exercising partisan power.

We Republicans are able to understand that the House may have to use restrictive rules on occasion to do its business. We cannot accept as legitimate, however, the idea that those rules belong solely in the hands of the majority. Each member of Congress is fully equal in his or her role as a representative of more than a half million people. The speaker is not only a partisan officer but a constitutional officer who is expected to represent the whole House and nation. In his constitutional role the speaker has an obligation to make sure that all members have an equal right to participate in the business of the House. To be sure, as George Orwell once said, some members may be more equal than others. Bills have to have floor mangers; committee leaders have more power over the bills in their jurisdiction than other members do. But it is not legitimate for a partisan majority to interpret the rules in an *ad hoc* way to make itself more equal in whatever way may seem convenient at the moment.

To make sure the House functions as was intended, I believe that no restrictive rules should be granted without the full consent of the minority party. To enforce fair treatment Republicans introduced a rules package in October (H. Res. 599) that would require restrictive rules to be filed and held for a few days so there can be adequate notice and debate about them. I personally might even want to enforce bipartisanship more formally by requiring a two-thirds vote for the House to adopt a restrictive rule. But the standing rules cannot be changed without the majority's cooperation, and if the majority cooperates, changing the formal rules may not be necessary.

The minority would be willing to accept restrictive rules as long as they are fair. The question is: What is fair? In our view rules should always permit a full debate and public vote on major policy alternatives. The Democrats have been using partisan procedures to avoid partisan accountability to the electorate. We would like a more bipartisan approach to procedures to allow for a more clear sense of public accountability. Only with such accountability can the other advantages of incumbency be put to the test.

Underlying this wish is a calculation that is partially partisan in its intent. In the past several elections Republican presidential candidates have won the vote in many more congressional districts than have Republican congressional candidates. Some commentators say this is because the people consciously prefer divided government. But survey data show that a remarkable number of people do not even know which party controls Congress. We therefore want the opportunity to present our case cleanly to the American people for debate. We think we will win that debate because we think we have the better policies to defend. We also believe we can win if we can bring about other changes to reduce the advantages of incumbency. If we do not win, so be it. We are willing to take our chances on a level playing field. The question is whether the other side is willing to play. ☑

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[1] *Congressional Record*, daily edition, May 24, 1988, H 3576-92.

[2] For Reed and Rayburn, see chapters 5 and 7 of Richard B. Cheney and Lynn V. Cheney, *Kings of the Hill* (New York: Continuum, 1983).

Richard B. Cheney (Wyoming—At Large) is the House Republican whip.

Lichter

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the Democratic candidate for president." He then ridiculed the Massachusetts governor for "displaying keen knowledge of gardening" at an agricultural event where he talked about compost piles. Pettit concluded, "This is what you call a turning point. Dukakis discussing composting, while George Bush was out being ferocious."

If the coverage was anything but fluff and puffery, why the flurry of assertions to the contrary? First, there's the frustration factor. Part of the battle for the presidency is the struggle for control of the battlefield—the media agenda. The combatants are the candidates on one side, and the journalists on the other. Both sides win some and lose some, and journalists always come away licking some wounds.

Remember 1984, which saw practically none of this year's notorious negative campaigning? It was derided as an issueless exercise in feel-good politics. On election eve NBC correspondent Chris Wallace complained that Reagan had waged "a campaign long on glitz and short on substance. . .a cynical campaign, manipulative. . .(that) offered pomp and platitudes. . . ." Since 1972, television has set the rules for presidential politics. Journalists disdain those who play the game poorly and resent those who play it well.

The complaints, however, do have some basis in reality. Bush ran a better media campaign than Dukakis, which is not the same as fooling the media or getting good press. The issues mentioned most often on TV news—crime and defense—were Bush's key issues. And Dukakis was called a liberal on the evening news sixty-five times this fall, compared to only fourteen times during fourteen months of primary campaigning. The proportion of the public who found him "too liberal" nearly doubled from May to October. But it's not television's fault that the Democrats lacked a coherent media strategy or that Dukakis proved a poor pugilist.

The one time that Bush clearly benefited from good press was during and just after the Republican convention. His coverage in late August fulfilled all the conditions for the type of media breakthrough enjoyed by Jimmy Carter in 1972, Gary Hart in 1984, and Jesse Jackson earlier this year. By exceeding expectations he briefly dominated the field as a highly visible, viable, and desirable candidate. Why the sudden shift? The traditional convention honeymoon coverage was magnified by journalistic amazement that the 97-pound weakling of American politics had turned into a muscle-bound macho man. His media image and poll ratings soared in tandem as he kicked sand into his rival's face. It was a textbook demonstration of the power of positive viewing.

So, did television give Bush an unfair boost after all? We think not, unless the canons of media fairness are interpreted to require balanced coverage during every week of the campaign. Bush's good press plummeted even before Labor Day and ran behind Dukakis's the rest of the fall. At the time, moreover, notions of a media boost for Bush seemed absurd. The question being raised in late August was whether the media had done in the Bush campaign by its aggressive coverage of the Quayle controversy.

During the twelve days after his selection on August 16, Quayle was the subject of ninety-three stories on the evening news—more coverage than any presidential candidate but Bush had received throughout the entire primary campaign. Quayle's 21 percent positive rating from nonpartisan sources at the height of the controversy was nearly as low as we logged for Gary Hart during the Donna Rice scandal in May 1987.[2] (Quayle's image never recovered. His nonpartisan good press score rose to only 31 percent, compared to an unbeatable 100 percent for Lloyd Bentsen.)

Ironically, the Quayle affair worked to Bush's advantage by keeping him on-screen every night defending his running mate in a decisive, resolute manner that reinforced his new take-charge image. In addition it moved up the kick-off of the fall campaign. Bush roared out of the gate like an Oklahoma "Sooner," while Dukakis was still awaiting the traditional Labor Day starter's gun. In fact some of Bush's edge in good press derived from criticism of his opponent on precisely this point. As ABC's Jim Wooten noted on August 29, "The governor may remember in November what he didn't do in August."

Voter Perceptions

Finally, the media's role must be understood within the broader dynamics of how voters decide. The playing field was tilted in Bush's direction this year by the combination of peace, prosperity, and a still-popular president. And voters' perceptions are formed not only by the campaign drama but by the stage on which it is played out. Bush needed only to actualize this potential advantage by convincing voters that he was not a bumbling effete snob out of touch with their concerns. He accomplished this by focusing attention on his opponent's flaws rather than his own virtues.

George Bush has always had a media problem. Previous studies found that he attracted mostly negative press during the 1980 and 1984 campaigns, as well as the 1988 primary season.[3] He didn't convert many reporters to his cause this year, and his coverage showed it. Nonetheless, 1988 will be remembered as the year Bush succeeded in turning his media image from a threat into an opportunity.

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[1] Michael J. Robinson and Maura Clancey, "General Election Coverage: Part I," *Public Opinion*, December/January 1985, pages 49-54 and 59.

[2] "Quayle Hunt," *Media Monitor*, September 1988.

[3] Robinson, "General Election Coverage: Part I," Michael J. Robinson and Margaret Sheehan, *Over the Wire and on TV* (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); S. Robert Lichter, "How the Press Covered the Primaries," *Public Opinion*, July/August 1988, pages 45-49.

S. Robert Lichter is co-director, Daniel Amundson is research director, and Richard E. Noyes is Election Project coordinator of the Center for Media and Public Affairs.

Teixeira

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Table 2
NET DEMOCRATIC GAIN FROM INCREASED TURNOUT AMONG THE POOR[1]

Matching turnout in general population	1,898,000
Matching turnout among the rich[2]	2,566,000
Exceeding rich turnout by 10 points	3,549,000

[1] Less than $12,500 in family income.
[2] More than $50,000 in family income.
Source: Author's estimates based on final 1988 CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll data, Census Bureau's *Projections of the Population of Voting Age, for States: November 1988* (Series P-25, No. 1019) and March 1988 Current Population Survey.

Democrats may have an understandable urge to trade in the current electorate for a new one, but it isn't advisable. They lost the presidency because they didn't have enough support in the nation as a whole, not because enough of their people failed to show up at the polls.

Other Scenarios for Increased Turnout

These results seem clear enough at the national level. It could still be argued, however, that the electoral college makes national results less important. What is key are the state-level results, and therefore, increased black or Hispanic turnout in enough key states could conceivably have swung the election for the Democrats. I tested this theory by looking at a number of states, including California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, where the election was close, and estimating the state-level effects of increased black/Hispanic turnout.

I found no evidence that reasonable increases in minority turnout could have swung these states for the Democrats. That is, when I estimated the net Democratic gain accruing from a ten-point increase in black or Hispanic turnout in each of these states, it was still not enough to change the outcome in any of them. This does not completely disprove the theory since I did not look at all states, but it does cast considerable doubt on its plausibility.

Now, none of this is to say that nonvoters could not *technically* have won the election for the Democrats. If every black in the United States had voted in 1988—that is, if turnout among the black electorate were 100 percent—the Democrats would probably have won the presidency. Or, if turnout among the poor had been a mere twenty points higher and every one of these additional poor people voted Democratic—that is, 100 percent for Dukakis, 0 percent for Bush—this, too, would have been enough to swing the election for the Democrats. But none of this will ever happen.

These fantastic scenarios, however, do illustrate an important point about turnout. When people say "turnout is the solution," they are usually basing their assessment on the kind of implausible assumptions described above. They envision either preposterously high turnout increases for their favorite group, or preposterously high voting rates for their favorite candidate among new voters, or both. Under more realistic scenarios—such as the ones described in this article—the turnout solution just doesn't work.

The implausibility of increased turnout as the solution to the Democrats' problems is further underscored by looking at one last scenario. What if they gave an election and everybody came? The CBS News/*New York Times* postelection survey has the answer for us. This survey investigated the presidential preferences of both voters and nonvoters. The result: if nonvoters had voted in the 1988 election, George Bush would still have won the election—except by a bigger margin! Even allowing for possible winner bias (the tendency of respondents to say they voted for the known winner), this result suggests rather strongly that turnout did not decide the 1988 election; voter preferences did.

Turnout may not be the key for the Democrats, but it is not completely irrelevant either. On the contrary, increased turnout among certain groups would clearly help the Democrats. Targeted registration and turnout activities have much to recommend them as parts of a winning strategy. But increased turnout cannot by itself be that winning strategy, as the figures presented above show conclusively.

Impact of Registration/Turnout Groups

In this context it is worth taking a look at the activities of groups that put a great deal of effort into registration and turnout. I would include here such groups as Human SERVE, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, Midwest-Northeast Voter Registration Education Project, and the National Coalition for Black Voter Participation, among others.

The claims of these groups are hard to pin down, but they seem to have two basic objectives: (1) to increase voter registration among their target groups (generally, the poor or minority groups) and thereby increase turnout; and (2) by increasing turnout among their target groups, to serve the political agenda of these groups (generally, Democratic). How much success have they had with these objectives?

This is not an easy question to answer. It is difficult to ascribe responsibility for any observed increases in registration to a particular group or groups, using official statistics or census data. We basically have to take their word for it when a group claims it signed up certain numbers of voters.

Assuming that their figures are accurate, these groups do appear to have had some success in the 1984 election. In that election the four groups mentioned above signed up over a million and a half new voters, while other nonpartisan groups of a generally liberal bent signed up over two million additional voters. Presumably, this enhanced turnout was among groups most favorable to the Democrats: blacks, Hispanics, and the poor.

On the partisan-impact side, however, there is much reason to doubt the efficacy of these efforts. To begin with, the efforts of liberal groups were roughly counterbalanced by registration efforts on the conservative side (Republican party, Christian right), so the overall net gain for the Democrats from registration activities may have been very small.

But even if there had been no conservative countermobilization, and if every one of the registrants claimed by the liberal groups had actually voted, and every one of them had voted for Mondale, he still would have lost badly to Reagan. In fact Mondale lost so badly that if every black in America had been registered, turned out at the polls, and voted for him, he still would have lost by more than seven million votes.

The most that can be said for registration drives in the 1984 election is that they might have prevented Reagan's margin from being even larger than it was. And, as pointed out above, there are reasons for doubting even that.

What of the 1988 election? On the face of it, registration groups would appear to have had little effect since the registration rate of the population actually went down 2.2 percentage points. This means that registration failed to keep pace with growth in the voting-age population. This compares rather poorly with 1984, when the registration rate actually went up 3.2 points.

It's hard to see in these circumstances how the groups under discussion could have had much partisan impact on the election outcome. Nor is there much evidence of such partisan impact. There are no success stories in individual states, for example, that seem to correlate with Democratic victories. In fact, only three states (Nevada, Arizona, and Virginia) showed registration increases, all of which went heavily for Bush; the District of Columbia also showed a registration increase, but there the outcome was never in doubt.

It is possible that without these groups' activities, registration and turnout would have gone down even further, especially among Democratic-leaning groups, and Dukakis would have lost by a bigger margin than he did. But this seems cold comfort, given the high aspirations of these groups.

Thus, it appears that registration activity was too anemic to have been much of a factor in the 1988 election. Could it have been a factor if it had been less anemic? What if, for example, the success of the 1984 registration drives had been duplicated?

To test this, I first assumed that the normal avenues of voter registration had added enough new voters to the rolls to keep pace with population growth. This keeps the registration rate at its 1984 level. Then I assumed that registration groups succeeded in adding another 3.2 percent of the electorate to the rolls (the registration increase in 1984), and that every one of these additional registrants was a member of a Democratic-leaning group. The results, allocating the new registrants equally among blacks, Hispanics, and the poor: a net gain of about 2,384,000 for the Democrats, once again far short of the 6,900,000 needed to overtake the Republicans.

Thus, even under a very generous series of assumptions, registration drives would not have changed the outcome of the 1988 election. This means that not only were the registration groups apparently unsuccessful in their efforts, but even *had* they been successful—indeed, spectacularly successful—it wouldn't have made much of a difference.

Future of Voter Turnout

The more than three-point drop in voter turnout in the 1988 election continues a downward trend that started after 1960. This latest drop in voter participation makes it clear that turnout trends are linked, not to the difficulties of voter registration, but rather to a generalized withdrawal from the political world by larger and larger segments of the electorate. This is because, while registration has become progressively easier, turnout has continued to go down, including the drop observed in the last election. This clearly invalidates the arguments of those, like Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, who attribute all problems with voter turnout to the registration system.

Another indicator that voter registration does not lie at the heart of the turnout decline phenomenon is that the turnout rate of registrants has also been declining over this period. Exactly how much is a matter of some controversy, though it could be as high as the thirteen-point decline shown by state registration and turnout figures.

It should be noted that figures based on Census survey data (which go back only to 1968) suggest a much smaller decline. Some, like Piven and Cloward, claim these are the "true" figures and that any attempt to use state data is hopelessly flawed due to the inflation of turnout rolls with the names of those who have died or moved away, but who have not been purged from the rolls. There is no doubt such inflation exists, but their argument hinges on the idea that this inflation has been increasing over time, thereby producing the declining turnout rate of registrants observed in state data. This contention is not consistent with the available evidence: some states have tightened up the procedures they use to purge the voter rolls, and some have loosened them, a mix that wouldn't lead to a steadily declining turnout rate.

Furthermore, the assumption that the Census data are by definition correct is open to question. A careful look at the way the Census calculates registration rates suggests it is open to biases of unknown scope. This is because the registration rate is derived by simply adding reported voters to reported nonvoters who say they are registered and dividing by the number in the sample. The problem is that some of these reported voters are nonvoters of unknown registration status. It can be shown mathematically that, depending on the true registration status of these misreporting nonvoters, the turnout rate of registrants derived from Census data could be inflated by as much as ten points. This is not to say it *is* off by ten points, but simply to illustrate that the Census data have their problems as well and are by no means a perfect guide to the changing turnout rates of registrants.

In light of all this I am inclined to believe that the turnout rate of registrants has dropped fairly substantially over time, though the exact magnitude may lie somewhere in between the state figures and the Census figures. This suggests that there is little cause for optimism on the turnout problem since even those who have taken the trouble to register seem increasingly disinclined to vote. It also suggests that faith in registration reform as an easy solution to the turnout problem is misplaced (see Teixeira, "Will the Real Voter Please Stand Up?" July-August 1988, *Public Opinion*, for a discussion of the limited effects of registration reform).

Faith in the partisan impact of increased turnout is probably also misplaced. As we've seen, simply bringing more of certain groups to the polls is not a quick and easy solution to the Democrats' problems. Because of this I am inclined to be skeptical that the Democrats (or the Republicans, for that matter) will move to "solve" the turnout problem in a big way since the marginal benefits of increasing turnout, especially among the general population, would probably not be enough to repay the costs. Instead, I would expect them to move to more and more precisely targeted activities among certain groups in certain states.

This puts the turnout problem squarely in the lap of society as a whole. This is appropriate since the problem appears to originate in the way politics is conducted in our society. Unfortunately, at this point we do not know the precise origins of this political problem, though the hypothesized causes are many: the influence of the media and polls; the role of television advertising; the decline of the political parties; the conduct of campaigns; the quality of candidates; generalized disconnection from politics; decreased sense of civic duty; the erosion of traditional forms of political consciousness. More work is needed to specify which among this rogues' gallery of political suspects are truly contributing to low and declining turnout.

Beyond this, perhaps we need to decide: is the turnout problem worth solving? What are the societal benefits that would accrue to increased turnout, and how does that compare to the costs of attaining it? In particular, do we want a "participatory democracy," to borrow a phrase from the sixties, or will a "de-participatory democracy" do just as well? The choice is ours.

Note: The author wishes to thank Leonard Bloomquist of Kansas State University, Curtis Gans of the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, Keating Holland of CBS News, Jerry Jennings of the Census Bureau, Leif Jensen of Bates College, and Neil Maslansky of *Public Opinion* for data and helpful discussions that contributed to this article.

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Breglio

(*Continued from page 51*)

BREGLIO: In our just-completed postelection study, we had 35 percent self-identified Democrats and 32 percent self-identified Republicans. That's all Republicans need to be competitive.

KEENE: *Has the movement of young people to the GOP stalled? The data suggest they didn't turn out for Bush the way they turned out for Reagan.*

BREGLIO: Young people were not the only turnout problems we had.

We just finished a study for the Republican National Committee on voter turnout among those under thirty-five. We found that a large number of them still look to Ronald Reagan as their political role model. And it's going to take time to fully convert them to Bush. They are inclined more toward his thinking than to any other national leader now.

KEENE: *Tubby said that race and racism were the most prominent features of national politics in the last fifteen years. Do you agree?*

BREGLIO: I disagree. Early in this campaign, race and gender were important determinants of vote. But over the course of the campaign, they simply became two of many predictors, and their importance waned. Age, union membership, religion, religiosity, and region became important factors in this election as they were in 1980 and 1984.

WATTENBERG: *How did Hispanics vote? What about Jews?*

BREGLIO: We got about 35 percent of the Hispanic vote. I'd like to see us at 45 percent or more.

We did better with the Jewish vote than I expected. We received about one vote in four, compared to Reagan's one in three.

WATTENBERG: *That's substantially more than twenty years ago, but it has plateaued recently.*

BREGLIO: Yes. The early indicators from the Jewish community were not encouraging. If there was one group in this country committed to change rather than continuity with the past, it was the Jewish community. For that reason we feared that we might not get the same level of support as in 1984. But we came close.

BREGLIO: Yes, I do.

KEENE: *Is class still an issue in American politics? Tubby argued it's still a big issue and that you could see it in the Democrats' embrace of the economic populism.*

BREGLIO: Class will always be an issue in politics.

KEENE: *Did you have a strategy to defuse the class issue?*

WATTENBERG: *They took the alligators off Bush's shirts.* [Laughter.]

BREGLIO: We targeted groups that cut across class lines. For example, we targeted northern Catholics who represented a mix of social classes and ethnic backgrounds.

Economic populism is a strong issue for the Democrats. Had they used it earlier, it would have helped Dukakis. It is the bedrock around which they must form their early coalition before broadening their base.

Populism capitalizes on fear of the unknown or uncontrollable. It is re-

(*Continued on page 60*)

Doble and Melville

(*Continued from page 49*)

spondents indicating that they would pay at least a modest increase in taxes—$25 per year for each proposal—to support it. That pattern suggests that Americans are willing to give serious consideration to various proposals to improve government efforts in social welfare.

Certain proposals are opposed by most people—such as providing subsidies to the working poor. Most important, most Americans don't want the new president to go too far in expanding the federal role or increasing federal spending. The findings from our study underline the limits of what the American public is willing to pay for new social programs. The annual estimated cost of these six proposals for an average taxpayer ranges from about $25 per year to $120 per year. Significantly, only a minority indicated a willingness to pay more than $25 per year for any of these proposals. This was true even of the most popular of them, the proposal to provide government assistance for long-term care.

While a majority wants the government's role to be expanded in certain ways, there are definite limits to what people are willing to pay for expanding the government's role in social welfare. Yes, people say, government should spend more for social welfare, but taxpayers shouldn't be asked to pay more.

That was the tightrope that the presidential candidates had to walk: they were obliged to appear to deliver the bacon, without the bill. One of the chief reasons why Governor Dukakis failed to win more support was that middle-class voters identified him more with high taxes than with the benefits that high taxes buy.

The public mood is somewhat different now from what it was in 1984 when Ronald Reagan won reelection by repeating the "less is better" theme. By proposing measures designed to address such problems as child care and health care for the uninsured, Mr. Bush has endorsed a larger role for the federal government. Still, as president he will have to make a series of difficult choices between competing claims, such as the growing tension between the demands for costly new programs for the elderly and the needs of children.

Limited public funds will no doubt inspire vigorous efforts to find alternative revenue sources and new ways to underwrite social welfare programs, such as imposing new requirements on business to provide health insurance. In any case it will be exceedingly difficult to devise social welfare efforts that reconcile the difference between what most Americans want from government and what they are willing to pay as taxpayers. ☑

John Doble and Keith Melville are vice presidents of the Public Agenda Foundation in New York City.

Rothenberg

(*Continued from page 11*)

the House of Representatives in nonpresidential years. Off-year elections are usually referendums on the president's performance and popularity, with the disappointed and disenchanted heavily motivated to march to the polls and cast their votes of protest. If the national economy tires between now and 1990, or if the administration finds itself confronted with a domestic or foreign policy crisis, the GOP could find itself back to Watergate levels in the House.

Naturally, there are a couple of reasons for Republican optimism, however limited. First, small but steady Republican gains in southern state legislatures reflect a growing Republicanism in the region, and that could benefit the GOP in the near future. Second, reapportionment and redistricting could deliver some seats to the Republicans as conservative Sunbelt areas gain in population and congressional representation. But if the Republicans lose House and state legislative seats in 1990 (leaving Democrats to draw the new congressional boundaries), the party could once again waste reapportionment and redistricting as opportunities to increase its strength in the Congress. That is exactly what happened after the last reapportionment.

In the Senate more Republicans (seventeen) than Democrats (sixteen) are up in 1990[2], even though the Democrats hold a five-seat edge in the chamber. A quick look at the list of seats up offers little solace to the GOP, as more Republicans than Democrats look endangered. Nor is it comforting to the Republicans to realize that in only two of the last nine elections have they had a *net gain* in the Senate. That suggests that 1978 and 1980 may have been merely aberrations, rather than steps in a long-term trend of Republican ascendancy in the Senate.

A decade ago Republicans had reasons to be optimistic about their chances in Congress. The 1980 census was going to reveal migration to the Sunbelt, and the country was poised for an ideological move to the right. The GOP also hoped to gain from demographic changes in the electorate, and the Democratic party's message was stale. But the Democrats have closed the campaign technology gap with the GOP and learned how to attract business political action committee money. More important, the Republicans have still not found the key to unlocking the Democratic incumbency advantage in the House. Until they do so, their prospects in the House of Representatives are poor. ☑

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[1] This number does not include three instances where the incumbent was nominated by both parties, nor any of the seven seats in Louisiana due to their primary system, nor the one open seat candidate who was unopposed.

[2] In 1990, there will be 18 Republican seats up and 16 Democratic ones. After the November 8 election Dan Coats was picked to succeed Dan Quayle. Coats must stand for election in 1990.

Stuart Rothenberg is the editor of The Political Report, *published by the Free Congress Foundation.*

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What's Left for Liberalism?

by Celinda Lake and Stanley B. Greenberg

Voters did not reject a liberal agenda in 1988. They were never presented with one. Something called "liberalism," as defined by Lee Atwater, came to haunt the Dukakis presidential campaign and limit its ability to build a Democratic majority. As fashioned by the Republicans, that ideology was something narrow and elitist, outside accepted values, and insensitive to the needs of average Americans. While Michael Dukakis embraced the liberal label late in the campaign, he did nothing to define it in positive terms. The Republicans used the liberal tag as a negative symbol to depict Dukakis as marginal and out of touch and as a risky, weak leader. This moved the election away from voters' issue concerns, which, importantly, would have favored liberals and the Democrats.

Liberals and Democrats must control the definition of liberalism. They must first emphasize the government policies that win strong and emotional support among Democrats and even move the swing electorate. Voters are ready to support a liberal policy agenda that is activist, populist, and nationalistic. Second, liberals and Democrats must honestly face the challenge of negative associations and symbols—centered on values and taxes—and be prepared to answer voters' doubts. And third, liberals and Democrats must be prepared to offer strong leadership, centered on their agenda, that invites confidence in their ability to govern.

Liberalism stands at a strategic disadvantage within the American political culture, on several fronts: specifically, on the number of its adherents and on its emotional strength as a basis for evaluating candidates. Conservatism is a powerful and popular symbol with which many voters feel quite comfortable.

Liberalism, in fact, enjoys much greater consistency and potential power than conservatism on the thematic and policy level. Conservative voters adopt some inconsistent postures: many of them support liberal policy initiatives, for example. Even more important, the general electorate in 1988—based on their policy goals—was prepared to vote for a populist, or indeed liberal, candidate and agenda. In the 1988 election, the Republicans were able to draw on symbols and emotions, while deflecting attention from policy concerns.

On the eve of the election, Greenberg Lake-The Analysis Group, Inc., conducted a nationwide survey to explore the public's definition of liberalism and the advantages and disadvantages liberal candidates faced. The survey was conducted for a consortium of Democrats. The results from that nationwide survey of 1,600 likely voters form the basis of this analysis.

The Conservative Advantage

Conservatives, at the most basic level, enjoy a numerical advantage—there are more of them (40 percent of the electorate say they are conservatives, compared to the 29 percent who say they are liberals). Here the conservatives are able to counter the seven-point advantage the Democrats have on party identification (46 to 39 percent). The conservative advantage also helps Republicans compete for the loyalties of independents, who are 27 percent conservative and 18 percent liberal, and even some Democrats (20 percent conservative).

Conservatives also come out ahead on winning affection—44 percent of voters say they like conservatives better than liberals, and only 30 percent like liberals better. Democrats, and even liberals, like conservatives significantly better than Republicans and conservatives like liberals, exacerbating the imbalance of adherents. As the presidential campaign entered the fall, Louis Harris found that 40 percent of the voters wanted the next president to be conservative, and only 13 percent wanted him liberal. The Reagan administration may not have increased the number of conservatives in the country, but it did make conservatism a more positive label.

Liberalism is, at the same time, a less powerful organizing idea than conservatism is for its adherents. The choice is clear for conservatives: they like fellow conservatives and dislike liberals. Liberals, by contrast, dislike many of their own. In fact, for liberals themselves, there is no significant relationship between a political figure's perceived ideology and his level of popularity. Liberalism clearly means less to liberal voters than conservatism does to conservatives, which reinforces the advantage that conservatives enjoy.

The Political World of Ideology

Voters sort their feelings about political leaders more along partisan than ideological lines, though Democrats are loosely associated with liberals and Republicans with conservatives. Voters can relatively easily recognize conservative and liberal political leaders though they like and dislike leaders on both ends of the spectrum. In general, ideology has only a loose hold on the public as they think about political actors and institutions. Voters generally see as conservative: Ronald Reagan (5.5 on a seven-point liberal-to-conservative scale), George Bush (5.6), the Republican party (5.5), corporations (5.1), and to a lesser extent Bob Dole (4.8). Liberals include Jesse Jackson (2.9), Michael Dukakis (3.2), civil rights organizations (3.2), Ted Kennedy (3.3), labor unions (3.4), women's organizations (3.4), and the Democratic party (3.4). Voters place Mario Cuomo (3.6) and environmental organizations (3.8) slightly toward the liberal, and they put Congress somewhere in the middle (4.3). Ideological associations have a certain reality in the public mind, but they by no means determine sentiment.

Voters as a whole separate political leaders into two groups—Democrats and liberals (and to some extent, the Congress), on the one hand, and Republicans and conservatives on the other. The swing voters in the last election—uncertain Bush and Dukakis supporters—sorted the political world into a series of fragmented dimensions that defy any easy ideological depiction. They divided political leaders and institutions into five categories: 1) conservatives, including Reagan, Bush, Dan Quayle, and the Republican party; 2) Dole, who occupies a unique space in their view; 3) liberals, including Dukakis and Lloyd Bentsen as distinct from 4) Democrats, which include Jackson, Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and Congress; and 5) new Democrats whose images are much less formed—Bill Bradley and Cuomo. There is a great deal of political sense in that pattern of the political world, but it is certainly not a simple ideological map.

Finally, conservative Democrats work to reduce the dissonance they may feel in today's political world. They see conservatives like Reagan as less conservative than other voters do, and they view liberals like Jackson as less liberal. That gives liberals greater opportunities with conservative Democrats, particularly if liberals emphasize the populist and nationalist economic messages that strongly appeal to these voters.

Pejorative Liberalism

Voters think of liberalism in terms of domestic social policies. When asked to name policies associated with liberalism, they volunteer that liberalism involves a role for government spending (24 percent), often in areas they want, but at a price of increased taxes. They say that liberals support fairness, which means welfare and helping the poor, and some see benefits for the middle class and others, like the elderly and children. Abortion is the most frequently mentioned specific policy associated with liberals, followed by general social programs. Voters also mention that liberals can be soft on crime and weak on defense. Abortion, being soft on crime, and increased taxes dominated the views of weak Bush voters, perhaps reflecting the Republican campaign to influence swing voters.

On the other hand, even conservatives credit liberalism with a number of positive attributes, including trying new approaches and siding with working families; in fact, most voters (except conservative Republicans) think liberals work for the middle class. Voters generally believe that liberals favor using government as a tool for action, though Republicans, Independents, and conservatives (including conservative Democrats) wonder whether this might interfere too much with private business and the economy.

Taxes and naiveté about foreign threats, however, posed the greatest challenge to liberalism and the candidates who wear the label in this election. Large numbers of voters (39 percent overall and 55 percent for weak Bush supporters), believe that liberals do not appreciate the burden that taxes put on middle-class families, cutting against their image as supporters of the middle class. Moreover, liberals seem willing to interfere with private enterprise (47 percent), risking damage to the economy and threatening the economic position of workers (white- as well as blue-collar). The interaction of doubts about taxes and economic interference pulls away support among Democratic-leaning but tax-sensitive constituencies—such as white-collar, older, and blue-collar suburban voters and the Independent voters key to winning majorities. These two factors combined contributed the most to negative feelings about liberal candidates in 1988.

The belief that liberals are naive about foreign policy is particularly important to conservatives, including the Democratic ones. They may not support increased defense spending, but voters still want candidates who can stand up to the Soviet Union and who understand that the United States has real enemies, economically and militarily. Those concerns were expressed most strongly by conservative Democrats, southern and mid-Atlantic voters, blue-collar voters, and Republicans. These doubts were important for soft Dukakis (41 percent) and soft Bush voters (52 percent)—the bulk of the swing electorate in this election.

While liberals were seen, first of all, as siding too often with minorities—58 percent believe this—that association did not play a central role in the 1988 vote choice. A model predicting attitudes toward liberal and conservative candidates showed this much less important than other views discussed above. Since more voters made this association than any other, however, it is possible that these attitudes would affect liberal candidacies in other contexts.

While weakness on moral standards was less associated with liberalism, it mattered a great deal for a number of groups that held back from Dukakis—conservative Democrats, Fundamentalist Protestants, and conservatives in the South and Rocky Mountain states. It mattered for weak Bush supporters (50 percent) who, in the end, failed to respond to Dukakis who, they believed, did not share their values and concerns.

Table 1

IMAGES OF LIBERALS

Question: Now I am going to read you a list of words or phrases. For each one, please tell me whether you think this is a very good, good, or not so good description of someone who is a liberal.

	National	Independent	Conservative Democrat	Soft Bush	Soft Dukakis
Very good + good					
Sides too much with minorities	58%	56%	58%	59%	52%
Interferes too much with private business	47	43	51	50	28
Naive about foreign threats	42	46	41	52	41
Does not appreciate the tax burden of the middle class	39	48	37	55	28
Does not support strong enough moral standards	37	37	35	50	28
Not for middle-class people	34	33	38	38	31
On the side of working families, not the wealthy	73	71	68	68	81
Tries new approaches	71	71	69	67	78
Wants the government to take an active role in solving problems	63	61	62	60	74

The Liberal Advantage—A Progressive Agenda

While voters express doubts about liberalism, they also understand that liberalism implies a range of public policies that are themselves broadly popular. In the current environment, for example, voters see fighting discrimination, being pro-choice, supporting federal day care initiatives, cutting defense spending, and taxing the wealthy as liberal policies—a number of which they strongly support. They view Star Wars, prayer in school, keeping inflation low, and cutting domestic spending as conservative policies. And a number of policies—such as funding education, tougher trade laws, providing economic opportunities for all parts of the country, welfare reform, and protecting the environment—are broadly popular and seen as neither particularly liberal nor conservative policies. Some of these policies (working to protect the environment, funding for education, and providing economic opportunity for all parts of the country) are so popular and without particular ideological association that liberals think they are liberal and conservatives think they are conservative. This further expands opportunities for liberal candidates who talk about these issues to appeal to more moderate and conservative voters.

Voters have a difficult time placing tough trade policies on the ideological spectrum. They give a high priority to a presidential agenda that promotes American jobs with tough trade policies, and Democratic candidates and leadership in the Congress have pressed the issue. Nonetheless, economic nationalist messages remain ideologically unresolved and a source of opportunity if Democrats seize the initiative.

At the policy level, it is the liberals who seem ideologically coherent and the conservatives who are searching for consistency. Self-identified liberals, for example, overwhelmingly support the conventional package of liberal policy positions: they opt for individual privacy over moral authority, a strong government role in the economy and in managing work and family issues, and cuts in defense spending; they show little interest in conservative initiatives like Star Wars and appointing anti-abortion judges to the federal courts. By contrast, self-identified conservatives defect substantially from the conservative agenda to take liberal positions. Thus, over half of the so-called conservatives say taxing the "wealthy and the corporations" to make taxes equitable should be a top goal of the new president; almost two-thirds say tougher regulation of toxic-waste polluters ought to be a top goal. Over half prefer a stronger government role in the economy (versus lower taxes and less regulation), and nearly half put themselves on the side of individual freedom rather than a stronger government role promoting "traditional morality."

Voters—even conservative ones—are drawn to a liberal policy agenda. But liberals in 1988 lost the critical battles over values and leadership; they seemed unable to articulate a conception of liberalism that would lead voters to care about policy differences and be reassured on leadership. Liberals failed to recognize how fundamental their vulnerabilities were, and they failed to press their advantages on the issues that mattered.

Recommendations

If liberalism is to be revitalized and if progressive candidates and Democrats expect to succeed in future elections, they must undertake a number of tasks:

• *Become self-confident and articulate about a liberal policy agenda.* Michael Dukakis might have run much stronger had he posed sharper contrasts on policy priorities, emphasizing the populist goals that Republicans resist. The populist current in the message, ironically, makes liberalism more attractive to conservative voters and to Democrats who have defected to the Republicans in recent years.

Table 2

PRIORITIES AND POLICY POSITIONS

Question: I am going to read you a list of goals for the next president when he takes office next year. Please give each goal a score of 1 to 7, with 1 meaning the goal is not very important for the next president and 7 meaning the goal is extremely important. Of course, you can give the goal any score in between 1 and 7.

		Self-described . . .	
	National	**Liberals**	**Conservatives**
Priorities (Points 6 + 7)			
Making sure the wealthy and big corporations pay their fair share of taxes	77%	74%	55%
Developing and deploying SDI and Star Wars	21	8	16
Appointing justices to the Supreme Court who make abortions illegal again	35	20	37
Imposing stricter environmental regulations on corporations that produce toxic wastes	73	66	64
Protecting American jobs from foreign competition by tougher trade laws	59	49	44
Making sure there are no new taxes	45	29	42

Question: Now I am going to read you two sets of statements. For each one, please, tell me which you agree with more . . . .

		Self-described . . .	
	National	**Liberals**	**Conservatives**
Cut back rather than build up defense (complete wording below) (1)	53%	77%	29%
Prevent government intrusion in private life rather than government role to support traditional morality (2)	56	72	49
Government should take strong role in economy to provide prosperity for all rather than government should regulate and tax less to ensure prosperous economy (3)	64	73	58
Government has role in helping families even if it means increasing spending rather than government should stay out of people's lives (4)	51	73	38

Note: (1) America's defense will only stay strong by continuing to invest in Star Wars and in new weapons systems, and by taking a tough attitude with the Russians *OR* The defense buildup has gone too far and now we need to emphasize weapons that work and cut out wasteful and expensive weapons that we do not need. For our future security we now need to invest more in our economy and less in the Pentagon budget; (2) The government should stand up for traditional family values and a strong moral fiber in this country. We should oppose abortion, promote prayer in school, and outlaw homosexuality, which is wrong *OR* It is most important to protect individual liberty and freedom which are basic American values. We should avoid mixing religion and politics in setting policy and should prevent government intrusion in our private lives; (3) We can best ensure a prosperous America by letting business run with little government regulation and low taxes and by keeping government spending and inflation down *OR* We must provide prosperity for everyone, not just the wealthy and big business. Government must take a strong role in building America's economy with job training, quality education, economic investment, and tougher trade laws; (4) Government should stay out of people's daily lives and not interfere with the economy. Everyone should be allowed to get ahead on their own. Families can best provide day care and health care for themselves. The best thing we can do to help working families is to keep taxes down *OR* The government has a role in helping working families meet the challenges they face. We need government initiatives to make day care and health insurance more available, even if it means increases in government spending.

• *Speak for the middle class.* Republicans have tried to drive a wedge between Democrats and the middle class by emphasizing social cleavages. At present conservatives can too easily reinforce doubts that voters have about liberals' priorities and the way they make decisions. Many voters who think of themselves as middle class doubt that Democrats and liberals share their values, stand on their side, or have their economic interests at heart. They believe that Republicans are too close to the rich and corporations, but the Democrats seem concerned only with taking care of the poor and minorities and seem not to understand the burdens of middle-class life. That leaves the middle class without a voice or a set of articulated interests. To become that voice, liberals must learn to speak about values, taxes, and the other middle-class burdens—including health care and housing, kids getting ahead, and a threatened environment.

• *Recognize that taxes are a burden.* Liberals and Democrats must come to terms with taxes, and not just as "the last resort." The sense of the tax burden is the most powerful element of the conservative agenda, blocking the perception that Democrats really are on the side of the middle class. While voters think any president will raise taxes, they believe Republicans and conservatives do so reluctantly. They fear that Democrats, once they start to raise taxes, will not be able to control themselves.

• *Offer leadership.* Democratic and liberal candidates cannot hope to win elections by simply being on the right side on a number of policies; they also need to understand and demonstrate leadership. Voters concede, in many areas, that Democrats' hearts are in the right place. But they are not sure that Democrats and their presidential nominees can govern and lead at the national level. Furthermore, George Bush (or Roger Ailes) understood that associating with issues like national security and defense, even if linked with unpopular policies, could communicate leadership. Democrats and liberals need to take a lesson from that book and use issues to demonstrate personal strength and an understanding of the nation's needs.

• *Take possession of concerns about economic nationalism.* A recession would no doubt change the political equation, much as it did in 1982, putting immediate economic issues at the top of the political agenda. But even without a recession, voters are greatly concerned about America's uncertain economic future. Democrats and liberals are well placed to take over this issue. Voters are concerned about trade issues and America's position in the world, yet they do not know where to place the issue ideologically or even in partisan terms. There is an opportunity here that progressives have yet to seize. ☑

Celinda Lake is vice president and Stanley B. Greenberg is president of Greenberg Lake-The Analysis Group, a national survey research firm based in Washington, D.C.

Is Deregulation Working?

by Thomas A.W. Miller

Has deregulation worked?

Two basic issues appear to be at the heart of the debate. The first is a broad, philosophical one: Have American expectations from both business and government changed? Are people looking for a different *kind* of relationship between the two? The issue here is whether a new consensus in public opinion is emerging—one that might replace the general perspective that has dominated since the New Deal—because of the deregulatory experience of the past decade.

The second issue is more specific and is actually a set of concerns. How—and in which areas—has deregulation succeeded? How has it failed? Financial services, telecommunications, airlines, energy: these industries, among others, have had their competitive environments dramatically altered by deregulation. But in the public's view, the results of the deregulatory initiatives have varied widely.

These two facets of public opinion about deregulation—the general, philosophical one and the specific, results-oriented one—are, of course, intertwined. If there were no specific cases of deregulatory success, the public would have little cause to change its philosophy of business/government relations. At the same time, the deregulatory legislation of the past decade probably would not have passed Congress unless the public was willing to try something new.

Where do Americans stand today? It seems that there *is* a call for a new relationship among business, government, and labor that represents a departure from attitudes first formed during the New Deal. This emerging consensus does embrace deregulation, but *not* in its purest form, that is, that government has no role whatsoever to play in the marketplace.

Public Sees a Big Increase in Competition

The primary argument in favor of deregulation is straightforward: by easing or eliminating regulatory constraints, competition will increase. Greater competition, in turn, will allocate resources more efficiently and serve consumers more economically. Free markets, in short, are superior to regulated ones.

Americans have perceived major changes in the extent of competition over the past ten years. In fact, public fears about insufficient competition in the marketplace have fallen to their lowest levels since the early 1970s.

Over the years the Roper Organization has asked Americans to evaluate a list of industries and to mention any "where you think there is too little competition—where too few companies dominate the industry." A comparison of the results obtained in 1979 and in late 1988 clearly reveals a vast change in public opinion.

- In 1979, 60 percent of the public thought there was too little competition in the telephone industry. By 1988 the figure dropped to 29 percent—cut in half.
- Half of the public worried about too little competition in the oil industry ten years ago (no doubt in part because, when we asked the question in October 1979, the country was entering the second oil crisis). In 1988 only 17 percent were concerned (again, probably largely because of OPEC's weakness and the drop in oil prices).
- For all twelve industries that we asked about, fewer people in 1988 than in 1979 cited insufficient competition.
- The proportion of respondents who said *none* of the twelve industries suffered from too little competition doubled over that period, from 10 percent to 21 percent.

Americans do detect a more competitive business environment, and deregulation—and the free-market philosophy underlying it—has undoubtedly helped foster this new perception. It would probably be a mistake, however, to attribute all of the change to deregulation alone. For one thing, the public is becoming much more aware of increasing global competition, which—from Americans' practical standpoint as consumers—has essentially the same effects as deregulation of domestic industries: greater choice, lower prices. Rising imports, as well as media coverage of the trade deficit and U.S. competitiveness, have contributed to the belief that competition is intensifying.

Furthermore, the low inflation rates of the past few years have also played a role. Deregulation can claim part of the credit for stable prices, but other factors—such as monetary policy—obviously figure in the equation, too. For consumers, low inflation implies that businesses are no longer free to raise prices when they want; this, in turn, suggests to them that the competition faced by business has stiffened.

Whatever the precise causes of the change, Americans are much more likely to see greater competition today than was the case a decade ago. But is increased competition necessarily a good thing? The fate of deregulation probably hinges on the answer to this question. A detailed examination of public attitudes toward two deregulated industries—telecommunications and airlines—suggests that Americans are ambivalent.

One Success Story: Telecommunications

It is somewhat difficult to assign a precise starting date to the deregulation of the telecommunications industry. The status of AT&T had been in the courts or before federal commissions since the mid-1970s. New long-distance companies began making significant inroads in the market in the early 1980s. AT&T formally spun off its local operating companies in January 1984.

For our purposes we'll consider 1984—when local and long-distance service providers were separated—to be the turning point in the structure of the telecommunications industry. And since that time, public opinion toward the telecommunications industry—both its long-distance and local components—has changed dramatically.

Table 1

INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITION

Question: Now, here is a list of some different kinds of industries. (Card shown respondent). Are there any industries on that list where you think there is too little competition—where too few companies dominate the industry? (If "yes") Which?

	1979	1988
Industries where there is too little competition		
Electric power	57%	44%
Telephone	60	29
Oil	50	17
Airlines	11	10
Drugs	14	9
Chemicals	11	8
Automobiles	15	8
Metals	13	6
Meat	9	6
Food processing/manufacturing	9	6
Lumber and paper	7	6
Computers and data processing	12	5
None of them	10	21

Source: Surveys by The Roper Organization (Roper Reports 88-10), latest that of October 29-November 5, 1988.

Whether in their assessments of telephone services or their general attitudes toward the industry, Americans are giving telecommunications suppliers much better marks. A few examples illustrate the increasingly favorable public opinion environment for this industry:

- In December 1988 only 12 percent reported any problems in placing a telephone call during the previous few weeks—down from 16 percent in 1984 and an average of 19 percent in the late 1970s.
- In April 1988, 52 percent said local telephone service was an "excellent" or "good value for the dollar," and 51 percent said the same for long-distance service—both up from 37 percent in early 1985.
- In August 1988, 46 percent claimed to be "completely satisfied" with their long-distance service—up from 34 percent in August 1984—and 39 percent were "fairly satisfied."
- In September 1987, 65 percent said that the telecommunications industry was "interested in the well-being of its customers"—up from 49 percent in 1982.
- In October 1988, 78 percent expressed a favorable opinion of the telecommunications industry—four times the proportion who expressed an unfavorable opinion, and the most positive measure Roper has recorded since this question was first asked in late 1983.

This list of examples could go on. For practically every measure of consumers' involvement with the telecommunications industry that Roper tracks, the news—for both local and long-distance providers—keeps getting better.

What lies behind the change? One factor might simply be growing use of telephone services. Our data suggest that usage, especially of long-distance services, has been growing steadily. One loose rule of public opinion is that the more frequently a consumer uses a service, the more favorably he or she is disposed toward the service provider.

Another factor has probably been that many of the dire predictions about what would happen after the breakup of AT&T have not come to pass. In the early 1980s, for instance, there was speculation that the price of local telephone service would rise beyond the means of low-income families. Or that fierce competition in the long-distance market would sap the financial resources needed for long-term investments. But consumers have not seen either of these materialize.

Finally, the public was somewhat confused and anxious at the time of the breakup. After all, "Ma Bell"—a long-time presence in every American home—was slated to disappear, at least in the form that consumers knew best. The extent of the change was so massive that people did not know what to expect, and they grew nervous as a result. Now, however, Americans are comfortable with the new, multi-supplier system—especially because it seems to perform so well.

So what is the current consensus about the deregulation of the telecommunications industry? Given the trends mentioned above, it comes as no surprise that a majority favor it. Last year 54 percent said that the deregulation of long-distance telephone service has been in the public's interest, versus 34 percent who said it ran against the public's interest. This represents a marginally greater degree of support for deregulation compared to mid-1986 when 52 percent believed deregulation of telecommunications had a beneficial effect.

The Airlines: A Deregulatory Failure?

Americans' attitudes toward the deregulation of the airline industry have evolved quite differently over the past decade. The mood is souring, and the wisdom of the deregulatory initiative is increasingly being called into question.

Even though Americans are flying in record numbers, it appears that air travel, for many, is becoming a less-than-satisfying experience. And among the most critical are precisely those who tend to use the airlines most frequently: executives, professionals, and affluent individuals.

When asked to assess the change in commercial airline service over the previous year, a 38 percent plurality in late 1985 perceived *no* change. Among the rest, opinion was evenly split between those who thought service had improved (19 percent), who believed it had deteriorated (21 percent), or who had no opinion (23 percent).

By late 1987, however, the picture had changed completely. Then a 39 percent plurality asserted that service had *worsened* over the past year. Most upset with the airlines' performance were executives, professionals, and the affluent, nearly half of whom said service had deteriorated. Meanwhile, substantially fewer than two years earlier thought service improved (just 13 percent) or did not change (32 percent).

And the assessments of airline safety were even more bleak. A 54 percent majority believed that safety had declined during 1987—which, again, was a negative shift in attitudes compared to 1985.

Other measures of public opinion indicate cause for concern in the airline industry. For example:

- In September 1988, 20 percent said that flying in a plane posed a "high risk" to a person's health and safety—up from 12 percent in early 1981. Combined with the 37 percent who believed that flying was at least a "moderate risk," this figure represents the highest level of fear of flying since Roper first asked the question in 1978.
- Also last year, 40 percent said the airlines were doing an "excellent" or "good" job of meeting the nation's needs, but 54 percent believed they were doing only a "fair" or "poor" job.
- A similarly negative assessment was given for meeting the country's needs "at a reasonable cost."
- In 1981 a 44 percent plurality thought there was "about the right amount" of government regulation of the airline industry; just 17 percent thought there was "not enough." But six years later the proportion of Americans calling for more regulation had doubled to 35 percent—a tie with the proportion who were satisfied with the level of regulation.

The reasons behind growing popular criticism of the airline industry are not difficult to fathom. One is the perception that air travel is less safe than it once was. While fatalities as a proportion of total air miles traveled may be the same or even lower than in the past, even a few highly publicized accidents or terrorist incidents give the public a very different impression.

More important, however, are probably the delays and inconveniences that seem to have become routine. Just one lengthy delay—stranded in an airport, on the runway, or in the air—or being "bumped" from a flight can have a tremendous effect on an air traveler's evaluation of the entire industry's performance.

Predictably, therefore, the public is souring on airline deregulation. In 1981 a 47 percent plurality believed that the deregulation of airline routes was *in* the public's interest. By 1988 a 45 percent plurality thought route deregulation worked *against* the public interest. And while a healthy 63 percent majority believed airline fare deregulation was a good idea eight years ago, only a bare 51 percent majority held that view late last year.

Results, Not Ideology

For the American public, the litmus test of deregulation is a pragmatic one: Has deregulation produced the benefits it promised? The standard used to judge is, frankly, self-interest: have lower prices, more choices, and greater convenience been the outcome?

According to these criteria, the verdict on deregulation is a mixed one. Americans perceive both successes and failures—or at least policies that have failed to meet expectations. Often the dividing line is between industries, as is the case with telecommunications and airlines. But sometimes it can fall within an industry. The deregulation of financial services, for instance, has offered investors better returns and more investment options and presumably more choices for customers. Yet the same deregulatory spirit may have contributed to the crisis in the savings and loan industry—and hence will cost some investors, and probably the taxpayers, a substantial amount of money.

What do these attitudes say about the public's broader philosophy of business/government relations? Is there a change under way? The cautious answer appears to be "yes."

Americans seem prepared to reevaluate some of the traditional checks that government imposes on business, and vice versa. They want business and government to concentrate on what they do best, but

(Continued on page 59)

WHAT AMERICANS ARE SAYING ABOUT TAXES

THE MESSAGE FROM THE VOTERS

Question: Thinking about the presidential election, this November (1988), how important would a presidential candidate's promise not to raise taxes be to you in deciding for whom to vote?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Money*, June 25-July 3, 1988

Question: I'm going to mention a few things that have become issues in this year's (1988) presidential campaign. For each, please tell me if this issue will be very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not important at all to you in deciding how you'll vote for President this November . . . holding taxes down.



Source: Survey by ABC News, September 21-27, 1988

Question: Do you think it's more likely that taxes would be raised in a Bush administration, or in a Dukakis administration, or isn't there likely to be any difference when it comes to raising taxes?

Taxes more likely to be raised . . .



Source: Survey by Media General for the Associated Press, September 6-14, 1988

Question: I am going to read you a list of problems facing the United States, and for each one, please tell me whether you think it is not much of a problem, is a problem but no government action is required, is a problem that requires government action but only if no new taxes are needed, or is a problem that requires government action even if new taxes are needed . . . .



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988

GETTING THE MOST FOR OUR MONEY: A LONG-TERM DECLINE IN ASSESSMENTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Question: From which level of government do you feel you get the most for your money — Federal, State, or Local?



Get the most for your money from . . .

	Federal	State	Local
1972	39%	18%	26%
1973	35	18	25
1974	29	24	28
1975	38	20	25
1976	36	20	25
1977	36	20	26
1978	35	20	26
1979	29	22	33
1980	33	22	26
1981	30	25	33
1982	35	20	28
1983	31	20	31
1984	24	27	35
1985	32	22	31
1986	32	22	33
1987	28	22	29
1988	28	27	29

Note: Don't know not shown.

Source: Surveys by Opinion Research Corporation, 1972-1982, the Gallup Organization, 1983-1988.

Question: Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 10-16, 1988.

THE WORST TAX? THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TAKES THE PRIZE

Question: Which do you think is the worst tax — that is the least fair?



Worst tax is . . .

	Federal income tax	State income tax	State sales tax	Local property tax
1972	19%	13%	13%	45%
1973	30	10	20	31
1974	30	10	20	28
1975	28	11	23	29
1977	28	11	17	33
1978	30	11	18	32
1979	37	8	15	27
1980	36	10	19	25
1981	36	9	14	33
1982	36	11	14	30
1983	35	11	13	26
1984	36	10	15	29
1985	38	10	16	24
1986	37	8	17	28
1987	30	12	21	24
1988	33	10	18	28

Note: Don't know not shown.

Source: Surveys by Opinion Research Corporation, 1972-1982, the Gallup Organization, 1983-1988.

WHERE SOCIAL SECURITY RANKS ON THE "WORST TAX" LIST

Question: Which do you think is the worst tax — that is, the least fair?

The worst tax is . . .



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 11-19, 1988.

READ OUR LIPS

Question: Who do you think is primarily responsible for the federal budget deficit — the President or the Congress?



Question: If taxes were raised, do you think the money would be used to cut the budget deficit, or do you think the government would find new ways to spend the additional money?



Question: Federal tax revenues are expected to rise by an average of $74 billion a year through 1993. At the present rate, government spending will increase about that fast, leaving the deficit above $100 billion. What would you do to reduce the budget deficit — raise taxes so that they equal spending, or hold down spending so that it fits tax revenues?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation, December 3-10, 1988.

Question: Do you favor raising taxes to reduce the budget deficit?



Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*, January 9-10, 1989.

Question: Would you favor or oppose an increase in federal taxes to help close the federal budget deficit?



Question: Do you think Congress should raise taxes to narrow the federal budget deficit even if George Bush does not ask for a tax increase, or not?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, January 14-17, 1989.

WAYS OF LOOKING AT OUR PRIORITIES

Question: If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of the following programs should spending be increased, for which should spending be decreased, or for which should spending be kept the same?

Question: (Asked of those who said funding for item should be increased) You mentioned that you favored increased spending in one or more areas of the federal budget. For example, you said there should be increased spending on (INSERT ITEM). Would you favor a freeze in spending in this area as part of a general freeze in spending to bring down the budget deficit, or do you oppose a freeze here because you feel spending in this area is too important?

Question: (Asked of those who aid funding for item should be increased) Regardless of whether or not you favor a freeze in spending on (INSERT ITEM), would you be willing to pay higher taxes to increase federal spending in this area, or not?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, January 1989.

IF TAXES ARE RAISED: TAX SIN AND TAX THE RICH

Question: (Here are some possible ways for the government to raise money to reduce the federal budget deficit. For each please tell me whether you support or oppose it.) . . .

To raise money to reduce the federal deficit



Source: Survey by Associated Press/Media General, November 10-20, 1988.

Question: Do you think federal income tax rates should be increased for people whose income is $100,000 a year or more, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, July 5-8, 1988.

CAN BUSH RESIST A TAX INCREASE? THE PUBLIC IS PESSIMISTIC

Question: While President Bush is in office, do you think taxes will probably be raised to reduce the deficit?



Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*, January 9-10, 1988.

Question: Do you think George Bush will ask Congress to increase taxes in the next four years?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 10-16, 1988.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO ON ITS 40th ANNIVERSARY

For over a half century now, Americans have faced as a regular issue in foreign policy the question of what part their country should play in Europe's defense. The fortieth anniversary of the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—the treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949—and current concern over the state of the alliance in an era when the Soviet Union looks less frightening, have prompted us to examine the historical record of public attitudes, looking at U.S. opinion in this issue and that of Britons, the French, and West Germans in the next.

The common assumption seems to be that World War II marks a great divide in American opinion on the proper U.S. role in Europe: "isolationist" before December 1941, much more "internationalist" and engaged after. Without question, U.S. policy shifted greatly in the postwar years with the Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction and NATO for the common defense. Undoubtedly, too, leadership attitudes on U.S. responsibilities shifted with the war and immediate postwar experience: the historic "America alone" position, which had commanded elite support throughout the 1930s, mostly disappeared in the late 1940s.

The turning point for many in the public was arguably, however, the threat of a totalitarian power other than the Soviet Union—Nazi Germany. Huge majorities looked with horror in 1939-1941 at the prospects of the United States being drawn into a second world war in just two decades. But long before Pearl Harbor, many Americans had clearly, though reluctantly, shifted to the position that our national interest required us to play a major role in seeing to it that Hitler did not triumph.

As early as February 1939, for example, a majority favored selling planes and other military equipment to Britain and France. By September 1940, a clear majority had concluded that we should help England win, even at the risk of our being drawn into the war (p. 28).

American opinion on the formation of NATO, on U.S. troops being stationed in Europe, and the like, was indeed positive in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as the summary of survey findings on p. 29 attests. But the public was by no means uncritically supportive. Then—as now—large majorities believed, for instance, that the West European democracies were not doing all they should in the defense of Europe, and about half thought the United States was spending too much (p. 30).

The striking story of public thinking over the last half century on questions of America's military responsibility in Europe is one of continuity. Today by huge margins we think that forming NATO was a good idea and that our heavy involvement in the alliance should be maintained rather than cut back (pp. 30 and 31). We still think, however, that Western Europe should do more to share the burden. And the use of American troops in Europe's defense in the event of a Soviet attack gets the same kind of tentative support, as a "necessary evil," that emerged at the end of the 1930s on behalf of direct U.S. intervention to prevent a Nazi triumph.

European opinion on the Soviet Union, and what is required of the United States and NATO in Europe's defense (which we examine in the next issue), is in a state of foment today. But U.S. public opinion shows only slow and limited adaptation around a fundamentally constant set of basic commitments.

ECL

ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II: RELUCTANCE AT FIRST . . .

Question: In case a war breaks out, should we sell Britain and France food supplies?

Question: Should we sell them airplanes and other war materials?

Question: What should be the policy in the present European war? Should we declare war and send our army and navy abroad to fight Germany?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, February 19-24, 1939.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 24-29, 1939.

THEN STRONG SUPPORT

Question: Which of these two things do you think is the most important for the United States to try to do—to keep out of war ourselves or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 5-10, 1940

Question: Which of these two things do you think is the more important—that this country keep out of war or that Germany be defeated?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 19-24, 1941

AWARENESS OF NATO GROWS

Question: Have you heard or read anything about the recent agreement between England, France, and other countries of Western Europe, to defend each other against attack?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, March 1948

Question: Have you heard or read about the North Atlantic Security Pact?



Note: On April 4th, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, a defense agreement that laid the foundation for NATO.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 2-7, 1949

STRONG SUPPORT OF NATO AT ITS CREATION . . .

Question: Do you think the United States and all the Western European countries participating in the Marshall Plan should join together in a permanent military alliance—that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if any one of them is attacked?



	Should	Should Not
April 1948	65%	21%
July 1948	73	16
Nov. 1948	68	19
Jan. 1949	67	16
March 1949	76	14

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 20-25, 1949.

Question: As you may recall, the United States signed an agreement with Canada and the countries of Western Europe last year to defend each other against any attack. How do you feel about this treaty now—Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to have this agreement?

	Good Idea	Bad Idea
Mar. 1950	80%	9%
July 1950	87	6
Dec. 1950	78	10
Aug. 1951	84	7
June 1953	85	9
Oct. 1955	80	11
Nov. 1955	87	6
Nov. 1956	80	12



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, latest that of November 1956.

BUT NOT UNCRITICAL SUPPORT

Question: Do you think the countries of Western Europe are doing all they should to build up their own defense, or not?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, latest that of December 1950.

Question: Do you think the countries of Western Europe will or will not do their share in building up armed forces for the common defense?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, latest that of May 1951.

Question: How do you feel about the amount of money the United States is now spending to help the western European countries to build up their defenses against Communism—in general are we spending too much, about the right amount, or not enough?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, December 1951.

Attitudes Today

Question: In your opinion, how important are this country's ties with Western Europe—would you say they matter a great deal, or that they aren't very important?



Note: Gallup also surveyed opinion leaders. Ninety-nine percent of them said this country's ties with Western Europe matter a great deal, 1% disagreed.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Commission of the European Communities, November 6-December 4, 1987.

Question: (Now I'll name some major events in our history. I'd like to know for each whether you think what this country did was the right thing or the wrong thing—or somewhere in between.) . . . Deciding to help form and become a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization.)

U.S. did . . . helping to form and become a member of NATO



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 84-8), latest that of August 11-18, 1984.

PUBLIC WANTS TO MAINTAIN OUR COMMITMENT TODAY . . .

Question: Some people feel that NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the military organization of Western Europe and the United States, has outlived its usefulness, and that the United States should withdraw militarily from NATO. Others say that NATO has discouraged the Russians from trying a military takeover in Western Europe. Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment but still remain in NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, December 6-14, 1974; and by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, latest that of October 30-November 12, 1986.

IN THE NEXT ISSUE:
PERSPECTIVES
ON NATO
FROM BRITAIN
FRANCE
AND WEST GERMANY

Question: All things considered, do you think that having American troops stationed in Western Europe is necessary to prevent a Soviet attack on Western Europe, or are these troops not necessary to prevent a Soviet attack?



Note: Gallup also surveyed opinion leaders. They agreed with the figures shown above, by 71 to 25%.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Commission of the European Communities, November 6-December 4, 1987.

Question: Here are some arguments for and against the idea of defending our own borders. For each, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?

Our allies are perfectly capable of defending themselves and they can afford it



Source: Survey by The Daniel Yankelovich Group for Americans Talk Security, February 17-24, 1988.

BUT SOME SORE SPOTS EXIST

Question: Do you think the Western European countries' contribution to the defense of the free world is too small, about right, or too great?

Question: (Now for each country or group of countries I mention, do you think the U.S. contribution to defense is not enough, the right amount, or too much?) . . . The countries of Western Europe . . . Japan . . . Canada?

Western European countries' contribution to the defense of the free world is . . .



Note: Sixty-seven percent of the opinion leaders in the Gallup survey said "too small," 28% said "about right," and 2% said "too great."

U.S. contribution to defense of (name country) is . . .



Note: Seven percent of the opinion leaders in the Gallup survey said "not enough," 53% said "about right," and 37% said, "too much."

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Commission of the European Communities, November 6-December 4, 1987.

Question: Some people believe that we should bring our troops home and limit our military involvement to defending only our own borders—that we should gradually end our treaty commitments and let our allies take care of themselves. Would you say you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this idea?



Source: Survey by The Daniel Yankelovich Group for Americans Talk Security, February 17-24, 1988.

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 88-8), latest that of August 24-31, 1988.

Question: Do you think our ties with Western Europe are closer or not as close as they were ten years ago?



Note: Thirty percent of the opinion leaders in the Gallup survey said ties are closer, 50% said not as close.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Commission of the European Communities, November 6-December 4, 1987.

Question: In mid-April, U.S. Navy planes from carriers in the Mediterranean and U.S. Air Force planes based in Britain made a bombing strike against Libya. Do you think our Western European allies should have given us more help against Libya or did they do as much as could be expected?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, May 7-8, 1986.

Question: When the French refused to let U.S. planes fly over their territory on the way to Libya (to conduct the air raids of April 14, 1986) were they being poor allies, or was their refusal understandable?

When the French refused to let U.S. planes fly over their territory . . .



Note: Sample size = 704 adults.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 15, 1986.

Question: Overall, do you think the United States is getting enough support from its European allies in the attempt to stop terrorism or not?



Note: Sixty-six percent of the opinion leaders in the Gallup survey said the U.S. is not getting enough support, 31% said it is.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Commission of the European Communities, November 6-December 4, 1987.

Question: When the British allowed U.S. planes to fly from bases in England on their way to Libya (to conduct the air raids of April 14, 1986), were they being especially good allies, or were they acting simply in their own best interests?

When the British allowed U.S. planes to take off from bases in England . . .



Note: Sample size 704 adults.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 15, 1986.

Question: France did not allow American planes to fly over French territory on their way to bomb Libya, forcing the planes to take a longer route. How much does it matter to you that the French did not allow American bombers to fly over their country . . . does it matter to you a lot, some, or not very much?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, April 28-29, 1986.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA:

Question: I'd like to have your impressions about the overall position that some countries have taken toward the U.S. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each country, tell me if you believe that country has acted as a close ally of the U.S., has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the U.S., has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S. but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the U.S.? First, . . .

1984

Country is a close ally of the United States . . . **Enemy**



Note: In the most recent asking of this question in 1987, Cuba was dropped from the list.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 84-6), May 29-June 3, 1984

Later this year, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev plans to visit Cuba. We look here at American attitudes toward Cuba. To do so we draw heavily on two surveys done by the Gallup Organization for Potomac Associates, the first in 1977, and the second in March 1988.

Question: Turning to a nearby country, what is your general attitude toward Cuba—very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?



Question: Particularly in view of its relationship with the Soviet Union, how serious a threat to the security of the United States do you think Cuba represents—very serious, fairly serious, not particularly serious, or not serious at all?



Note: Question wording varied slightly

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for Potomac Associates, latest that of March 4-13, 1988

NO CIGAR FOR FIDEL

Question: From what you have heard or read, is it your impression that Fidel Castro's leadership has been a good thing or a bad thing for most Cubans, or hasn't it made much difference?

Castro's leadership . . . for most Cubans



Question: Some say that as long as relations between Cuba and the United States remain strained, the current American trade embargo should be maintained as a form of pressure on Cuba. Others say that trade is in our own interest, and should be permitted regardless of poor relations between Cuba and the United States. How do you, yourself, feel? Should trade continue to be banned until overall relations are improved, or should trade be permitted even though overall relations are poor?



Question: Under present conditions, how do you feel about the United States entering into negotiations with Cuba looking toward re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations and exchanging ambassadors? Would you be strongly in favor, fairly strongly in favor, fairly strongly opposed, or very strongly opposed?



Question: What about the human rights situation in Cuba, that is, the degree to which the rights and liberties of individual citizens are protected? Is it your impression that the situation concerning human rights in Cuba is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

The human rights situation in Cuba is . . .



Question: Both Cuba and the United States have been active in Central America. Cuba has indicated that it is willing to cooperate with the Central American Peace Plan and enter into discussions with the United States about U.S. security concerns in the area. In your opinion, should the United States enter into such discussions with Cuba, or should it refuse to do so?



Question: The United States has full diplomatic relations with most countries around the world, including the Soviet Union and South Africa, for example, with whom we have major policy differences. We have been unwilling, however, to establish such relations with Cuba. Under present conditions, how do you feel about the United States entering into negotiations with Cuba looking toward re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations and exchanging ambassadors? Would you be very strongly in favor, fairly strongly in favor, fairly strongly opposed, or very strongly opposed?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Potomac Associates, March 4-13, 1988

CONSUMER CONFIDENCE



Note: Please see *Public Opinion*, September/October 1987, page 28 for question wording.

Source: Surveys by Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, and the National Family Opinion, Inc., for the Conference Board, latest that of January 1989.

PUBLIC PORTRAITS OF FIRST LADIES

For the pollsters, first ladies have been a secondary interest. No questions were asked about Bess Truman during her husband's presidency, and only a few appear about Mamie Eisenhower (see p. 38). The number of questions about first ladies picked up in the mid-seventies, but it wasn't until the Reagan presidency that two survey organizations frequently tapped our sentiments about the president's wife. Several survey organizations have already posed questions about Barbara Bush, perhaps heralding more regular assessments. Interestingly, initial reactions to Barbara Bush have been more positive than the early reactions to her husband. Only three first ladies—Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosalynn Carter, and Nancy Reagan—inspired the pollsters to ask questions about their influence in the White House and on their husbands.

KHK

Question: In general, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Barbara Bush?



Source: Survey by NBC News *Wall Street Journal*, January 14-17, 1989

COMPARING THE FIRST LADIES

Question: Since 1960 we have had six first ladies: Jackie Kennedy, Lady Bird Johnson, Pat Nixon, Betty Ford, Rosalynn Carter, and Nancy Reagan. Which one do you have the most favorable impression of ?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, December 4-6, 1981, and NBC News for WKYC, May 14-15, 1985

Question: You will notice that the ten boxes on this scale go from the highest position of plus five — for someone you have a very favorable opinion of —all the way down to the lowest position of minus five — for someone you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up or down the scale would you rate . . .



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 30-May 3, 1982

STYLE AND SUBSTANCE

Mamie

Question: Would you like to have people continue to refer to Mrs. Eisenhower as "Mamie" or not?



Note: Forty seven percent of Americans wanted people to call Dwight Eisenhower "Ike", 38% did not.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 11-16, 1953.

Jackie

Question: Of course every person in public life has his or her good points. Thinking of Jacqueline Kennedy, the president's wife, I'd like to ask you first what things you like best (least) about her?

(Rank order)

Like best about Jacqueline Kennedy

Attractive, pretty, good looking
Good personality
Intelligent, educated
Makes a good impression abroad
Interested in culture
Good mother
Friendly, warm

Like least

Travels too much, away from family
In the limelight too much
Her hairdo
Her taste in clothes
Undignified
Her voice
Spends too much money
Pictures in newspaper in bathing suit
Doesn't wear right attire to church

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 23-28, 1962.

Nancy

Question: Compared to other first ladies, generally, do you think Nancy Reagan is . . .

Compared to other first ladies Nancy Reagan is . . .



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 4-6, 1981.

INFLUENCE

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

Question: Do you approve of the way Mrs. Roosevelt has conducted herself as first lady?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 22-27, 1940.

Question: What do you think about the trips that Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt makes?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 27-May 2, 1944.

Question: The Daughters of the American Revolution would not allow a well-known Negro singer to give a concert in one of their halls. As a protest against this, Mrs. Roosevelt resigned from the organization. Do you approve of her action?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 4-9, 1939.

ROSALYNN CARTER

Question: All in all, how would you rate the job Mrs. Carter has been doing as the first lady — excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?

How would you rate the job Mrs. Carter has been doing as first lady . . .



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, June 13-18, 1977

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Mrs. Jimmy (Rosalynn) Carter is handling her role as first lady?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 17-20, 1979

Question: During June (1977), Rosalynn Carter went on a visit to meet with government leaders in seven Latin American and Caribbean nations as a representative of the United States to discuss matters of mutual interest to their country and ours. Some people have said such a trip is not appropriate for a first lady, and that only elected officials or professional diplomats should represent the United States abroad. Others have said it is perfectly appropriate for a first lady to be sent on such a trip if the president wishes it. How do you feel — that a first lady should or should not officially represent the United States in talks with other countries?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 77-7), July 9-16, 1977

Question: Now let me read you some statements about Mrs. Carter and her trip, and about the use of the president's family for diplomatic missions. For each tell me if you tend to agree or disagree . . .



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, June 13-18, 1977

NANCY REAGAN

Question: Do you generally approve or disapprove of the way Nancy Reagan is handling her responsibility as first lady?



Note: CBS News/*New York Times* asked the same question in January 1985 and found 71% approve, 14% disapprove, 14% don't know

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 13-15, 1988

Question: How much influence do you think Nancy Reagan has on her husband's official presidential policies and decisions — a great deal, some, not very much, or none at all?

Nancy Reagan has . . .



Question: And how much influence do you think Nancy Reagan should have on her husband's official presidential policies and decisions . . . a great deal, some, not very much, or none at all?

Nancy Reagan should have . . .



Question: In general, do you think Nancy Reagan has too much influence on her husband's official presidential policies and decisions, or don't you think so?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of June 9-12, 1988

THE WOMEN WE ADMIRE

Nineteen eighty-eight marked the fortieth anniversary of the Gallup Organization's "Most Admired Women" poll. Over the years, first ladies have figured prominently on the list. Eleanor Roosevelt wins the prize for the most first-place mentions, thirteen; she was number one every year from 1948 to 1961, except in 1951 when she took second place to Australian Sister Kenny. Jacqueline Kennedy held first place five years in a row; when she became Jacqueline Onassis in 1968 she slipped to seventh place. The Kennedy name still had its magic, though—in 1968 Ethel Kennedy was number one, and Rose Kennedy made her first appearance of eight (at number two). Neither Bess Truman nor Lady Bird Johnson won our hearts as the *most* admired woman during her husband's presidency, and Mamie Eisenhower (on the list 21 times) and Betty Ford were chosen number one only after their husbands left office (in 1979 for Mamie Eisenhower, and in 1978 for Betty Ford). Patricia Nixon took the top spot only once during he Nixon years, and in 1974, the year her husband resigned, she placed third. Golda Meir was number one three times during the Nixon presidency. Rosalynn Carter was our most admired woman in 1977 and 1978, and in 1980 she shared the spot with Mother Teresa. Nancy Reagan was first in three of the eight Reagan years. Ronald Reagan's soul-mate, Margaret Thatcher, took that spot for four years during his presidency.

Historically, the number one spot has been won by a president's wife, or a world or religious leader. Wives of foreign leaders have also made the top ten—Madame Chiang Kai-shek (seventeen times) Madame Ngo Diem Nhu once, and Raisa Gorbachev once, in 1987 when she shared eighth place with Coretta Scott King (seven times on the list), Elizabeth Dole (once), and Geraldine Ferraro (twice). Barbara Bush was already a "10" a month after her husband was elected. The list below includes the person who ranked first each year Gallup asked the question, and the ranking of every first lady on the list that year.

KHK

1948 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Bess Truman (5)
1949 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
1950 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
1951 Sister Kenny (1)
Eleanor Roosevelt (2)
1952 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (3)
Bess Truman (10)
1953 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (2)
Bess Truman (8)
1954 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (2)
1955 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (3)
1956 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (3)
1957 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (6)
1958 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (4)
1959 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Patricia Nixon (7)
1960 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (2)
Patricia Nixon (6)
Jacqueline Kennedy (7)
1961 Eleanor Roosevelt (1)
Jacqueline Kennedy (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (4)
Patricia Nixon (10)
1962 Jacqueline Kennedy (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (4)
Patricia Nixon (10)
1963 Jacqueline Kennedy (1)
Lady Bird Johnson (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (5)
1964 Jacqueline Kennedy (1)
Lady Bird Johnson (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (7)
1965 Jacqueline Kennedy (1)
Lady Bird Johnson (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (4)
1966 Jacqueline Kennedy (1)
Lady Bird Johnson (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (7)
1968 Ethel Kennedy (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (3)
Lady Bird Johnson (4)
Patricia Nixon (6)
Jacqueline Onassis (7)
1969 Mamie Eisenhower (1)
Patricia Nixon (3)
Jacqueline Onassis (5)
1970 Mamie Eisenhower (1)
Patricia Nixon (2)
Jacqueline Onassis (5)
Lady Bird Johnson (6)
1971 Golda Meir (1)
Patricia Nixon (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (5)
Jacqueline Onassis (6)
Lady Bird Johnson (7)
1972 Patricia Nixon (1)
Mamie Eisenhower (4)
Jacqueline Onassis (5)
1973 Golda Meir (1)
Patricia Nixon (2)
Mamie Eisenhower (6)
Lady Bird Johnson (7)
Jacqueline Onassis (8)
1974 Golda Meir (1)
Betty Ford (2)
Patricia Nixon (3)
Lady Bird Johnson (8)
Jacqueline Onassis (9)
Mamie Eisenhower (10)
1977 Rosalynn Carter (1)
Betty Ford (4)
Patricia Nixon (6)
Jacqueline Onassis (10)
1978 Betty Ford (1)
Rosalynn Carter (2)
Patricia Nixon (4)
Jacqueline Onassis (6)
1979 Rosalynn Carter (1)
Betty Ford (2)
Patricia Nixon (7)
Jacqueline Onassis (10)
1980 Rosalynn Carter (1)
Betty Ford (3)
Nancy Reagan (8)
Jacqueline Onassis (9)
1981 Nancy Reagan (1)
Betty Ford (5)
Jacqueline Onassis (6)
Rosalynn Carter (7)
1982 Margaret Thatcher (1)
Nancy Reagan (3)
Betty Ford (8)
Rosalynn Carter (10)
1983 Margaret Thatcher (1)
Nancy Reagan (3)
Betty Ford (4)
Jacqueline Onassis (5)
1984 Margaret Thatcher (1)
Nancy Reagan (4)
Betty Ford (6)
1985 Nancy Reagan (1)
Betty Ford (7)
Jacqueline Onassis (9)
1986 Mother Teresa (1)
Nancy Reagan (3)
Betty Ford (8)
Jacqueline Onassis (10)
1987 Nancy Reagan (1)
Betty Ford (7)
1988 Margaret Thatcher (1)
Nancy Reagan (3)
Betty Ford (5)
Jacqueline Onassis (8)
Barbara Bush (10)

Summing Up Before the Economic Summit

by Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman

Next July marks the fifteenth annual economic summit. Although lacking some of the glamour of the arms control summits, it will be a major media event in its own right. As the only annual meeting of the leaders of the seven major industrialized countries, each economic summit is a well-choreographed production. Consequently, leaders from the United States, Japan, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada (as well as the European Community) will be paying a great deal of attention to the way their performance is playing back home. In trying to reach agreements on politically sensitive economic issues, then, these leaders have to take into account the expectations and constraints of public opinion (see table 1). Survey data collected in the seven summit countries between 1974 and 1988 hint at some of those constraints.[1]

Table 1

SUMMIT ACCOMPLISHMENTS?

Question: You may have heard that leaders of our country and other industrialized democracies are meeting this (month) in (place) at their annual summit to discuss economic problems facing the world. In your view, how much can be accomplished in solving global economic problems by such meetings of heads of state . . . ?

A great deal/fair amount can be accomplished

	1979	1982	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
France	—	—	38%	33%	35%	46%	54%
Italy	—	—	46	41	50	46	50
Britain	—	—	41	43	41	52	45
Germany	—	—	47	45	50	34	30
Canada	—	—	42	49	52	47	53
Japan	26%	29%	—	37	—	28	38

Note: "Not very much," "nothing at all," and "don't know" not shown. The "don't know" responses were consistently higher in Japan than other countries shown here, ranging from 19 to 24%.

People in the six summit countries linked the health of their own economy to that of the United States. In April 1988 large majorities in Canada and the four major West European countries said their country's economic health depended at least a fair amount on U.S. economic health; in Japan 90 percent thought trade with the United States was important for Japan's prosperity (see table 2). Furthermore, in the same survey large majorities in Britain (71 percent), Canada (87 percent), France (82 percent), Japan (80 percent), and West Germany (70 percent) thought the value of the U.S. dollar *vis-à-vis* their own currency had at least a fair amount of influence on their country's economic health; Italian opinion was evenly divided.

Table 2

INTERDEPENDENCE

Question: To what extent would you say the economic health of the (survey country) depends on the economic health of the U.S. . . .?

Our economic health depends on economic health of U.S. a great deal/ fair amount (1988)	
France	64%
Italy	68
Britain	60
Germany	63
Canada	84

Given the acknowledged interdependence with the U.S. economy, majorities—ranging from 56 percent in West Germany to 84 percent in Japan—said in April 1988 that it is fairly or very important for their country's economic health "to closely coordinate our policies with the United States" (see table 3). Willingness to coordinate economic policies dropped considerably, however, when factors such as self-interest or excessive U.S. influence were raised. Support for coordinating with the United States on trade with the U.S.S.R.—though the prevailing view in four of six countries—was substantially lower, for example, than general support for policy coordination. Similarly, in an April 1987 survey, only in Japan did a majority (53 – 18 percent) agree that "we should coordinate our economic policies with the United States since this best serves our interests." In the other five summit countries, opinion was divided between this view and the alternative that

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[1] The data used in this paper—all based on representative national samples—come from a variety of sources. Some of the surveys were sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency, others by newspapers, periodicals, or television networks, and one by the European Community. Fieldwork was normally conducted by local commercial survey research firms. Most surveys used here were based on between 1,000 and 1,500 in-home personal interviews with a probability or quota sample of adults; a few of the surveys either had a smaller sample and/or were done by telephone. Unless otherwise noted, all surveys outside the United States used in this article are USIA surveys.

Table 3

IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION

Question: How important do you think it is for the economic health of (survey country) to closely coordinate our policies with the United States . . . ?

Very/fairly important to closely coordinate our policies with the U.S. (1988)	
France	63%
Italy	66
Britain	58
Germany	56
Canada	79
Japan	84

Table 4

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF INTERESTS COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES, 1988

Question: Using the scale on this card where 1 is very similar and 5 is very different, please tell me how similar or different are the economic interests of (survey country) and those of the United States.

	Our interests are . . .	
	Similar to U.S.	**Different from U.S.**
France	28%	31%
Italy	30	45
Britain	36	33
Germany	30	33
Canada	55	24

Note: "Similar" = points 1 and 2. "Different" = points 4 and 5.

Table 5

U.S. COOPERATION IN RESOLVING DIFFERENCES

Question: In trying to resolve economic problems with Western Europe and other countries, is it your impression that the U.S. has been . . . ?

U.S. has been very/rather cooperative in trying to resolve economic problems

	1983	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**	**1987**	**1988**
France	18%	22%	24%	31%	29%	25%
Italy	36	46	50	42	45	45
Britain	57	41	59	53	49	45
Germany	39	38	41	35	31	39
Canada	—	57	—	73	53	55
Japan	48	63	—	—	34	45

"we should not coordinate our policies with the U.S. since the U.S. already has too much influence on our economic policies." Furthermore, in April 1988 only minorities in Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany thought their country's economic interests were similar to those of the United States (see table 4). Opinions are mixed on U.S. willingness to cooperate on solving economic problems. In most countries, opinion has changed little since five years ago (see table 5).

In 1988 more people in all summit countries except Italy tended to believe that U.S. policies had been harmful rather than helpful to their country's economic situation; in April 1988 the proportion seeing them as harmful ranged from 20 percent in Italy to 38 percent in France. A majority in West Germany, half in Britain and Japan, and almost half in France and Italy, however, either said U.S. policies had little effect or said that they were not sure. Moreover, the proportion calling U.S. policies harmful has decreased substantially since the mid-1980s (see table 6).

Table 6

ASSESSING U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS

Question: Do you think that the economic policies and actions of the United States have been more helpful or more harmful to the economic situation in our country, or have they had little effect on our country?

Effect of U.S. policies/actions has been
More helpful—More harmful

	1978	**1982**	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**	**1987**	**1988**
France	21-28%	11-48%	8-49%	7-41%	13-24%	24-30%	18-38%
Italy	33-30	37-34	29-35	7-34	10-38	39-25	36-20
Britain	28-12	15-32	11-39	6-58	16-36	22-31	17-33
Germany	19-28	22-29	10-56	5-46	13-37	23-29	18-25
Canada	22-16	18-47	26-36	23-48	24-38	26-42	27-37
Japan	—	20-40	11-36	22-24	—	13-47	15-35

A series of similar questions in each of these countries asked about the effects of their own government's policies and those of the European Community and Japan. Only in Canada and Japan were U.S. policies most often seen as harmful. In France and West Germany, Japanese policies were more widely seen as harmful than were U.S. policies. In Italy in 1988, both Japanese and their own country's policies were more often seen as harmful than U.S. policies (see table 7).

Protectionism

Protectionism remains a major concern in the late 1980s, partly because of its link to unemployment. In many Western countries unemployment continues at a high level and is seen by the public as the number one problem. A number of other recent developments have also sparked concern about the onset of increased protectionism. The harsh U.S.-European Community (EC) conflicts over agricultural trade in the current round of GATT negotiations and the threat of an agricultural trade war are examples. Two recent agreements—though they will lead to a reduction of trade barriers among the partners—have also raised concerns that barriers might increase toward the rest of the world: the EC's goal of a common market of goods, services, people, and capital among its twelve members by the end of 1992; and the U.S.-Canada free-trade accord.

Free trade is widely supported in principle, but when a question includes the protection of jobs or domestic industries, the prevailing view favors restrictions on imports—meaning that a substantial minority

Table 7

ASSESSING ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS

Question: From what you have heard or read, do you think the economic policies of (the current survey country government/the European Community/Japan) have been more helpful or more harmful to the economic situation in our country?

Economic policies and actions of . . .

Have been more helpful— More harmful to our country	**Our Country**		**The European Community**		**Japan**	
	1987	**1988**	**1987**	**1988**	**1987**	**1988**
France	38-32%	25-24%	44-12%	34-22%	20-41%	13-46%
Italy	53-34	14-35	48-17	34-21	11-40	10-32
Britain	47-41	47-27	27-38	17-44	10-67	19-43
Germany	50-18	26-27	35-31	25-32	15-42	11-40
Canada	35-47	30-24	15-13	17-20	28-35	27-27
Japan	—	—	10-28	12-18	—	—

Table 8

FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONISM

Question: Some people favor restrictions on foreign imports to protect (survey country) jobs in certain industries. Others oppose restrictions because they would lead to higher consumer prices for certain products. Which view is closer to your own?

Favor restrictions on imports—Oppose	**1987**	**1988**
France	59-28%	54-32%
Italy	50-36	50-38
Britain	62-28	59-29
Germany	44-34	48-29
Canada	61-30	65-26
Japan	38-27	29-33

Question: Which policy do you think the United States generally follows—free trade or restrictions?

U.S. follows Free Trade—Restrictions	**1985**	**1988**
France	25-41%	27-48%
Italy	41-35	45-34
Britain	34-38	37-42
Germany	46-32	35-45
Canada	34-46*	16-71
Japan	42-37	47-33

Note: * = 1984 question.

Question: Some countries favor free trade—that is, fewer restrictions on the freedom of countries to buy and sell to each other. Other countries favor restrictions on free trade in order to protect their own products against foreign competition. Which policy do you think (survey country) follows—free trade or restrictions?

Own country follows Free Trade—Restrictions	**1985**	**1988**
France	58-17%	68-18%
Italy	73-11	70-17
Britain	57-28	59-30
Germany	69-15	56-23
Canada	39-52	25-63
Japan	31-53	17-68

support free trade *only* in principle but not in practice. This has shown up in several surveys during the 1980s. In a March-April 1983 survey, for example, majorities in Britain, Italy, and the United States and pluralities in France, Japan, and West Germany wanted to "progressively reduce trade restrictions and encourage free international trade" as a means to deal with economic difficulties; in the same battery of questions, however, majorities or pluralities in each of these countries wanted to "protect national producers by increased import restrictions." In April 1983 and March 1984 surveys, sizable majorities in the four major West European countries—France, Italy, West Germany, and Britain—supported the principle of free trade, but in an October 1983 survey, support was 20 – 40 percent lower in these countries when the question linked attitudes on free trade to a loss of jobs. This was also shown in a November-December 1987 survey in the United States, in which majorities supported contradictory solutions to the U.S. trade deficit: passing free-trade agreements with our trading partners (67 percent) as well as raising import taxes on West European goods (55 percent) and on Japanese goods (67 percent).[2]

In surveys between 1985 and 1988, support for restrictions on foreign imports to protect jobs in certain industries prevailed in all years in Britain, Canada, France, and Italy, and in most years in Germany. In Japan support for restrictions on imports was the plurality view in 1985 and 1987, but opinion divided in 1988. More specifically, in April 1988 import restrictions "to protect jobs in certain industries" were favored by majorities in Britain, Canada, and France and by pluralities in Italy and West Germany. Japanese opinion was roughly divided (see table 8). In a U.S. survey in May 1988, Americans favored restrictions to protect domestic industries over free trade by a 56 – 34 percent margin.[3] Similar questions asked in the United States since 1973 have consistently shown majority support for protectionism.

Opinions on U.S. trade policy have been mixed, with pluralities in Britain, France, and West Germany seeing it as more protectionist than free-trade oriented, while pluralities in Italy and Japan see the United States as supporting free trade (see table 8). In Britain, France, and West Germany, more in 1988 believed the United States favored protectionism than at any time since the question was first asked in 1974; fewer Italians saw the United States as a free trader than in 1978, though more than in 1983 – 85 surveys. In 1988, more Japanese saw the United States as a free trader (47 percent) than in any survey since the Japanese were first asked in 1974 (see table 8 for selected years).

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[2] The 1983 multinational surveys were sponsored by the Atlantic Institute, with fieldwork coordinated by Louis Harris France. The 1987 U.S. data are from a telephone survey of 1,300 adults by Gallup for the European Community.

[3] May 1988 U.S. survey sponsored by CBS News in conjunction with a similar survey in Japan sponsored by the Tokyo Broadcasting System.

Large majorities in the four major West European countries see their own country as a free trader, while the Japanese and Canadians (the latter in a 1987 survey) consider their own country to favor trade restrictions (see table 8 for selected years). In France and West Germany since 1976 and in Italy since 1982, this has always been the perception; in Britain opinion was closely divided in 1976 and 1979, but the free-trade image has been the majority view in the 1980s. In Japan the protectionist self-image is held by a wide margin that has grown considerably since the mid-1980s.

U.S.-Japanese Bilateral Trade

U.S.-Japanese relations in the past decade have been marked by frictions resulting from the large U.S. trade deficit with Japan. A majority in Japan have been at least fairly concerned in surveys between 1982 and 1988 that these trade frictions "will seriously damage relations between the United States and Japan." (See table 9) In a November-December 1987 survey, large majorities of Americans knew of the U.S. trade deficit with Japan (70 percent) and thought that the Japanese used unfair practices to make it difficult for Americans to sell products in Japan (65 percent). By contrast a majority (72 percent) thought the Canadians used fair practices, and a plurality (47 – 30 percent) said this of West Europe. In a similar series of questions in October 1985, many more in the United States favored restrictions on Japanese imports (70 percent) than on Mexican (48 percent) or Canadian (37 percent) imports.[4]

Both the Americans and the Japanese view Japan as protectionist, but Japanese opinion is divided on who is to blame for the large trade imbalance. In May 1988 a majority of Americans saw Japanese restrictions as unfair, but a majority of Japanese thought they were fair. Furthermore, though the Japanese generally see the United States as a free trader, their opinions divide on U.S. complaints that the Japanese market is not as open to U.S. products as the U.S. market is to Japanese products (see table 9). The Japanese also tend to blame both U.S. economic policies and Japanese trading practices equally for current frictions between the two (53 percent said this); 21 percent blamed only U.S. economic policies and only 12 percent Japanese trading practices. Finally, about as many in Japan in May 1988 blamed lower-quality U.S. products or insufficient efforts by American companies for the U.S. failure to sell more American goods in Japan as blamed Japan (for protectionist policies). By contrast, though a large plurality of Americans rated the Japanese ahead of the United States in making "consumer products that are more technologically advanced," more Americans put primary blame for poor U.S. export performance on Japanese restrictions (47 percent) than on lower-quality U.S. goods (11 percent) or U.S. companies not trying hard enough (26 percent).[5]

Table 9

JAPANESE VIEWS
TRADE RELATIONS

Question: How concerned are you that trade frictions with the U.S. will seriously damage relations between the U.S. and Japan—very concerned, fairly concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned?

Japanese views	**1982**	**1983**	**1985**	**1988**
Concerned that trade frictions with U.S. will seriously damage relations	59%	52%	52%	62%
Not concerned	18	37	37	29

Question: Americans complain that the Japanese market is not as open to American products as the U.S. market is to Japanese products. Do you think these complaints are justified or don't you think so?

Japanese views	**1987**	**1988**
American complaints that Japanese market is not open are justified	51%	39%
Are not	36	36

Question: Which would you say is more to blame for current economic frictions between Japan and the U.S.—Japan's trading practices or U.S. economic policies, or would you say both were about equally to blame?

Japanese views	**1987**	**1988**
Japan's trading practices more to blame	11%	12%
U.S. economic policies	28	21
Both about equally	55	53

Agriculture: Subsidies and Import Restrictions

In mid-1987 President Reagan proposed that "trade-distorting" agricultural subsidies be eliminated shortly after the year 2000. He also said he would not accept a short-term deal without this long-term commitment. In direct contrast, the European Community, supported by Japan, has said it would accept some reduction of agricultural subsidies in the short term but could make no commitment to eliminating them.

In advanced nations, traditional public sympathy for the farmer combines with well-organized agricultural interests to hinder achievement of subsidy-free agriculture. In fact, people generally support protectionism in agriculture—import restrictions as well as subsidies to domestic farmers. In 1988 surveys, people in six of seven summit countries supported agricultural subsidies; only in Japan, where opinion divided evenly, was this position not widely favored. Interestingly, in a November-December 1987 survey, only a plurality of Americans considered "forcing Western Europe to cut back on subsidies to European farmers" to be a good (43 percent) rather than a bad (36 percent) solution to the U.S. trade deficit. In addition, customs duties are supported by majorities in Canada, France, and Italy and by a plurality (42 – 33 percent) in West Germany, in order to protect domestic farmers from foreign competition *even if it meant increased food prices*. In Britain, which has a small farming population, opinion divided. Similarly, majorities in the United States (72 percent in a May 1988 survey, 65 percent in a September 1988 survey) and Japan (59 percent in May 1988, 55 percent in September) supported import restrictions to protect domestic farmers; this was true even when, as in the September 1988 survey, "lower prices for consumers" was mentioned in the question. A plurality (47 – 27 percent) of Japanese favored quotas to protect farmers even with higher prices.[b]

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[4] U.S. data are from the 1987 Gallup European Community survey, and an October 1985 NBC/*Wall Street Journal* survey.

[5] Some Japanese results from an April 1988 USIA survey. Other Japanese data and the U.S. data from two May 1988 surveys, one by the Tokyo Broadcasting System and one by CBS News.

Trading with the Bear

Western economic relations with the Soviet Union may be one of the most difficult areas for Allied cooperation, as these data show. Since 1981 fewer than half in France and Italy believe Western nations should impose "tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology to the Soviet Union," with the Italians the most adamantly opposed. By contrast, from 1981 through 1988 majorities in Britain and Canada supported trade restrictions on high-technology sales to the Soviet Union. In West Germany pluralities supported restrictions, except in 1986. Large numbers of respondents in Japan had no opinion (see table 10).

Table 10

DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS

Question: Do you tend to agree or disagree that Western nations including (survey country) should have tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology to the Soviet Union? Is that strongly or somewhat?

Agree-Disagree, Western nations should have tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology to the Soviet Union

	1981	1982	1984	1985	1986	1988
France	37-42%	48-37%	43-38%	34-36%	34-35%	36-45%
Italy	38-47	42-46	41-46	29-53	25-62	30-55
Britain	65-23	66-25	65-26	54-33	60-30	52-30
Germany	50-26	45-34	52-29	46-32	47-49	41-28
Canada	74-21	68-23	64-22	62-29	64-29	64-28
Japan	28-28	36-29	42-25	36-32	—	38-23

Question: In trading with the Soviet Union, do you think it is better for our country to make the best deal it can even if it harms relations with the U.S., or is it better to coordinate our trade policies with the U.S. even if it means trading less with the Soviet Union?

In trading with Soviets,
Make best deal-Coordinate policies with U.S.

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1987	1988
France	25-38%	19-42%	23-37%	20-40%	22-34%	38-34%	33-41%
Italy	45-35	41-39	55-34	51-40	55-36	57-34	51-39
Britain	27-51	19-60	40-42	36-44	34-46	57-31	40-44
Germany	21-35	22-37	36-43	45-35	40-43	37-45	29-47
Canada	27-62	21-62	—	22-52	27-57	42-50	35-57
Japan	9-45	9-57	10-63	10-60	12-61	14-53	9-45

Support for restrictions dropped in all countries—in some of them considerably—when a follow-up question tied restrictions to "the loss of important sales to the Soviet Union." In 1988 support for restrictions decreased in Canada (from 64 to 50 percent), Britain (52 – 35 percent), France (36 – 17 percent), Italy (30 – 16 percent), Japan (38 – 19 percent), and West Germany (41 – 26 percent) when the follow-up question was asked. At the same time, opposition to Soviet trade restrictions decreased in 1988 by at least half in each summit country when opponents were asked if they "would still disagree with such restrictions if these highly advanced technologies would help the Soviet Union modernize its military force." In four of six Allied countries, prevailing opinion favored coordinating with the United States on Soviet trade policy when asked whether "in trading with the Soviet Union, do you think it is better for our country to make the best deal it can even if it harms relations with the United States, or is it better to coordinate our trade policies with the United States even if it means trading less with the Soviet Union?" (see table 10). Throughout the 1980s, the predominant attitude in Canada and Japan has favored coordinating with the United States. Except in 1987, pluralities in France have supported trade coordination from 1981 through 1988. French proponents of "making the best deal" with the Soviets, however, have increased to one-third or more in 1987 (38 percent) and 1988 (33 percent). Pluralities in Germany also supported coordination with the United States during the 1980s, except in 1984. Majority British support for coordination in the early 1980s dwindled to a low of 31 percent in 1987; in 1988 the British were evenly divided (40 – 44 percent). Since 1983 half or more of the Italian public have said that their country should make the best deal it can with the Soviets.

The need to respond to local interests makes it difficult for Western leaders to achieve common economic policies. Multilateral agreements for freer trade, subsidy-free agriculture, or appropriate East-West trade relations, for example, will be very difficult given the nature of public opinion in the summit countries. ☑

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[b] November-December 1987 U.S. data come from the Gallup survey. The Japanese and U.S. May 1988 data from Tokyo Broadcasting and CBS News surveys, and a September 1988 survey in Japan and the U.S. sponsored by *Yomiuri Shimbun*, with American fieldwork done by Gallup.

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THE PRESIDENCY: NOT FOR SALE

by Michael Robinson, Clyde Wilcox, and Paul Marshall

It's been twenty years since Joe McGinnis first stunned us with his best-selling book, *The Selling of the President*. McGinnis's thesis was simple enough: that political advertising on television had somehow fooled Americans into believing that the Old Nixon of the early 1950s was the New Nixon of the late 1960s. In other words, candidates could buy the presidency by buying television time.

Back in McGinnis's day, money, television, and the campaign industry were already considered slightly sinister. But people generally felt them to be low-grade evils that could be overcome or reformed. Today, that is no longer the case. Money, paid media, and the campaign consultants who orchestrate the two have become *the* national political boogeyman.

Certain types of people are especially likely to be spooked. Losers, for example, invariably blame their defeats on not having had enough money or enough money at the right time. Liberals have always had a special problem with the power of money in all phases of politics. And when losers turn out to be liberals, money and paid media can take on Mephistophelean proportions. Last November Democrats were willing to believe that the money spent on Roger Ailes and his ads was responsible for George Bush's defeat of Michael Dukakis. In fact, everybody seemed to buy the money-to-vote (MTV) theory as the explanation for Campaign '88. It is true that every candidate needs some money to get started and then more money to prove that he or she's serious. But it would be a mistake to explain the relationship between 1988's candidates and the public by emphasizing money.

Whatever else may have moved voters during last year's election, it wasn't money *per se*. In fact, our evidence suggests the opposite. The data show that paid media had practically no effect on the race last fall; that campaign expenditures had no greater effect on primaries in 1988 than they had in 1984; that old-fashioned political variables like "home state," "region," and "race" explained more than dollars and cents did. On only one day, and in one party, did money seem to matter.

The Money-To-Vote Theory: The Power of MTV in Autumn

How does one measure the power of money-to-voting? It isn't easy. Since 1976 the government has been making it difficult to measure the impact of money in the general election; since then, the federal government has given equal amounts of money to each major party candidate. With everybody getting the same number of dollars, there's no simple way to show how dollars influence the vote.

The fall campaign does provide an interesting test of an important corollary to MTV: paid media *per se*—political advertising—determines vote. In fact, after last fall's campaign ended, pundits insisted that it was George Bush's paid media that made the real difference. Specific ads notwithstanding, we can say that spending *per se* by the Bush campaign on all those ads explains almost nothing about what happened in the polls last fall.

Using KRC/American Political Network daily polling data from the general campaign, and using figures provided by the Bush campaign about how much was spent week by week on ads, we've looked at the statistical relationship between dollars spent and position in the polls for September, October, and the first week in November. We found precious little evidence to support the theory that Bush won votes on the basis of his ads, and practically no evidence that he won votes on the basis of his advertising expenditures.

We correlated Bush's week-by-week paid media buys with four measures of how the race was going in the polls. We correlated the *size* (in dollars) of Bush's weekly ad campaign with: (a) the percent of voters supporting Bush week by week; (b) the percent of voters supporting Dukakis week by week; (c) the *difference* in support for these two candidates week by week; and (d) the *change in the difference* between the two candidates week by week. Overall, the amount Bush spent on all his great ads bore little, if any, relationship with the conditions of the race. The numbers show that Bush's victory cannot be credited to his paid-media effort or campaign.

A correlation measures the extent to which two things change together. Typically, a correlation coefficient can range from as "high" as 1.0 (or -1.0) to as "low" as zero. The "larger" the number (positive or negative), the greater the relationship between the two things (a correlation of 0.00 means no patterned relationship exists between the two factors). So, if Bush's paid media had had much impact on voters, we'd expect to find a large positive correlation between Bush's expenditures for his advertising and the various measures of his support.

But it doesn't work out that way. There is a correlation, week by week, between Bush's paid-media effort and the percentage of those planning to vote for him. The coefficient is +.30, statistically insignificant yet still noteworthy. But that correlation is actually *lower* than the correlation between Bush's paid-media expenditures and the percent of voters intending to vote for Dukakis (+.35). In other words, using correlation as the test, the more Bush spent on his great media campaign, the *higher* was Dukakis's position in the polls.

The best test of paid-media impact is the correlation between Bush dollars and the difference between Bush and Dukakis support week by week. The correlation between these two factors is .0036, which rounds to zero. No single finding leaves us as unconvinced about the power of paid media as this one—a correlation of zero between the dollar size of Bush's ad campaign and the size of the lead he enjoyed over Dukakis.

An *inverse* relationship existed between Bush's effort and the change in the difference of the size of the lead. When Bush spent more in one week than he had in the previous week, the size of his lead actually grew smaller. In the end the correlations say that Bush's ad campaign was not the major factor in his victory and that money isn't everything in politics, or even close.

The General Election

History can make the same point about the influence of money and paid media on the general election.

Because Dukakis formally won his nomination in July, he had a full month's federal funding advantage over George Bush for his fall campaign. Bush, by law, wasn't entitled to his federal money until the end of August.

In fact, some pundits thought that the money advantage might give Dukakis a good chance to expand his post-convention lead over Bush. But Dukakis's lead fell even before the Republican convention. Money proved practically worthless as stories about Dukakis's mental health ate away at his advantage.

Data from the Bush campaign also show that Bush waited until mid-September to start his paid-media effort after he had overcome his fifteen-point deficit in the mid-summer polls. The ad campaign came *after* Bush had taken the lead.

The Primaries

What about the primaries?

For many reasons it's easy to imagine that big money and paid media might be more powerful in the spring than in the fall. But it didn't happen that way in 1988. What the general election has now revealed about the power of paid media in autumn, the primary campaign tells us about the power of big money early on. Even in primary campaigns money doesn't talk, at least not loudly.

The primaries provide a direct test of the MTV hypothesis: the Federal Election Commission (FEC) keeps close tabs on how much money each candidate spends, by state; and candidates themselves choose to spend different amounts of money among the several states. Although methodological problems also exist with this approach—candidates often fudge on their FEC reports, for example—looking at how much each candidate spent in each caucus or primary and then looking to see how well he did in those campaigns is a good test of the power of money.

The Winners and Losers of Winter to Spring

MTV was a bigger issue in the primaries than it was in the general election. The specter of MTV set the terms for most of the political questions that were raised back then. "How long can Dole hang on in the campaign now that his money is drying up?" "How far could Jesse Jackson have gone had he had serious financial support from the outset?" "Would Robertson's ready access to money from his evangelical base make him an honest-to-goodness threat?"

What did money really do during the primaries? If money had talked, monied candidates should have won more than the unmonied. But they didn't. As in 1984 the unmonied won more often, and in the more important states.

Consider first those primary or caucus states in which there was a serious dollar effort by *any* candidate—where "serious" is defined as 10 percent of the FEC spending limit for that state. The Democrats—or at least one Democrat—met that test in twenty-seven primary and caucus contests. The Republicans—or a

Table 1

SPENDING AND RESULTS
THE REPUBLICANS

	Big Spender	Winner	$ Expended by . . .		Winner's spending as a percentage of big spender's spending
			Big spender (in thousands)	Winner	
AL	Dole	Bush	216	88	41%
AK	Bush	Bush	86	86	100
CO	Robertson	Bush	132	102	77
CT	Bush	Bush	143	143	100
FL	Bush	Bush	1118	1118	100
GA	Dole	Bush	291	253	87
HI	Bush	Robertson	86	46	53
IL	Dole	Bush	1098	797	73
IA		TIED EXPENDITURES*			
KS	Dole	Dole	309	309	100
KY	Bush	Bush	115	115	100
LA	Robertson	Bush	259	158	66
ME	Bush	Bush	167	167	100
MD	Dole	Bush	275	115	42
MS	Dole	Bush	1004	906	90
MI	Bush	Bush	976	976	100
MN	Dole	Dole	655	655	100
MS	Bush	Bush	188	188	100
MO	Dole	Bush	423	319	76
NV	Robertson	Bush	98	18	18
NH		TIED EXPENDITURES*			
NC	Dole	Bush	705	204	29
OK	Dole	Bush	306	181	59
RI	Dole	Bush	78	66	85
SC	Bush	Bush	581	581	100
SD	Dole	Dole	253	253	100
TN	Dole	Bush	268	116	43
TX	Robertson	Bush	961	421	44
VT	Dole	Bush	140	105	75
VA	Robertson	Bush	302	55	18
WI	Bush	Bush	140	140	100
WY		TIED VOTE**			
WA	Dole	Robertson	343	100	29

Note: *Winner and big spender spent identical amounts.

**Dole and Bush received same number of votes.

Table 1

SPENDING AND RESULTS
THE DEMOCRATS

	Big Spender	Winner	$ Expended by . . .		Winner's spending as a percentage of big spender's spending
			Big spender (in thousands)	Winner	
AL	Gore	Jackson	226	26	12%
AK	Gore	Gore	124	124	100
DC	Dukakis	Jackson	97	47	48
FL	Dukakis	Dukakis	738	738	100
GA	Gore	Jackson	239	45	19
IL	Dukakis	Simon	458	321	70
IA		TIED EXPENDITURES*			
KY	Gore	Gore	120	120	100
ME	Dukakis	Dukakis	168	168	100
MD	Dukakis	Dukakis	245	245	100
MA	Dukakis	Dukakis	272	272	100
MI	Gephardt	Jackson	464	78	17
MN	Dukakis	Dukakis	547	547	100
MS	Gore	Jackson	90	22	24
MO	Gephardt	Gephardt	283	283	100
NE	Dukakis	Dukakis	116	116	100
NH		TIED EXPENDITURES*			
NJ	Dukakis	Dukakis	392	392	100
NY	Gore	Dukakis	980	937	96
NC	Gore	Gore	355	355	100
OK	Gore	Gore	159	159	100
PA	Jackson	Dukakis	320	305	95
SC	Gore	Jackson	114	41	36
SD	Dukakis	Gephardt	235	101	43
TX(P)	Dukakis	Dukakis	1069	1069	100
TX(C)	Dukakis	Jackson	1069	74	7
VT	Dukakis	Dukakis	74	74	100
VA	Gore	Jackson	216	21	10
WI	Gore	Dukakis	516	311	60
WY	Gore	Gore	89	89	100

Note: Texas had a "meaningful" caucus, and a primary. We have included figures for both. Jackson won the caucuses, Dukakis won the primary.

*Winner and big spender spent identical amounts.

Republican—made a serious effort in thirty-three states. (See table 1)

Setting aside states where the two biggest money people spent equal amounts or where the vote totals were tied among the top two vote getters, there were sixty state contests that had a big spender. And in those sixty big media contests, the big spender won twenty-six times—43 percent of the time.

Given that the average primary or caucus had more than three contestants, one could say that big spenders did better than expected. But they did not do very well—better than chance, but not much better.

Back in 1984 the big spender won 38 percent of the time—slightly less than big spenders were able to achieve in 1988. These two figures are, in fact, statistically almost the same: two victories out of five for the big spender in 1984; two victories out of five for the big spender in 1988. If money is becoming more powerful in determining primary elections, it's power is growing slowly enough to be explained by rounding.

Table 1 also contains a delicious irony: although big money had little effect on the Republican primary campaign, it seems to have had some noteworthy effect on the Democratic one.

For the Republicans, starting in Iowa and moving on until Dole's withdrawal from the race, the big spender's success rate was only 36 percent, about what's expected from chance alone in a three-person race. But for the Democrats, the figure was 52 percent—not exactly indicative of money-to-vote politics, but a substantially higher percentage than that for the GOP.

The "party factor" is especially intriguing in those few states where a case can be made that the victory was "bought." A bought state is one in which the big spender outspent his closest competitor by a factor of at least two-to-one and then went on to win the state.

In a few primaries and caucuses, one could argue that money did buy votes in sufficient number to turn a loser into a winner. Excluding home states and those states where nobody made a serious dollar effort, a clear pattern emerges: eight states were "bought" during the primaries, seven by Democrats (Minnesota, Vermont, Maine, Florida, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Kentucky) and only one by a Republican (Connecticut). Even though big spending seems to have made a difference in these, it doesn't contradict our thesis that the MTV theory doesn't hold up. For one thing, our definition of a bought state is shaky. We assume that if the winner outspent his opponents by two to one, then money made the difference. But in a state like Connecticut, one could also attribute Bush's victory over Dole to something other than money—confusion over whether or not Bush was a favorite son, for example. (It sometimes seemed as if most states were his home states.) And two of Dukakis's big-money victories—Maine and Vermont—and Gore's victory in Kentucky could just as easily be explained by regional loyalties as by comparative dollar advantage.

We've identified more than fifty races in which a victory was *not* bought. In thirteen state elections, outspending one's nearest opponent by at least a factor of *two* did not lead to victory. So, once again the MTV thesis falls on its face.

But despite qualifications, the irony remains: the party that has spoken out most against the evils of money in politics is also the party more likely to be influenced by it.

Super Tuesday Effects

Why are Democrats more dollar-sensitive than Republicans? This is best explained structurally—the way the race was organized this time.

The Democratic campaign had an unusual *non*-structure. It had *no* clear front-runner, *no* central issue around which to fight, *no* national incumbent, and *no* palpable issue space between the candidates involved. What the Democrats did have, however, was Super Tuesday. The interaction between these structural factors—the factors they lacked plus Super Tuesday—best explains why the Democrats turned out to be the party of MTV.

If one excludes Super Tuesday states, Democratic voters turn out to be almost as impervious to dollar politics as the Republican electorate. Without Super Tuesday the won/lost ratio for Democratic big spenders is 43 percent, identical to the overall ratio in the primary campaign. On Super Tuesday, however, Democratic big spenders won in 62 percent of the states, a figure high enough to suggest *real* money-to-vote power.

Incredibly enough, for the Republicans it was precisely the opposite. For Bush, Dole, and Robertson, dollar politics had far less effect on Super Tuesday than it had throughout much of the primary campaign. The big spender won in only 24 percent of the Republican contests held on Super Tuesday. On Super Tuesday Dole outspent Bush practically everywhere—in three times as many states as Bush outspent him. Yet Dole lost everywhere.

Among Republicans there was not a single case of "state buying" on Super Tuesday, but lots of examples of states that were not for sale. In Maryland Dole outspent Bush three to one, and Bush wound up with about twice as many votes. In Alabama Pat Robertson outspent Bush by a factor of three and received about one-fifth the popular vote going to the vice president. NOT FOR SALE signs went up in Texas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, and Tennessee—all states in which the big spender outspent his closest opponent by a factor of at least two and still came away a loser.

By Super Tuesday the GOP field had been reduced to two men with fairly well-developed images, both of whom had been national figures for at least a dozen years. In a campaign like that, money per se should have meant very little. Indeed, with all the press attention focusing on Dole and Bush, one might have predicted that the power of money would have been even less than normal, with news overwhelming money and ads as a principal cue for voting. That's precisely what happened.

For the Democrats everything was different. The field was unstructured and the press corps was hard-pressed to cover the four leading, but relatively unknown, candidates. With no real structure—and with so little press attention on each candidate—money should have had more impact than usual. And it did.

What Matters More?

If MTV didn't determine the outcome of the primaries, and if paid media didn't matter much in the general campaign, then what did matter from spring to fall? The answer is traditional politics.

In the fall, an incumbent party nominated a sitting vice president, who ran during a period of peace and prosperity. And . . . that guy won. Traditional politics.

In the spring, traditional politics also prevailed. Favorite sons—native sons—won everywhere. Dole in Kansas. Gore in Tennessee. Gephardt in Missouri. Jackson in South Carolina. Simon in Illinois. And Bush in . . . well, Bush won everywhere he claimed as home. Regionalism worked as well. Gore did best in his center-South, Dukakis in New England, and Jackson in the Deep South.

Race worked, too. Jackson received black votes everywhere he went—in enormous proportions. And he won in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and D.C.—everywhere blacks were a majority of the Democratic party. So compared to the old standbys like place of birth, region, and race, money was a weak factor.

Conclusions

In certain circumstances, money does matter in an election, although those circumstances are exceptional. It almost never matters during a general election campaign. The laws of campaign funding and the laws of electoral behavior pretty much ensure that. But during the race for the nomination, it *might* matter: if there is no incumbent, if there are no real policy-related differences among the candidates, if the field of contestants is unrecognized or unrecognizable, or if times are unusually quiescent or divisive. But that's a lot of ifs—and anything other than normal circumstances.

Our last conclusion is that once again the spirit of reform has turned out to be, if not an evil spirit, at least a poltergeist. The issue here is Super Tuesday. Super Tuesday failed to achieve its original goal—the nomination of a conservative (Southern) Democrat. It also gave us the worst of both worlds—worlds in which money counted *too* much among the Democrats, and in which *nothing* counted much among the Republicans.

In the end, then, the problem in Campaign '88 wasn't so much the miseries of money as it was the vagaries of reform. Money didn't do nearly as much damage to the recruitment system as did Super Tuesday. In fact, the Super Tuesday system was the only thing that gave money anything approaching the power most critics assigned to it. So once again, it wasn't big-time money that made presidential politics seem scary or irrational; it was big-time reform. ☑

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Etzioni

(Continued from page 3)

this balance, it is the task of intellectuals and civic leaders to make the case and build support for restoring the I-and-We balance. In Communist societies, from China to Albania, from the U.S.S.R. to Afghanistan, the forces of individualism, finally, seem to be making some significant gains while oppressive collectivism is clearly still dominant. In the United States the sixties and seventies have left a strong wake of excessive individualism.

Me-ism has been documented in many ways. Young Americans have been shown to be much more preoccupied with their rights and entitlements than with their duties and civic obligations. They insist they have the right to be tried by a jury of their peers, should the need arise, but are quite reluctant to serve on a jury. Americans favor defense but would much rather have someone else serve in the Armed Forces (hence, the strong aversion to a draft) and are increasingly reluctant to pay for a stronger defense. While the heydays of self-actualization, even at the cost of one's family, are over, preoccupation with career, combined with neglect of parenting, is common.

In the public arena it has been often noted that special-interest groups dominate. Indeed, in some circles it is now fashionable to argue that there is no such thing as "the public interest," only the claims of various groups that "give-me" will serve the commonwealth. Attempts to reassert the rights and needs of the common frequently run into the ACLU itself or the individualistic ideology it fosters. There are numerous specific public policy issues that await correction. None, by itself, will correct the imbalance; all will help to a limited extent. Above all, they illustrate why the I-and-We balance must be restored.

A reporter for the *Los Angeles Times* and an editor of *The Washington Post* were asked whether they would publish a report on the inner working of an American reconnaissance satellite even if this would allow the U.S.S.R. to blind it, and even if the United States was dependent on it for early warning of a Soviet nuclear attack. Both stated they would because news is their duty; security is the Pentagon's job.

Despite some redress in the Reagan years, the rights of criminals are still much better protected than those of the victims—or of the public. For instance, convicted child abusers, doctors with revoked licenses, and serial killers can readily move from one part of the country to another and set up shop again.

In schools we must find ways to preserve the civil rights of students without endangering learning and even elementary order when due process becomes so cumbersome that schools dare not try to expel highly destructive students. In matters of public health we must find ways to protect the privacy of AIDS patients while encouraging them to disclose their sexual contacts. In short we must move away from the notion that attempts to explicate *community* rights and moral obligations to the commons are reactionary forms of government intrusion or coercion. Dichotomies often are the bain of good thinking. We must outgrow the simplification that one is either for individual rights or an arch-conservative; there is a crying need for a sensitive, caring balance of individual rights and the institutions of a viable community: family, education, character, and above all, social/moral order. ☑

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CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS ELITES

by Robert Lerner, Stanley Rothman, and S. Robert Lichter

America has, for most of its history, been a Protestant culture. Yet with the rise of the Social Gospel movement and the publication of *The Fundamentals*, a polemic in favor of maintaining the traditional authority of the (Protestant) Bible, American Protestantism split into two camps that have maintained their distinctiveness.

Mainline Protestants, members of an establishment once referred to as "the Republican party at prayer," historically set the tone for American society. Recently, they seem to have moved somewhat to the left, but how far remains to be seen. Studies have shown that most members of the Protestant denominations remain fairly conservative on social and economic issues. The question is to what extent their leaders feel the same way.

As for Fundamentalists, after the fiasco of the Scopes trial they became apolitical, concentrating on personal salvation and morality. Unlike Catholic and establishment Protestant leaders, their views went relatively unchanged by Vietnam and the civil rights struggle. Instead, their recent emergence as a conservative political force coalesces around responses to Supreme Court decisions and the moral decay they claim now characterizes American society.

The conventional wisdom tells us that Roman Catholics, in the wake of Vatican II, have become more liberal on economic issues while remaining conservative on social issues. The American Church was at one time strongly anticommunist, but today many of its elite members espouse opinions that are less so.

Given these histories, we might expect Fundamentalist religious leaders to be conservative across the board, Catholic leaders to be liberal on economics and foreign affairs but conservative on social issues, and Mainline Protestants to be essentially moderate in their views. In fact according to our study of Christian religious leaders, the first two assumptions are largely accurate, but the Mainline Protestant leaders are liberal on every dimension.

In order to find the most influential religious leaders, we contacted leaders of those Christian denominations with one million or more members and the editors of leading religious periodicals such as *Christian Century* (we used their published list of the most influential religious figures for 1982) and *Christianity and Crisis*. We asked them to nominate the most influential American religious figures. Their responses included prominent clergy from the major Christian denominations, leaders of religiously based social activist groups, editors of religious journals, and theologians. These nominees provided the basis of our sample. Only names that appeared on multiple lists were included in our preliminary listing, which was then reviewed by the above groups and individuals.

Sixty-three percent of those we eventually contacted completed the questionnaire during 1984 – 1985. Among our respondents were the heads of Protestant churches and Catholic orders, university and seminary presidents, editors of major religious publications, prominent televangelists, and individuals in positions of leadership at such diverse organizations as the National Council of Churches, the Moral Majority, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Religious Roundtable, and the National Association of Evangelicals. While our sample is not random, our results broadly represent the major divisions among the country's Christian religious leaders.

Respondents are identified as Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Fundamentalist Protestant according to self-stated affiliation. Examples of Mainline churches are the Episcopal Church, United Church of Christ, and the United Methodist Church. Examples of Fundamentalist churches are the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the Church of God and Christ. We were able to classify 97 percent of our sample of 178 religious leaders as follows: 89 Catholics, 61 Mainline Protestants, 23 Fundamentalists, and 5 unclassifiable.

Personal Background

American religious leaders are mostly white (82 percent) males (85 percent) who are middle-aged (median age 53) and highly educated (85 percent have postgraduate degrees). A substantial proportion were raised in families who had a great deal of interest in politics (39 percent). Nonetheless, Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and Fundamentalists grew up in sharply different family settings and political milieus. The Catholic elite grew up mostly in large urban areas (66 percent), in New England (34 percent) and the Midwest (40 percent). They report that their family income while growing up was "above average" more often than do either of the other two groups. Nearly three out of four (72 percent) place both their mothers and fathers in the Democratic camp. They remember their fathers, however, as being politically conservative and their mothers as more liberal.

Table 1

SOCIAL AND PERSONAL BACKGROUND
OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
White	85%	80%	78%
Male	79	89	96
Median age	52	56	51
Current personal income			
Under $20,000	45	3	4
$50,000 +	13	39	39
College education			
Attended selective college	10	26	0
Postgraduate degree	85	85	78
Parents' income below average	32	47	61
Parents' income above average	27	19	9
From a metro area	66	33	48
Region of origin			
South	2	23	39
New England	34	21	13
Midwest	40	39	26
Father graduated college	20	42	32
Discussed politics at home frequently	42	37	36
Father a Democrat/	72	36	59
Republican	24	55	31
Mother a Democrat/	72	44	59
Republican	18	49	32
Father a liberal/	30	28	18
conservative	39	45	41
Mother a liberal/	37	41	18
conservative	29	42	46

Table 2

SELF-IDENTIFIED IDEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
Liberal	59%	80%	13%
Moderate	18	5	26
Conservative	23	15	61

The Mainline Protestants grew up in the most diverse geographic settings and were raised mostly in small towns and rural areas. They come from the most highly educated households, and of the three groups they attended the most selective colleges. Like the Catholics, they rate their mothers as considerably more liberal than their fathers, but they report mainly Republican affiliations for both parents.

Fundamentalists represent a third distinctive social experience. They were raised most often in the South (39 percent) in families with below-average incomes (61 percent). They come from solidly Democratic households (59 percent of both parents). Alone among the three groups, however, they rate both parents as mainly conservative, with their mothers more so than their fathers.

Roman Catholic leaders have remained in the Democratic camp, like their parents, but they perceive themselves as being markedly more liberal. Fundamentalist Protestants on the whole grew up in Democratic households but subsequently shifted their political support to the Republicans. Mainline Protestant leaders appear to have made the most radical break with their parents. They were brought up in conservative Republican households, yet they are now Democrats and identify themselves primarily as liberals.

Where They Stand

How do these groups differ from one another in their social and political perspectives? Three out of five Catholic leaders (59 percent) and four out of five Mainline Protestants (80 percent) consider themselves liberals, compared to only 13 percent of the Fundamentalists. (In a 1988 CBS/*New York Times* poll, 21 percent of Americans called themselves liberal, and 33 percent considered themselves conservative.)

These differences are paralleled by the religious leaders' voting records. The majority of Mainline Protestants have consistently voted Democratic in presidential elections. Roman Catholics also voted Democratic, but in smaller numbers. Fundamentalists voted for Republican candidates except in 1976.

Table 3

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING RECORD OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS

	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
1968			
Nixon	26%	20%	67%
Humphrey	74	80	33
1972			
Nixon	35	26	75
McGovern	65	74	25
1976			
Ford	35	21	39
Carter	65	79	61
1980			
Reagan	39	19	61
Anderson	4	9	0
Carter	57	72	39

Economic, Social, and Foreign Policy Attitudes

Religious leaders' attitudes on specific issues mostly correspond to their ideological self-identification and voting records. The Catholic and Mainline Protestant leaders are much more critical of capitalism than are the Fundamentalists. Nearly one in three Catholics and one in four Mainline leaders agree that the United States should move toward socialism. Similarly, 23 percent of Catholics and 21 percent of Protestants agree that "big corporations should be taken out of private ownership and run in the public interest." Only 4 percent of Fundamentalists agree with either statement. Moreover, only a slight majority of Mainline Protestants (52 percent) and 64 percent of Catholics believe that private enterprise is fair to workers, compared to an overwhelming 91 percent of Fundamentalists.

The criticism of capitalism seems to be part of a broader disaffection with American institutions. A majority (51 percent) of Mainline Protestant leaders argue that the U.S. needs a complete overhaul of its basic institutions. They are joined by 39 percent of the Catholic leaders and 35 percent of the Fundamentalists. Similarly, 41 percent of the Protestants and 44 percent of the Catholics believe that the very structure of our society causes alienation, compared to 30 percent of the Fundamentalists.

Roman Catholic and Mainline Protestant leaders are more sympathetic to a welfare-state philosophy and less supportive of what has sometimes been called the "Protestant ethic" than are Fundamentalists. Eighty-two percent of the Catholics, 77 percent of Mainline Protestants, but *all* Fundamentalists agree that those who are more able should earn more. Fewer Catholic and Mainline Protestant than Fundamentalist religious leaders believe that hard work pays off (41 percent and 29 percent versus 61 percent, respectively), and large majorities of Catholics and Mainline Protestants (77 percent and 68 percent, respectively) believe that the poor are poor because of circumstances beyond their control. Only 48 percent of Fundamentalist leaders agree.

Eighty-one percent of the Roman Catholics and 83 percent of the Mainline Protestants favor government action to reduce the income gap between rich and poor, as compared to only 43 percent of Fundamentalist leaders. Fifty-one percent of the Catholic elite sand 32 percent of Mainline Protestants would like to see less regulation of business, compared to 83 percent of Fundamentalist leaders.

Many of the Mainline Protestant and some of the Catholic leaders distinguish between a tolerant public morality (their belief that gays should be able to teach in public schools) and a stricter private one (against homosexuality and extramarital sex). Fundamentalists, on the other hand, insist on a strict morality in both private and public spheres.

Most religious leaders say that adultery is wrong, although one out of six Mainline Protestants disagree. Sixty-four percent of the Catholics and 83 percent of the Fundamentalists agree that women with young children should not work unless it is necessary, but only 28 percent of Mainline leaders take this position. The abortion issue most clearly separates Mainline Protestants from the other two groups. Two-thirds believe that a woman has a right to have an abortion, compared to only one in six Fundamentalists and fewer than one in four (22 percent) Catholic leaders.

Civil rights issues also fragment opinion among religious leaders. Members of all groups are united in disavowing the statement that blacks lack the motivation necessary to advance; they also disagree with the statement that black gains come at the expense of whites. On other issues Fundamentalists are much more conservative than the other two groups. Seventy-three percent of Catholics and 80 percent of Mainline Protestants, but only 43 percent of Fundamentalists, agree that blacks lack the education necessary to advance. Sixty-three percent of Catholic leaders and 61 percent of the Mainline Protestant leaders, but only 32 percent of the Fundamentalists, agree that special preference in hiring should be given to blacks. Seventy-three percent of the Mainline Protestant elites agree that special preference in hiring should be given to women, as do 57 percent of the Catholics. Only 22 percent of Fundamentalists agree.

Fundamentalists are considerably more hawkish than either Mainline Protestants or Catholics. Most Fundamentalists agree that it is sometimes necessary for the CIA to undermine a foreign government (61 percent), while only minorities of Catholics (39 percent) and Mainline Protestants (22 percent) agree. A similar majority of Fundamentalists (65 percent) believe that we should be more forceful with the U.S.S.R. even at the risk of war. Only 30 percent of Catholics and 20 percent of Mainline Protestants would go along with that. And a majority (57 percent) of Fundamentalist leaders believe that the American military should be strongest, no matter what the cost; less than one-fourth of Catholics and Mainliners feel this way.

Table 4

RELIGIOUS LEADERS' ATTITUDES ON SELECTED ISSUES

	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalists
Economics			
U.S. would be better off if it moved toward socialism	31%	25%	4%
Big corporations should be taken out of private ownership	23	21	4
Private enterprise fair to workers	64	52	91
Less regulation of business is good for country	51	32	83
The more able should earn more	82	77	100
U.S. offers opportunity for financial security to all those who work hard	41	29	61
The poor are such due to circumstances beyond their control	77	68	48
Government should reduce income gap between rich and poor	81	83	43
U.S. needs to overhaul basic institutions	39	51	35
Social structure causes alienation	44	41	30
Legal system favors wealthy	85	85	65
Hard work pays off	41	29	61
Social Issues			
Homosexuals should not teach in public schools	33	29	73
Homosexual relations are wrong	76	58	95
Extramarital sex is wrong	93	83	91
Woman has right to abortion	22	67	17
Women with young children should not work unless necessary	64	28	83
Blacks and Women			
Special preference should be given to hiring women	57	73	22
Blacks don't have motivation or willpower to pull themselves out of poverty	10	8	13
Blacks don't have the chance for education it takes to rise out of poverty	73	80	43
Special preference should be given to hiring blacks	63	61	32
Almost all blacks' recent gains have come at expense of whites	2	3	4
Foreign Policy			
Sometimes necessary for CIA to undermine hostile governments	39	22	61
We should be more forceful with USSR even at risk of war	30	20	65
American military should be the strongest no matter what the cost	21	22	57
U.S. morally obligated to prevent destruction of Israel	70	69	73

Heroes and Villains

We asked religious leaders to rate twelve public figures and groups on a scale from one (strongly disapprove) to five (strongly approve). The Catholic and Mainline Protestant elites rate highest Ralph Nader, John Kenneth Galbraith, Andrew Young, and Ted Kennedy. They do not care much for Ronald Reagan: Catholic religious leaders rank him ninth, and Mainline Protestant leaders rank him tenth, well below the Sandinistas and barely above Fidel Castro. The Moral Majority (since renamed the Liberty Foundation by founder Jerry Falwell) remains anathema.

Fundamentalist religious leaders have a quite different list of heroes and villains. They rank Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Milton Friedman as their top four selections. Their last three choices are Gloria Steinem, the Sandinistas, and Fidel Castro.

Religious leaders agree that the media, business, and federal government agencies are the most influential groups. From that point on, Catholics and Mainline Protestants are in almost total agreement, while Fundamentalist perceptions diverge. Catholic leaders rank religious leaders seventh, as do Mainliners, with only consumer groups, feminists, and black leaders ranked lower. Fundamentalist leaders, on the other hand, rank religious leaders fourth. Furthermore, Fundamentalists rate black leaders as moderately influential (tied with labor and more influential than the military).

Table 5

RELIGIOUS LEADERS' RANKINGS FOR PUBLIC FIGURES

Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
1) Ralph Nader	1) Andrew Young	1) Ronald Reagan
2) John K. Galbraith	2) Ralph Nader	2) Margaret Thatcher
3) Andrew Young	3) John K. Galbraith	3) Jeane Kirkpatrick
4) Ted Kennedy	4) Ted Kennedy	4) Milton Friedman
5) Jeane Kirkpatrick	5) Gloria Steinem	5) Moral Majority
6) Margaret Thatcher	6) Milton Friedman	6) Andrew Young
7) Milton Friedman	7) Margaret Thatcher	7) Ralph Nader
8) Gloria Steinem	8) Sandinistas	8) John K. Galbraith
9) Ronald Reagan	9) Jeane Kirkpatrick	9) Ted Kennedy
10) Sandinistas	10) Ronald Reagan	10) Gloria Steinem
11) Moral Majority	11) Fidel Castro	11) Sandinistas
12) Fidel Castro	12) Moral Majority	12) Fidel Castro

Religious leaders, regardless of faith, believe that religious leaders *should* be the most influential group in American society. All these groups would rank intellectuals and consumer groups high and would improve the ranking of black leaders but reduce the ranking of the media and federal agencies. Catholic leaders and Mainline Protestant leaders would drastically curtail the power of business and the military.

Table 6

RELIGIOUS LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE IN AMERICA

Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
1) Media	1) Media	1) Media
2) Business	2) Business	2) Business
3) Federal government	3) Federal government	3) Federal government
4) Military	4) Military	4) Religious leaders
5) Labor	5) Labor	5) Intellectuals
6) Intellectuals	6) Intellectuals	6) Blacks
7) Religious leaders	7) Religious leaders	7) Labor
8) Consumer groups	8) Consumer groups	8) Military
9) Feminists	9) Blacks	9) Consumer groups
10) Blacks	10) Feminists	10) Feminists

Table 7

RELIGIOUS LEADERS' PREFERENCES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE IN AMERICA

Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
1) Religious leaders	1) Religious leaders	1) Religious leaders
2) Intellectuals	2) Intellectuals	2) Intellectuals
3) Consumer groups	3) Blacks	3) Business
4) Blacks	4) Consumer groups	4) Consumer groups
5) Labor	5) Feminists	5) Blacks
6) Business	6) Business	6) Media
7) Feminists	7) Media	7) Labor
8) Media	8) Labor	8) Military
9) Federal government	9) Federal government	9) Federal government
10) Military	10) Military	10) Feminists

Table 8

RELIGIOUS LEADERS' VIEWS ABOUT RELIGIOUS ISSUES

	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Fundamentalist
Clergy should take a stand on public issues			
Agree	83%	86%	77%
Disagree	17	14	23
Primary focus of the church in the United States should be:			
Bringing people to faith in Jesus	54	57	95
Improving the material lot of the poor	13	26	5
Unable to choose	33	19	0
Primary focus of church abroad should be:			
Bringing people to faith in Jesus	51	46	90
Improving the material lot of the poor	18	36	10
Unable to choose	30	18	0

Faith and Action

The political values of these religious leaders are also related to the role they assign to the church in modern society. Most members of all three groups believe the clergy should take a stand on public issues, but self-defined political liberals outpace conservatives by 93 to 63 percent in seeing a public role for the clergy. Virtually all Fundamentalists choose spreading faith in Jesus over improving the material lot of the poor as the church's principal mission both here and abroad. That position is held by a majority of the Mainline Protestant and Catholic leaders. The rest either would place greater emphasis on helping the poor or decline to choose between the two. The Protestant leaders are the most oriented toward the social gospel; 36 percent choose helping the poor, compared to 46 percent who select spreading the faith, as the church's primary obligation abroad. Once again, this choice is related to political ideology. The vast majority of self-described conservatives (89 percent) select faith in Jesus as the church's top domestic priority, compared to a minority (41 percent) of liberals. Conversely, one in three liberals (33 percent) give primacy to helping the poor, compared to only 2 percent of conservatives.[1]

In sum, we found sharp differences in the political outlooks of America's religious leadership. Mainline and Fundamentalist Protestants respectively stand at the left and right poles of this country's political discourse. Catholic leaders resemble their Mainline Protestant counterparts except on issues of sexual morality, on which they agree more closely with the Fundamentalists. These differences extend to the role of the church today. Fundamentalists stand united on the primacy of spreading the faith, while large minorities of Mainline and Catholic leaders would not exclude good works (in the form of helping the poor) from the church's primary focus. Finally, the views these leaders hold on the public face of the church are closely related to their own political values. Thus, religion and politics seem as intertwined in the lives of America's religious leaders they are in the life of American society. ☑

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[1] These data suggest that religious and political ideology are closely related. When we asked respondents to rate themselves as liberals or conservatives on theological issues, we found a close fit with their political self-ratings. Eighty-five percent of self-described religious liberals also saw themselves as political liberals, and 89 percent of conservatives on one dimension were also conservative on the other.

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Miller

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they are also looking for a greater spirit of compromise.

The words "regulation" and "deregulation" are becoming misnomers of a sort; they are too broad and all-encompassing. The former implies government primacy; the latter signifies business dominance. Their replacement, in the emerging public philosophy, might be "interventionism": the willingness of *both* business and government to act on a more event-specific, case-by-case basis, as well as the willingness to cross some of the boundaries that typically separated business and government activities.

For instance, Americans fervently desire that business should help address the crisis in the nation's public schools—once the sole preserve of government—and support a wide range of options for greater business involvement. At the same time, however, they favor more government initiatives in a variety of business areas, such as the disposal of industrial toxic wastes.

To achieve certain social goals, growing numbers of Americans want business and government to work *together*. In December 1988 we asked Americans whether business or government should have primary responsibility for accomplishing things like job retraining or the provision of day care services. For every item we asked about, the biggest changes since late 1983 came in the proportions saying "both equally" should take responsibility—dramatic increases of [illegible]0 percent or more over the 1983 levels.

Instead of a return to an adversarial relationship among government, business, and labor, the public seems to be calling for greater cooperation among them. Americans are looking for a new kind of *partnership* among these institutions—one in which they iron out their differences and join forces, as far as possible, to address the nation's problems.

The public's belief in the system of economic checks and balances still holds, but it is being tempered by new economic realities. And if one factor is responsible for the growing desire for institutional cooperation, it is probably competition—*international* competition. Fears about whether any one domestic institution will become too big and powerful for the good of the others—or the American people—are waning. Taking their place are worries about whether American institutions will be powerful enough in the future to compete with big foreign rivals.

To the extent that deregulation helps make companies more competitive, it fits this changing public philosophy. But in cases where interventionism or cooperation prove more effective, they too will find popular support. Ideology is no longer the issue. Results are. ☑

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Gavin

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world) would have been. Doesn't "Joseph Goebbels, author of the novel *Michael*," sound better than "Reichminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda"? Would the sum of human happiness have been decreased if Mao Zedong had stuck to poetry instead of going into politics? Why didn't someone give Frederick the Great more flute lessons? Nero, who loved singing, dancing, acting, and playing the lyre, surely could have been better employed working in the Roman equivalent of a Las Vegas lounge. The frustration of artistic ambitions has contributed more than its share to the tragedies of history.

The Art of the Statesman

There is a small group of political figures who could have made a living or gained fame as either artists or statesmen. Winston Churchill, in this as in so many other cases, is *sui generis*, a man of transcendant political genius with the kind of literary stylistic panache that we associate with artists, as good with the pen as he was with the sword. While his Nobel Prize for literature (1953) was given for his historical and political writing, it is tempting to speculate what would have happened if he had turned all that prodigious energy and imagination to writing novels, after his turn-of-the-century attempt at that form—*Savrola*. His illustrious predecessor Benjamin Disraeli wrote *Coningsby*, one of the truly great novels of politics, and there can be no doubt that Dizzy could have succeeded as a novelist at the top rank of the second class—not a bad place to be. Would former British Prime Minister Edward Heath have become famous if he had pursued his talent for conducting symphonic orchestras? After all, conducting is a job that calls for the same qualities of leadership, ego, and manipulation as high political office. It remains to be seen whether French President François Mitterrand will complete the novel he has been working on for ten years. But if he does, the result could place him among this select group of artist-statesmen.

Given the rather staid Bush cabinet, it would appear we live in no danger of artistic types running amok up and down Pennsylvania Avenue. Unless John Updike or Joyce Carol Oates start spending a lot of time in Iowa and New Hampshire with Roger Ailes, when it comes to mixing art and government American politics will remain the kind of place where President Grant (not a bad writer himself) said he knew only two tunes—one was "Yankee Doodle" and the other wasn't. ☑

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Note to Readers: In the January/February 1989 issue of *Public Opinion*, we printed unweighted ABC News exit poll data. The weighted data released by ABC News are shown below. We also identified the sponsor of the poll as ABC News/*Washington Post*. The correct sponsor is ABC News.

	ABC News unweighted data	
By party:	**Dukakis/Bentsen**	**Bush/Quayle**
Democratic = 44%	84%	16%
Republican = 36%	8	92
Independent = 18%	46	54
By political philosophy:		
Liberal = 27%	86	14
Moderate = 32%	58	42
Conservative = 41%	18	82
By sex:		
Male = 47%	45	55
Female = 53%	53	47
By race:		
White = 86%	44	56
Black = 8%	91	9
Hispanic = 3%	70	30
By union household:		
Union = 10%	65	35
Nonunion = 90%	44	56
By region:		
East = 26%	51	49
Midwest = 25%	46	54
South = 30%	40	60
West = 19%	50	50
By income:		
Under $5,000 = 6%	69	31
$5,001-$9,999 = 7%	62	38
$10,000-$19,999 = 16%	46	54
$20,000-$29,999 = 19%	51	49
$30,000-$39,999 = 18%	46	54
$40,000-$49,999 = 13%	42	58
$50,000 and over = 21%	41	59
By age:		
18-24 years = 10%	51	49
25-29 years = 12%	45	55
30-39 years = 27%	49	51
40-49 years = 20%	49	51
50-59 years = 14%	47	53
60 years and over = 17%	52	48

	ABC News weighted data	
By party:	**Dukakis/Bentsen**	**Bush/Quayle**
Democratic = 42%	82%	18%
Republican = 38%	8	92
Independent = 18%	43	57
By political philosophy:		
Liberal = 25%	84	16
Moderate = 32%	55	45
Conservative = 43%	16	84
By sex:		
Male = 48%	42	58
Female = 52%	49	51
By race:		
White = 87%	41	59
Black = 8%	90	10
Hispanic = 3%	67	33
By union household:		
Union = 10%	65	35
Nonunion = 90%	44	56
By region:		
East		
Midwest	NA	
South		
West		
By income:		
Under $5,000 = 6%	68	32
$5,001-$9,999 = 7%	59	41
$10,000-$19,999 = 16%	51	49
$20,000-$29,999 = 19%	47	53
$30,000-$39,999 = 18%	44	56
$40,000-$49,999 = 13%	39	61
$50,000 and over = 22%	38	62
By age:		
18-24 years = 10%	47	53
25-29 years = 12%	42	58
30-39 years = 27%	46	54
40-49 years = 20%	46	54
50-59 years = 14%	44	56
60 years and over = 17%	48	52

Note: Sample size = 22,785 voters as they left voting booths.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 8, 1988.

ERRATUM

Several astute readers have called our attention to an error that appeared in the article "Referendums" in the January/February 1989 issue of *Public Opinion*.

The wording of initiatives on public ballots can be technical, lengthy, and even confusing. A majority of "no" votes might mean that the initiative is defeated, but if the wording contains a double negative, it does not mean the action proposed is defeated.

On the ballot in Colorado and Michigan last fall, were two confusingly worded initiatives, one from the pro-life movement, and the other from the pro-choice side. The results as presented in the magazine were not correct.

In Colorado the initiative "provide(d) that the state shall not prohibit use of public funds for abortion." As one reader wrote to explain "a 'no' vote rejected an attempt to reinstate public-funded abortions into the constitution." "No" votes were cast by 809,078 or 61.2% of the voters, defeating the initiative and prohibiting the use of public funds for abortion. 534,070 or 39.8% cast "yes" votes.

In Michigan the initiative stated "tax funds shall not be used for abortions for women receiving public assistance." The same reader explained that "a 'yes' vote upheld the state legislature's ban on state funded abortions." "Yes" votes were cast by 1,959,727 or 56.8% of the voters, passing the initiative and prohibiting the use of public funds for abortion. 1,486,371 or 43.2% cast "no" votes.

The text of the article stated that . . . "proposition(s) to prohibit the funding of abortions by state funds . . . lost . . . in Colorado and Michigan . . ." which was not correct. One initiative passed and one was defeated, but in both cases state funding of abortions is prohibited.

Many readers were confused because the article did not always distinguish between whether an initiative passed or failed, and whether the action it proposed was enacted or defeated. We apologize for our error.

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ABORTION
THE PARTISAN BATTLE

Also

Attitudes About Gun Control; NATO: The View From Europe;
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Volume 12, Number 1 May June 1989

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A DEBATE

ABORTION:

Trouble for the GOP

by William Schneider

The abortion issue could drive a stake through the heart of the Reagan coalition. That is why the turnout of some 300,000 pro-choice marchers this April in Washington has Republicans worried.

Pro-choice sentiment is strongest among well-educated, high-income people. A *Los Angeles Times* poll taken in March 1989 asked respondents whether they favored the Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision, "which permits a woman to get an abortion from a doctor at any time during the first three months of her pregnancy." Support for *Roe* was at 34 percent among non-high-school graduates, 44 percent among high-school graduates, and 58 percent among the college educated.

The best predictor of anti-abortion sentiment is religion. People with strong religious convictions, whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, are the most critical of abortion rights. In the *L.A. Times* poll, support for the *Roe* decision went from 24 percent among those who said religion was "very important in their lives" to 42 percent among those who said religion was "somewhat important," 45 percent among those who said it was "somewhat unimportant," and 66 percent among people who said religion was "very unimportant."

Hence the problem for the GOP: religious conservatives and prosperous suburbanites are the Republican party's two core constituencies. No issue is better calculated to drive these groups apart than abortion. A decision allowing abortion to be recriminalized could be as divisive for Republicans as the 1954 school desegregation decision was for Democrats.

To be sure, abortion divides Democrats as well as Republicans. But it will probably be a hotter issue for the GOP for two reasons. First, the religious right, which is a major player in the battle over abortion, is a Republican constituency. Second, the Republicans have elevated the right-to-life position to the level of official party doctrine.

The situation is in many ways analogous to that of the Democrats in the early 1960s. By making civil rights a matter of official party doctrine and enacting legislation to back it up, the Democrats solidified their black support at the cost of driving away large numbers of white southerners and ethnics. If the Republican position prevails and the Court recriminalizes abortion,

(Continued on page 59)

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THE PARTISAN CONSEQUENCES

Trouble for Both Parties

by Everett Carll Ladd

What do Americans want their country's policy on abortion to be? And what are the implications for the Democratic and Republican parties of the ever-growing salience of the abortion debate?

The nature of the public's views on abortion is now a hot debate. With the U.S. Supreme Court reexamining in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* the policy it set forth sixteen years ago in *Roe v. Wade*, and with feelings running high among both those who want change and those who oppose it, vigorous efforts are being made to promote various interpretations. The very complexity of opinion on the issue gives ample opportunity to those inclinations. People on either side can pick and choose among the various strains in the public's thinking—emphasizing only those parts that agree with their own stands.

In a March national survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, 61 percent said abortion is "morally wrong," and 57 percent said that it is "murder." The same survey, however, found 62 percent opposed to amending the Constitution to prohibit abortion. Accounts that stress one of these elements point in a different direction from those that emphasize the others.

An Overview of Public Sentiment

In fact, although public opinion on abortion is complex, it has been remarkably clear and consistent over the last decade. Substantial majorities of Americans have continued to say a few basic things.

1. *Policy should seek a balance between the mother's claim to choose and the claim accruing to all human life.* Here, as on so many other questions, the public is plainly inclined to the general proposition that individual choice deserves considerable respect. But the public believes that at some point other interests come into play, requiring limits on that choice. The mother should be able to choose to have an abortion—but not for just any reason, and only after taking other important interests into account. The *Los Angeles Times* survey found, for example, 80 percent opposed to abortion "when it is used as a form of birth control." By 53 to 37 percent, the public would require obtaining the consent of the natural father before an abortion is performed, and by 81 to 14 percent they would insist that minors get parental permission.

2. *Neither state nor national government should be permitted to ban all abortions, but government should impose*

greater restrictions. By 50 to 34 percent, the *L.A. Times* survey found, the public opposes "wiping out national standards about abortion" and letting each state impose whatever restrictions—including a complete ban—it chooses. And, as noted, a large majority reject a constitutional amendment that would categorically prohibit abortion. People believe that a woman should be able to get a legal abortion when the pregnancy results from rape or from incest, and when there is significant chance the child will be genetically deformed. And in overwhelming numbers, Americans would permit abortions to save the mother's life.

At the same time, large majorities in a poll taken March 27-29 by KRC Communications Research would make abortion illegal in cases where the claim for an abortion rested on the fetus not being of the desired sex (69 percent would make it illegal, 27 percent legal), the father's unwillingness to help raise the child (63 percent illegal, 31 percent legal), the judgment that it was the wrong time in life to have a child (63 to 32 percent), economic exigency (59 to 34 percent), or the belief that the pregnancy would cause excessive emotional strain (53 to 38 percent). Every survey taken in the last fifteen years asking whether abortion should be legal or illegal in various circumstances has found this basic pattern of public response.

3. Roe v. Wade *should not be reversed, but it should be amended*. The *L.A. Times* poll asked its respondents if they favored the Court's decision in *Roe* that "permits a woman to get an abortion from a doctor at any time within the first three months of her pregnancy." Forty-six percent said they did, while 35 percent were opposed. The element of constitutionally guaranteed choice stipulated by *Roe* should be retained. It should be noted, however, that this question misstates the *Roe* ruling in one critical regard. The decision bars state-imposed curbs on abortion except to protect the health of the mother at any time in the *first six months of pregnancy*.

> *Women and men hold similar views on most abortion questions, but women are usually found slightly more . . . in the anti-abortion camp. Black Americans are slightly more likely than whites to oppose abortion.*

But if an important element of choice is to be preserved in the public's view, the full sweep of *Roe* is not. By 57 to 34 percent, respondents to the March 1989 *L.A. Times* survey rejected the proposition that "a pregnant woman should be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason"—essentially what *Roe v. Wade* permits. The National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago has asked this question annually since 1978, and it has never found the proportion favoring "abortion no matter what the reason" higher than 39 percent. Periodically since 1975, Gallup has asked whether "abortion should be legal under any circumstances, legal under only certain circumstances, or illegal in all circumstances." In no case, including the latest question in a *Newsweek* poll earlier this month—have more than 27 percent endorsed the *Roe* standard of "legal always." Each time at least two-thirds would restrict *Roe*.

The argument goes on in democratic theory over where majority preferences should be followed and where they should be subordinated to minority rights that majorities may not intrude upon. This question will never be resolved in the court of public opinion. On abortion, though, majority opinion is quite clear: *Abortion should not be categorically banned, but it should not be established as an absolute right*.

Group Differences

Opinions on abortion vary, of course, across different population groups. Women and men hold similar views on most abortion questions, but women are usually found slightly more than men in the anti-abortion camp. Black Americans are slightly more likely than whites to oppose abortion. Regional differences are large, with residents of the Pacific Coast and the Northeast the most supportive of legal abortion and those in the East and West South Central states most opposed.

Two variables stand out in shaping abortion attitudes: (1) *religiosity*, for which frequency of church attendance is perhaps the most reliable survey measure; and (2) *levels of formal education*, where education is important both as a surrogate for overall socioeconomic status and, by itself, in identifying exposure through formal education to contrasting world views. Fifty-nine percent of college graduates in NORC's General Social Surveys (GSS) from 1984 to 1988 think a pregnant woman should be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason. Just 24 percent of those whose formal education stopped sometime prior to high school graduation take this stand. Fifty-four percent of those who never attend church favor abortion if the woman wants it "no matter what the reason," the position of only 9 percent who attend church more often than once a week. These two simple measures together explain an extraordinarily high proportion of the differences on abortion questions. Eighty percent of college graduates who rarely if ever attend church back the right to abortion no matter what the reason; just 12 percent with less than a high school education, who regularly attend church, think abortion should be legal in this case.

The Partisan Battle

The two parties' stands on abortion could hardly be more dissimilar. In 1984, for example, the Democrats' platform proclaimed that the party "recognizes reproductive freedom as a fundamental human right. We therefore oppose government interference in the reproductive decisions of Americans, especially government interference which denies poor Americans their right to privacy by funding or advocating one or a limited number of reproductive choices only. . . .The Democratic party supports the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abortion rights as the law of the land and opposes any constitutional amendment to restrict or overturn that decision. . . ."

In sharp contrast, the 1984 Republican platform insisted that "the unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We therefore reaffirm our support for a human life amendment to the Constitution, and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn children. We oppose the use of public revenues for abortion and will eliminate funding for organizations which advocate or support abortions. . . .[W]e reaffirm our support for the appointments of judges . . .who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life." The GOP reaffirmed these commitments in its 1988 platform. While the Democrats changed their platform language on abortion substantially in 1988—as part of a drastic shortening of the entire document—they reaffirmed their basic commitment: "We further believe . . .that the fundamental right of reproductive choice should be guaranteed regardless of ability to pay. . . ."

How has its stand on abortion affected each party's electoral fortunes? This question is difficult to answer, of course, because in electoral contests, including that for president, Democrats and Republicans differ on a great variety of issues. Final voter judgments are complex composites. Often no one, including voters themselves, can tell how much any one issue contributed to a vote.

We must be content, then, with a few observations of modest reach. The years since *Roe* have been an era of Republican ascendancy in presidential elections—the arena where policy differences stand out most sharply and are almost certain to have their greatest impact. At the very least, it's hard to make the case that the unequivocal stands against *Roe* in successive party platforms and the positions of Ronald Reagan and George Bush have diminished the GOP's appeal.

Even misstatements of an already strong Republican position against abortion seem not to have hurt. In his first debate with Michael Dukakis, for example, Bush was asked, "If abortions were to become illegal again, do you think that the women who defy the law and have them anyway—as they did before it was okayed by the Supreme Court—and the doctors who performed them, should go to jail?" Bush's answer was, "I—I haven't sorted out the penalties, but I do know—I do know that I oppose abortion. . . .As I've seen, abortion is sometimes used as a birth-control device, for heaven's sake—see the millions of these killings—accumulate. . . .And once that illegality is established, then we can come to grips with the penalty side, and of course there's got to be some penalties to enforce the—enforce the law—whatever they may be."

> *At the very least, it's hard to make the case that the unequivocal stands against* Roe *in successive party platforms and the positions of Ronald Reagan and George Bush have diminished the GOP's appeal.*

For once Dukakis wasn't slow in responding to a clear opening: "Well, I think what the vice president is saying is that he's prepared to brand a woman a criminal for making this decision. It's as simple as that. I don't think it's enough to come before the American people, who are watching us tonight, and say, 'Well, I haven't sorted it out.' This is a very, very difficult and a fundamental decision. . . .And what he is saying, if I understand him correctly, is that he's prepared to brand a woman a criminal for making this choice." After the debate, campaign chief James Baker and other Bush aides insisted that what the vice president meant to say was something like this: "Of course I don't think the women involved should be sent to prison. I am arguing for a policy of compassion, not retribution." But he didn't say that.

The many polls taken on debate night and in the days immediately following offer no indication that this exchange cut into Bush's support. Some in the political community maintain that the lack of impact was due simply to Baker's adroit damage control. But this seems implausible. It's far more likely that Bush escaped harm because—as the summary of survey findings above indicates—many Americans are dissatisfied with the policy consequences of *Roe v. Wade* and thus accepted, at least in part, Bush's main point that "Yes, my position has evolved, and is continuing to evolve, and it's evolving in favor of life."

Intraparty Divisions

Both parties' leadership encompasses people who have different views on abortion. Some Republican leaders think their party is aligned too outspokenly these days against abortion; some Democrats worry that their party is too supportive of abortion rights. But if there is some concern in both camps, Democrats are giving more public voice to their concerns than are Republicans as the abortion controversy moves front and center in the *Webster* case. On April 6, fifty Democratic members of the House of Representatives signed a letter to their national chairman, Ronald Brown, calling for a shift in party policy. The effort was initiated by John J. LaFalce, a congressman from the Buffalo area.

The fifty Democrats stated that "along with millions of our fellow Democrats, [we] believe the platform plank is bad public policy. We, as good Democrats, simply cannot accept that plank as part of our Democratic heritage and philosophy." The signers went on to argue that the platform commitment to "the fundamental right of reproductive choice" is also bad politics. "A good case can be made," they said, "that the last three presidential elections have turned, at least in part, on the loss of traditional Democrats who have broken with the party over so-called social issues, particularly abortion. . . .The Democratic party is seen more and more as the party of abortion—a sure recipe for losing irretrievably a significant segment of our traditional base of support." The fifty Democrats urged their national chairman "to take appropriate steps to alter the party's course."

Were the situation reversed, and 19 percent of House Republicans were protesting their party's plank against abortion by telling national chairman Lee Atwater to change course by recognizing a "fundamental right of reproductive choice," it would be seen, properly, as a political bombshell. The 19 percent of House Democrats who signed the letter to Ronald Brown were motivated not only by personal beliefs but also by political judgment—that the party was hurting itself politically.

Democratic and Republican leaders are, as groups, far apart on abortion. Rank-and-file members of the two parties, however, for the most part hold strikingly similar views on the issue.

Democratic and Republican leaders are, as groups, far apart on abortion. Rank-and-file members of the two parties, however, for the most part hold strikingly similar views on the issue. The distribution of opinion among all Democratic identifiers differs little from that among Republicans. In NORC-GSS surveys taken from 1984 through 1988, 34 percent of those who identified themselves as strongly committed Democrats said they favored abortion for any reason; 66 percent opposed it. Among strong Republicans the distribution was identical—34 percent in favor, 66 percent opposed. Furthermore, most matched pairs of Democrats and Republicans hold similar views. Seventy-eight percent of Democrats and 76 percent of Republicans with less than a high school education, for example, opposed abortion for any reason. So, too, did 79 percent of Democrats and 82 percent of Republicans among those who attend church regularly (see table 1).

Table 1

PARTISAN ATTITUDES AND ABORTION

Question: Do you think a pregnant woman should, or should not, be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason?

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Yes	**No**	**Yes**	**No**
National	36%	64%	36%	64%
By partisan intensity:				
Strong	34	66	34	66
Not strong	38	62	38	62
By age:				
18-34 years old	43	57	39	61
35-49 years old	44	56	37	63
50 and over	27	73	33	67
By education:				
Less than H.S. graduate	22	78	24	76
H.S. graduate	37	63	35	66
College graduate	65	35	50	50
By region:				
Northeast	45	55	48	52
Midwest	33	67	30	70
South	29	71	32	68
West	48	52	39	61
By church attendance:				
Low	49	51	55	45
Mid	40	60	42	58
High	22	79	18	82

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1984-1988 combined.

Note: Low church attendance = attandance once a year or less, mid = attendance ranging from several times a year up to 2–3 times a month and high = every week (or nearly) and even more frequently.

College-educated Democrats and Republicans do differ significantly in their views on abortion. In the NORC surveys, Democratic college graduates maintained, by a margin of nearly two to one, that a woman is entitled to a legal abortion if she wants one for any reason. College-educated Republicans were far more supportive of abortion than other educational groups in the party but still much less so than their Democratic counterparts: they split fifty-fifty on this question.

Evidently, there is a wide range of sentiment on abortion within both camps of partisans. This suggests that both parties are in positions to lose supporters if abortion becomes more of a voting issue following *Webster* and subsequent decisions. The rank-and-file party coalitions thus far have remained remarkably heterogeneous on the issue. Each party is a microcosm

Table 2

INDEX OF ABORTION SENTIMENT

Note to readers: This index combines the responses to three questions in the *Los Angeles Times* survey. The questions are:

1. Are you in favor of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would prohibit abortions, or are you opposed to that?
2. Do you think a pregnant woman should, or should not be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason?
3. Do you believe abortion is morally right or morally wrong?

This index yields eight possible response groups, from those who take the pro-abortion position on all three questions, to those taking an anti-abortion position on all three, with six intermediate combinations. Ninety percent of the responses fit into four of the eight possible categories. Those four are shown below.

	Pro-abortion on all three questions*	**Pro-choice but believe abortion is immoral***	**Anti-abortion but no categoric ban***	**Anti-abortion on all three questions***
By age:				
18-24 years	21%	14%	25%	30%
25-29	16	16	19	32
30-34	21	19	25	22
35-39	22	13	26	27
40-49	21	12	24	28
50-59	16	15	30	31
60-69	10	11	38	31
70 years and over	18	9	25	38
By sex:				
Male	20	13	29	26
Female	17	14	24	33
By education:				
Less than H.S. grad.	14	13	26	36
H.S. grad/Some college	18	13	27	30
College grad.	28	16	25	19
By frequency of church attendance:				
Occasionally/rarely	26	17	26	20
Regularly	11	11	28	38
Frequently	6	8	29	44
By church attendance and education:				
Occasional/College grad.	44	21	18	5
Occasional/H.S. grad.	24	16	29	19
Occasional/Less than H.S. grad.	21	16	23	30
Regular/College grad.	19	15	32	24
Regular/H.S. grad.	11	12	29	38
Frequent/College grad.	9	10	29	40
Frequent/Less than H.S. grad.	7	5	35	44
Regular/Less than H.S. grad.	5	8	21	51
Frequent/H.S. grad.	5	9	25	46
By party:				
Democratic	19	16	27	28
Independent	17	13	29	28
Republican	18	13	25	31
By party and education:				
Democrat/Less than H.S. grad.	11	18	31	30
Republican/Less than H.S. grad.	10	21	25	36
Democrat/H.S. grad.	21	14	25	30
Republican/H.S. grad.	18	11	25	31
Democrat/College grad.	31	18	21	16
Republican/College grad.	24	13	24	25
By frequency of church attendance and party:				
Occasional/Democrat	27	23	21	19
Occasional/Republican	31	16	25	19
Regular/Democrat	13	8	27	38
Regular/Republican	11	12	28	37
Frequent/Democrat	4	10	36	40
Frequent/Republican	6	5	26	47

Note: *Column 1 = those taking the pro-abortion position on all three questions. Column 2 = those who say that a pregnant woman should be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason and who oppose an amendment banning abortion, but who nonetheless describe abortion as morally wrong. Column 3 = those who describe abortion as morally wrong and who disagree that a woman should be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason, but who nonetheless oppose a categoric ban on abortion. Column 4 = those taking the anti-abortion position on all three questions.

Note: Frequent church attendance = more than once a week, regular = once a week to once a month, and occasional/rare = less than once a month.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

of the population, so both can lose if Court decisions on abortion serve to increase public awareness of the parties' positions, which are so sharply opposed.

Small Differences Between Rank-and-File Partisans

Before exploring further what the partisan fallout might be of giving the contending party positions even greater salience, it might be helpful to introduce a measure of public opinion on abortion that can better cope with what we have seen to be the complexity of the public's judgments. We have created such a measure from three questions included within the March 1989 *Los Angeles Times* survey—items that tap different dimensions of the public's thinking. The first item—the full text of which appears in table 2—asks respondents whether they favor a constitutional amendment categorically banning abortion. A large majority say no. The second question included in our composite measure asks whether "a pregnant woman should, or should not, be able to get a legal abortion no matter what the reason"—the policy that most closely approximates *Roe*. A third question asks whether abortion is morally right or wrong. A large majority think it is morally wrong.

> *Should the abortion issue start to drive dissenting partisans out of their traditional coalitions in far greater proportions than anything we have seen until now, the Democrats are likely to lose more than the GOP.*

> *On abortion, two positions are seen by large majorities as extreme: that abortion should be established as an unlimited right, and that it should be categorically banned.*

Nearly nine out of ten of these respondents are located in four of the eight positions: 18 percent take the pro-choice position each time; 14 percent say no to a constitutional ban on all abortions and yes to a woman's right to a legal abortion if she wants one for any reason but still indicate that personally they find abortion immoral; 26 percent describe abortion as morally wrong and say that a woman should not be able to choose abortion "no matter what the reason" but reject an absolute constitutional ban; and 30 percent take the anti-abortion position on all three dimensions.

Looking at group responses, we again see that education and religious adherence are enormously powerful predictors. College graduates who rarely or only occasionally attend church, and persons with less than a high school education who attend frequently, occupy opposite poles. Both camps of party identifiers, however, contain large if not exactly comparable proportions of the most religious and the least religious, the most highly educated and the least educated. Overall, Democrats are distributed in roughly the same proportions as Republicans across the four principal response categories that our composite measure defines.

William Schneider argues in the accompanying article that the Republicans have been saved thus far from the consequences of their anti-abortion stand because abortions have gone on even as the party has declared its strong opposition to them. Many Republican voters—especially the upscale and highly educated—have been able to ignore the party's stand because it hasn't seemed terribly consequential. But if *Webster* really cuts back on *Roe*, they would be forced to confront their party's policy. Or, to put the matter a little differently, corresponding to the analysis presented above, less educated, highly religious Republicans could not easily stay in coalition with highly educated, less religious Republicans if court rulings were to make the GOP's stand more salient.

Our analysis shows, however, that by this reckoning the Democrats are at least as vulnerable as the Republicans. Their coalition is still replete with persons who are highly religious and of low formal education; indeed, more of both these groups presently identify themselves as Democrats than as Republicans. Should the abortion issue start to drive dissenting partisans out of their traditional coalitions in far greater proportions than anything we have seen until now, the Democrats are likely to lose more than the GOP. Congressman LaFalce and his forty-nine cosigners obviously agree.

By definition, extremist stands don't find favor. On abortion, two positions are seen by large majorities as extreme: that abortion should be established as an unlimited right, and that it should be categorically banned. Should Republicans come to be seen as the party that would move policy to preclude abortion in all cases, they will surely suffer. But should the Democrats be seen as favoring an unlimited right to abortion, they will suffer. The public wants measured change in the policy set forth by the *Roe* decision. ☑

Everett Carll Ladd is senior editor of Public Opinion *and executive director of the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut.*

BLACK COLLEGES:

On February 1, 1960, in Greensboro, North Carolina, four students from a nearby black college sat down at a lunch counter, asked for cups of coffee, and waited to be served. They were threatened and arrested for "trespassing," a series of events that sparked a reaction on black college campuses throughout the South. While predominantly black colleges represent a small segment of all colleges and universities in the United States, their students were at the forefront of the civil rights movement in the 1960s.

It has been more than twenty years since the height of the civil rights movement when black youth struggled against racism and discrimination. Infusing politics with religion, young black Americans and sympathetic whites, most of whom were college students in the 1960s, participated in demonstrations, marches, boycotts, and freedom bus rides. Many of these young civil rights activists withstood firehoses, police clubs, snarling dogs, burned-out churches and schools, jail, and the death of their leaders and workers. These sacrifices were made so that future generations of blacks could vote, attend colleges of their choice, and go about their daily lives unimpeded.

Despite the apparent gains made by the civil rights movement since the 1960s, the struggle has been a rocky one. The nonviolence of the early sixties gave way to outbreaks of militancy, revolutionary rhetoric, and violence after Martin Luther King's assassination in 1968. In the 1970s, policies, actions, and attitudes began to shift from trying to redress the problems of discrimination against minorities—especially through affirmative action—to concerns with reverse discrimination, dramatized in the 1978 Bakke Supreme Court case. In the 1980s, the Reagan years signified the end of liberalism and ushered in an enthusiastic era of big business, self-interest, and conservatism.

In the 1980s a new generation of black Americans—born after the days of blatant segregation and too young to remember the civil rights protests of the 1960s—began college. Some of the older generation, active in the civil rights movement during their youth, now worry that this younger generation has little appreciation of the civil rights struggle.

How have students going to black colleges in the 1980s—once the core of the black student movement—reacted to these events and trends? In order to address this question, we looked at the American Council on Education (ACE) and Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) data on freshmen attending predominantly black colleges (5 percent of the colleges and universities in the United States) with all freshmen—most of whom attend largely white institutions of higher learning (95 percent of the colleges and universities in the United States). For over twenty years, the ACE-CIRP has conducted annual nationwide surveys of approximately 220,000 college freshmen—the largest collegiate survey in the United States.

In order to gain a perspective on whether the changing times have had an impact on the attitudes and behavior of freshmen at predominantly black colleges, we compared the latest survey (1988) to the 1968 survey (or the closest years with equivalent survey items), contrasting responses with those for all college freshmen in each year.

Fewer Advantages, Higher Aspirations

As can be seen in table 1, students from predominantly black colleges are at an economic disadvantage compared to all college freshmen in the United States.

Table 1

Background Characteristics of College Freshmen in America: 1968-1988

	College Freshmen	Survey Year	
		1968	1988
Parents' status: not living together (1981); divorced, separated, deceased (1988)	Black colleges	36%(1981)	55%
	All colleges	15 (1981)	27
Estimated parental income: less than $10,000 (1968); less than $30,000 (1988)	Black colleges	85	56
	All colleges	49	31
Received money from parents, family: $600 or more (1979); $1,500 or more (1988)	Black colleges	41 (1979)	38
	All colleges	64 (1979)	52
Some/major concern about financing college	Black colleges	80	74
	All colleges	65	63

Note: Sample size = 5,744 freshmen at predominantly black colleges and 243,156 freshmen at all institutions (1968) and 6,048 freshmen at predominantly black colleges and 222,296 freshmen at all institutions (1988). When background survey items were not avilable for 1988, the next earliest year was selected for comparison.

Sources: American Council on Education, *National Norms for Entering College Freshmen*, Washington, D.C.: ACE Office of Research, 1968; Cooperative Institutional Research Program and American Council on Education, *The American Freshman: National Norms*, Los Angeles: UCLA Graduate School of Education, latest that of 1988.

Freshman Attitudes

by Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart

Although the economic backgrounds of freshmen from black colleges have improved—in that fewer of them in 1988 were from poorer families or were worried about financing their college education—they continued to come from less economically advantaged homes than do college freshmen as a whole. And while students in both groups in 1988 relied less heavily on their parents for money than in 1979, again fewer from black colleges received financial support from their parents than most freshmen did. On the positive side, the financial gap between freshmen from black colleges and all freshmen was not as pronounced in 1988 as it was in 1968. Yet, despite the less economically harsh conditions for students from black colleges in 1988, an increasing proportion were from single-parent homes (parents separated, divorced, not living together, or deceased), which, while also a growing national trend among all college freshmen, occurred to a greater degree among students from black colleges. Compared to all freshmen, freshmen from predominantly black colleges continue to go to school with the added stress of less economic support and more financial worries.

The 1980s in America have been characterized as a time of turning away from wider social and political problems to pursue more personal interests such as money, power, and status. Has this trend affected students going to black colleges? Are their aspirations in the 1980s like those of all college freshmen—primarily concerned with financial achievement and personal success—or do they adhere to many of the social and political goals of the 1960s? Some of the answers to these questions appear in table 2.

Freshmen at predominantly black colleges in 1988 continued to be more involved with religion than the general population of college freshmen. The majority identified themselves as either Baptists or born-again Christians, while the largest percentage of all freshmen identified themselves as Catholic. Black-college youth attended religious services at slightly higher rates and were somewhat more likely to discuss religion than were freshmen in general. The stronger religious identification of young people from black colleges, particularly with some of the more conservative religious groups, may partially explain why they were less likely than their freshman contemporaries to smoke cigarettes or drink beer in either 1968 or 1988.

Freshmen from black colleges in 1988 took a slightly greater interest in politics than did freshmen as a whole. The marked drop in concern with politics evident among the 1988 cohort of freshmen was not reflected to such a large extent among the group from black colleges. Although there was a decline in political discussion among black-college youth from 1968–1988, it was less pronounced than that for most students. Moreover, by 1988 there was an increase in the percentage of freshmen at black colleges saying that they had worked in campaigns.

Differences were also apparent in attitudes toward higher education. When asked about their reasons for

Table 2

Attitudes and Behavior of College Freshmen in America: 1968-1988

	College Freshmen	Survey Year 1968	Survey Year 1988	Percent Change 1968-1988
SELECTED RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE				
Baptist	Black colleges	61%(1970)	61%	0
	All colleges	14 (1970)	13	−1
Jewish	Black colleges	0 (1970)	0	0
	All colleges	4 (1970)	3	−1
Methodist	Black colleges	16 (1970)	10	−6
	All colleges	11 (1970)	9	−2
Catholic	Black colleges	7 (1970)	7	0
	All colleges	31 (1970)	36	+5
Born-again Christian	Black colleges	42 (1980)	45	+3
	All colleges	27 (1980)	23	−4
ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN LAST YEAR				
Attend a religious service	Black colleges	96%	90%	−6
	All colleges	91	82	−9
Discussed religion	Black colleges	25	29	+4
	All colleges	29	21	−8
Drank beer	Black colleges	39	36	−3
	All colleges	52	65	+13
Smoked cigarettes	Black colleges	10	4	−6
	All colleges	16	10	−6
Discussed politics	Black colleges	21	19	−2
	All colleges	30	19	−11
Worked in a political campaign	Black colleges	9 (1972)	14	+5
	All colleges	9 (1972)	9	0
REASONS TO GO TO COLLEGE (VERY IMPORTANT)				
Get a better job	Black colleges	89%(1971)	90%	+1
	All colleges	74 (1971)	83	+9
Become more cultured	Black colleges	52 (1971)	57	+5
	All colleges	29 (1971)	35	+6
Gain a general education	Black colleges	69 (1971)	75	+6
	All colleges	60 (1971)	60	0
Improve reading, writing skills	Black colleges	46 (1971)	69	+23
	All colleges	22 (1971)	39	+17
Learn more about things	Black colleges	72 (1971)	79	+7
	All colleges	69 (1971)	74	+5
Make more money	Black colleges	71 (1971)	85	+14
	All colleges	50 (1971)	73	+23
Parents wanted me to go	Black colleges	42 (1971)	34	−8
	All colleges	23 (1971)	19	−4
Prepare for graduate school	Black colleges	58 (1971)	71	+13
	All colleges	35 (1971)	50	+15

	College Freshmen	Survey Year		Percent Change 1968-1988
		1968	1988	
OBJECTIVES IN LIFE (ESSENTIAL OR VERY IMPORTANT)				
Become authority in my field	Black colleges	71%	81%	+ 10
	All colleges	58	72	+ 14
Successful in own business	Black colleges	59	70	+ 11
	All colleges	45	52	+ 7
Involved in environmental cleanup	Black colleges	40 (1971)	25 (1987)	15
	All colleges	43 (1971)	18 (1987)	25
Be very well off financially	Black colleges	52	86	+ 34
	All colleges	41	73	+ 32
Develop a philosophy of life	Black colleges	85	67	18
	All colleges	83	51	32
Have administrative responsibility	Black colleges	31	54	+ 23
	All colleges	23	40	+ 17
Help others in difficulty	Black colleges	71	69	2
	All colleges	59	56	3
Keep up with politics	Black colleges	57	41	16
	All colleges	52	33	19
Influence political structure	Black colleges	25 (1970)	30	+ 5
	All colleges	13 (1970)	17	1
Influence social values	Black colleges	42 (1970)	53	+ 11
	All colleges	34 (1970)	37	+ 3
Participate in community action	Black colleges	45 (1970)	39	6
	All colleges	29 (1970)	22	7
Promote racial understanding	Black colleges	66 (1977)	68	+ 2
	All colleges	36 (1977)	32	4
Raise a family	Black colleges	62 (1970)	64	+ 2
	All colleges	68 (1970)	67	1
SELECT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES (AGREE STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT)				
Abolish death penalty	Black colleges	55% (1978)	36%	19
	All colleges	33 (1978)	23	10
Abortion legalized	Black colleges	72 (1970)	60	12
	All colleges	83 (1970)	57	26
Busing okay to achieve balance	Black colleges	70 (1976)	63	7
	All colleges	37 (1976)	54	+ 17
Government not doing enough to control pollution	Black colleges	89 (1971)	83	6
	All colleges	91 (1971)	84	− 7
Government not doing enough to promote disarmament	Black colleges	71 (1985)	78	+ 7
	All colleges	66 (1985)	67	+ 1
Government not doing enough to protect consumers	Black colleges	80 (1971)	76	− 4
	All colleges	77 (1971)	65	− 12
Nuclear disarmament attainable	Black colleges	52 (1985)	58	+ 6
	All colleges	54 (1985)	60	+ 6
Should live together before marriage	Black colleges	47 (1974)	51	+ 4
	All colleges	45 (1974)	51	+ 6
Marijuana legalized	Black colleges	44 (1972)	20	− 24
	All colleges	47 (1972)	19	− 28
Increase military spending	Black colleges	38 (1982)	27	− 11
	All colleges	39 (1982)	26	− 13
Important to have laws to prohibit homosexual relations	Black colleges	52 (1976)	50	− 2
	All colleges	47 (1976)	49	+ 2
Criminals too many rights	Black colleges	36 (1970)	59	+ 23
	All colleges	52 (1970)	69	+ 17
Woman's activity best in home	Black colleges	60 (1967)	34	− 26
	All colleges	57 (1967)	26	− 31
Can do little to change society	Black colleges	34	45 (1985)	+ 11
	All colleges	32	37 (1985)	+ 5
POLITICAL ORIENTATION				
Far left	Black colleges	7 (1970)	5	− 2
	All colleges	3 (1970)	2	− 1
Liberal	Black colleges	36 (1970)	30	− 6
	All colleges	34 (1970)	22	− 12
Middle-of-the-road	Black colleges	37 (1970)	46	+ 9
	All colleges	45 (1970)	54	+ 9
Conservative	Black colleges	16 (1970)	17	+ 1
	All colleges	17 (1970)	20	+ 3
Far right	Black colleges	3 (1970)	2	− 1
	All colleges	1 (1970)	2	+ 1

Note: "Black colleges" refers to freshmen at predominantly black colleges. When survey items were not available for 1968 or 1988, the next earliest year was selected for comparison.

Sources: American Council on Education, *National Norms for Entering College Freshmen* Washington, D.C.: ACE Office of Research, latest that of 1972; Cooperative Institutional Research Program and American Council on Education, *The American Freshman: National Norms* Los Angeles: UCLA Graduate School of Education, latest that of 1988.

going to college, freshmen at black colleges, to a greater degree than most freshmen surveyed, perceived college as a vehicle not only for career mobility and making more money, but also for self-development. For them more than most students, college is the place to become more cultured, to improve reading and writing skills, gain a general education, and learn more about things in life. In addition, freshmen from black colleges were almost twice as likely to claim that a major reason for attending college was because their parents wanted it. Furthermore, by 1988 the percentage of students from black colleges who saw college as a place to prepare for graduate school had grown substantially since 1971 and was larger than that for the total sample of freshmen.

A further indication of the increased aspirations of freshmen from black colleges in 1988 is evident in their career choices, which generally conformed to the national trends of the 1980s. Most notable is a dramatic shift on all American college campuses away from preparing for careers in teaching, social work, health professions, and the arts in favor of business, engineering, law, and medicine—a change that includes black colleges as well. In the 1980s, freshmen attending black colleges were among the students most likely to aspire to the high-paying, high-status professions of engineering, law, medicine, and business. They want to fit into, and excel in, the mainstream.

The freshmen sent mixed signals about their most important individual and social objectives. They are concerned with personal careers; they want to be authorities in their fields, to be successful in their own businesses, to be well-off financially, and to have administrative responsibility. Freshmen from black colleges expressed these aspirations to a greater extent than most freshmen. Black-college freshmen in the 1980s are ambitious and success-oriented, and they express high ideals—raising families, helping others in difficulty, influencing social values, and promoting

(Continued on page 57)

GROWING OLD GRACEFULLY: TWO GENERATIONS LOOK AT AGING

by John C. Pollock

Aging in America is often considered a precarious prospect. At best it signifies graceful acceptance of an inevitable decline in physical and financial resources. New evidence from a national survey of two generations—middle-aged and senior-aged—commissioned by Transamerica Life Companies and conducted by New World Decisions, Inc., uncovers an astonishing bedrock of optimism among seniors (more so than among middle-aged Americans), a passion for independence, and an appreciation of their good fortune.

The same national survey also reveals remarkable misinformation among our nation's seniors about the benefits they are likely or eligible to receive from pensions, Medicare or Medicaid, and social security, as well as widespread misconceptions about nursing-home care. Extraordinary optimism about their own circumstances combined with ominous overestimates of the financial aid they can expect, make today's senior citizens possibly the most satisfied and appreciative senior generation in American history.

The Transamerica survey relies on samples of 500 for each of the two generations, weighted by age, gender, and region to correspond to a representative national household sample of middle-aged (forty-five to fifty-four) and senior (sixty-five plus) citizens. The survey collects information that helps address several key questions. How much do people plan for long-term care? What do different generations expect society and government to offer? And do today's retirees expect to be better off than those who came before and those who come after?

How cautious are "seniors" and "middles" in their financial planning, and how confident are they about the future, especially since the stock market plunge of October 1987? How much do both "middles" and "seniors" anticipate accurately or know about the personal and national costs of retirement planning and long-term care? Finally, how much time and resources do both generations devote to each other: is one generation bearing a disproportionate share of responsibility for another's concerns, and are tomorrow's retirees optimistic or pessimistic about the weight of their responsibilities?

Optimism About Self-Reliance and Financial Security

Both generations manifest a curious dualism: skepticism about what society will do for them and optimism about what they can do for themselves. Between 37 and 40 percent of both middles and seniors believe strongly that inflation and health-care costs will erode their financial resources. A similar four in ten proportion of middles are highly skeptical that by the year 2000 the government will have adequate resources to meet the needs of its retired citizens, while only about 23 percent of the senior group are similarly pessimistic.

Despite some skepticism about help from the outside, sizable proportions of both middles and seniors believe they can meet financial obligations in the future. About half of both groups believe it "extremely" or "very" likely that, if healthy, they will have enough financial resources to live where they are now planning to and to meet basic needs for the rest of their lives.

Asked about whether income from a variety of sources will be enough to meet their daily needs at retirement, seniors are even more optimistic than middles. Only about one in eight seniors (12 percent) say their income is *not* adequate, compared to almost three in ten middles (28 percent) who anticipate inadequate income. Despite uncertainty about whether their own children will be better off at retirement than they are or will be, clear majorities of 61 to 66 percent of seniors and middles believe they will be (or are) better off at retirement than their parents were at an equivalent time.

Several sources confirm the accuracy of overall senior financial perspectives found in the Transamerica study. Although the public usually perceives large numbers of seniors as economically deprived, modern analysis of census data from the 1980s reveals that the average economic resources of individual seniors are at least comparable to those of non-seniors. Census data, in addition, may underestimate senior income because certain categories, such as private pension income and interest and dividend income, are underreported, according to Dr. Stephen Crystal of the Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and Aging Research at Rutgers University. Seniors may be optimistic about self-reliance because they believe that their incomes are adequate or more than adequate.

The two generations may also owe their optimism to wise asset allocation. Both middles and seniors put their assets in safe harbors. The most popular places for both groups are savings accounts, life insurance policies with cash value, company pensions, and in the case of seniors, owning their homes free of mortgages. Among the least widely held financial vehicles are bonds and income-producing real estate.

The safety of these financial positions may explain why fewer than one in eight middles and seniors are "extremely concerned" about the safety of assets following the 1987 stock market plunge, and why a similarly small proportion have moved or plan to move their assets in response to the crash.

Long-Term Independence and Family Proximity

About half of both groups live or anticipate living near one of their children, and those with more children are more likely to prefer that proximity. Middles from the West are least likely to wish to live near children.

The most appealing housing options are those with considerable physical autonomy, a preference that has many implications for planning long-term care and retirement. Sixty-five percent of the seniors (and 75 percent of the middles) find "very" or "somewhat" appealing the option of living in their own homes and hiring help for household chores and personal care. Forty-three to forty-five percent of seniors and middles like a continuing care retirement community, which would give them their own condominiums. Least popular as a long-term option—considered "very appealing" by only about 5 percent—is living with a son or daughter either in one's own home or in theirs. As with so many other attitudes, the desire for autonomy is similar across generations and prized in equal measure by both men and women.

At the same time, roots in home and family are highly valued. Seniors are about twice as likely as middles (29 to 13 percent) to believe that if they ever have to sell their homes they will lose a "big part of the joy" in their lives.

Home-oriented behavior is even more rooted than attitudes. Only about one in three middles (35 percent) plan to move at retirement, and only about one in four seniors (26 percent) say they actually did so. Similarly, only one in three middles would move at the death of a spouse, compared to fewer than one in four seniors (23 percent).

No single generation bears the immense burden for caregiving. Among those with relatives (older relatives, in the case of middles), large portions of both age groups are active caregivers: 45 percent of the middles have weekly in-person contact with relatives, compared with 33 percent of the seniors. Similarly, middles and seniors are equally likely to provide relatives with financial assistance (9 percent and 8 percent, respectively). Companionship is the service provided most frequently by both generations (80 percent of caregiving middles, 56 percent of caregiving seniors). Further cross-generational similarity is found in the average number of hours devoted to caregiving each week: 7.2 for middles; 7.6 for seniors. Among both groups, women are about twice as likely as men to devote ten or more in-person contact hours each week to relatives.

Over eight in ten middles and seniors agree that relatives who move in should pay a fair share of household expenses. Consistently autonomous, seniors are more likely than middles to agree strongly with that assertion.

Uncertainty About Concrete Financial Support

The optimism about self-reliance and financial security as well as the independence that middles and seniors prize so highly, are far from guaranteed. The belief that finances will be adequate for the remainder of one's life is associated strongly with higher income and somewhat with region (southerners are least likely to be highly optimistic; westerners are the most optimistic).

Optimism is accompanied by uncertainty or reluctance to speculate about current and projected financial circumstances. When asked about the total value of the assets they now have, about half (53 percent) of middles and two-thirds (68 percent) of seniors don't know or don't answer. When asked about how much income they believe they will (or do) receive from social security, company pensions, and all other sources at (or since) retirement, between half and six in ten middles, and between four in ten and over half of seniors, don't know or don't answer.

The Transamerica Report catalogues several similarities between seniors and middles regarding financial attitudes and behavior. It also uncovers similar views and misperceptions concerning long-term care.

Both groups believe the average age at which people enter nursing homes is about seventy, below an estimated national average of 76.1. Both groups believe the median length of stay is about five years, above the estimated national average of 2.9 years. (Figures for average age and length of stay are supplied by the National Center for Health Statistics.)

Misperceptions are also found in estimates of annual nursing-home costs. Three-quarters of seniors (73 percent) and almost two-thirds of middles (65 percent) either don't know or underestimate the annual cost of one typical person staying in a nursing home. (According to the U.S. House Committee on Aging, the current average cost is about $22,000.)

Respondents are uncertain about help from outside (public and private) sources. When asked what proportion of nursing-home costs they think are routinely covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance, approximately half of the middles and about 60 percent of seniors don't answer. When they do guess, their estimates can be quite mistaken. Seniors believe Medicare covers about 29 percent of nursing-home costs, while the reliable figure is 4 percent, according to the National Foundation for Long-Term Care.

Misplaced Optimism or Appreciative Expectations?

Seniors are about twice as likely as middles (47 percent to 25 percent) to say they "almost never worry" about their financial situation. (See table 1) Seniors, especially women, are somewhat more likely than middles to be "completely satisfied" with their current standard of living. Westerners are more likely than residents of other regions to report they "almost never" worry about finances and are more likely to report "complete satisfaction" with their standard of living.

Table 1

WORRY ABOUT FINANCIAL SITUATION

	Middles (Aged 45–54 years)		Seniors (Aged 65 and over)	
	Seldom	Almost never	Seldom	Almost never
Total	26%	25%	23%	47%
By sex:				
Men	28	27	21	50
Women	25	23	25	44
By household income:				
Low	21	16	24	37
Middle	28	24	21	46
High	25	31	22	56
By marital status:				
Married	26	26	26	44
Single	26	22	20	49
By region:				
Northeast	27	22	24	48
Midwest	30	18	25	40
South	27	22	22	43
West	18	40	22	59
By age:				
65–74 years			24	44
75 and over			22	50

Source: Survey by New World Decisions, Inc. for Transamerica Life Companies, March 25–May 3, 1988.

Some of this optimism may be associated with misconceptions about the actual costs of growing older. But some of it may also be rooted in certain advantages associated with aging. In some cases standard of living may improve with aging because of social security, because of cautious asset placement, because mortgages are more likely to be paid off, and because at least one major financial burden—young children—is less likely to be a worry.

The positive personal outlook of seniors may also owe something to the low expectations that were fostered in a generation that came of age during the depression and World War II, a group for whom the assistance of social security and the privilege of home ownership count as special achievements. In addition, there are clear regional differences regarding financial concern. Westerners, for example, say they're better off. Countering any assumptions that aging means automatic vulnerability—a time when physical fragility mirrors other disadvantages—seniors appear at least as cheerful as middles about several aspects of their financial circumstances.

Similarities Across Two Generations

The similarity between middle-aged and senior Americans is one of the most striking findings, a conclusion that runs counter to many expectations. Cross-generational similarities in perspectives on retirement and the personal optimism measured in the Transamerica Two Generation Report document something unusual. One adviser to the study, Rutgers anthropologist Dr. Lionel Tiger, calls it "a robust sense of legitimate social place for older Americans and consideration of their rights as occupants of valued roles."

A standard view is to regard older people as "occupational" rather than "biological" beings. According to this viewpoint, people who don't engage in formal work or have defined occupations are likely to become vulnerable, despondent, and of little value to society.

But the optimism of seniors and their willingness to shoulder caregiving responsibilities suggest that diminished occupational roles do not necessarily reduce the important social and biological activities seniors perform: nurturing, staying in touch with relatives, cementing the bonds of family and kin. By illuminating these socially useful dimensions of retirement, the Transamerica Report witnesses a social and policy system that may be working, recognizing seniors as rightful tenants of a valued place in American society. ☑

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NATO: THE VIEW FROM EUROPE

Question: Now a question about NATO—that is, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say that it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?



	Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	Belgium	Denmark	Netherlands
NATO is still essential-No longer essential							
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
10 69[1]	68-15	47-37	76-13	66-23	—	—	—
07 71[1]	81-12	54-35	84-11	—	—	—	—
04 73	—	42-34	73-13	—	—	—	—
07 76[1]	69-15	42-35	85-10	58-30	—	—	—
03 77[1]	73-08	44-29	79-07	54-24	—	—	78-11
03 78[1]	70-10	39-35	84-05	58-22	—	62-16	71-10
10 80[1]	79-13	44-34	88-08	54-25	56-20	—	63-26
03 81	70-15	—	62-20	62-27	—	—	62-15
07 82	65-25	34-26	66-18	55-31	—	—	67-16
07 83	72-16	—	86-12	61-26	—	—	—
05 84	76-12	—	87-10	63-24	60-20	63-19	58-20
02 87	72-17	49-28	71-11	58-29	—	—	—
09 87	72-16	48-19	70-15	65-23	—	—	—
10 87	—	—	—	—	—	61-22	—
10 88	72-17	58-22	76-13	53-31	66-22	70-23	64-25

Note: [1] In the October 1980 and prior surveys, this question was asked only of those who had heard or read about NATO. To standardize the data in this table, percentages for these surveys have been recalculated on the base of those actually asked the question.

Source: Surveys conducted under the auspices of the United States Information Agency, using local polling firms in each country.

BRITISH

Question: Some people say that NATO is still essential to Britain's security, others say it is no longer essential. Which view is closer to your own?



Question: Here are some statements that have been made about Britain's defense. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each statement?



Mr. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost has reduced the threat of war, and soon there will be little need for organizations such as NATO

Source: Survey by British Gallup, March 22-27, 1989

Question: Using this card, would you tell me how important you think it is for the defense of Europe



That America stations troops in Europe

Note: The survey also asked how important it was for America to maintain Air Force bases in Europe ([illegible] said very or quite important, 31% said not very or not at all important) and to maintain naval and submarine facilities in Europe (60% said very or quite important, 31% not very or not at all important).

Question: Which side—NATO or Russia and the Warsaw Pact—has the strongest military forces? And which side is strongest in nuclear weapons—NATO or Russia and the Warsaw Pact?



Source: Survey by British Gallup, November 27-December 1, 1986

Question: Suppose that the Soviet Union were to withdraw most of its military forces now in Eastern Europe. Would you say that NATO was still essential to our country's security, or not?



Suppose the Soviet Union were to withdraw most of its military forces now in Eastern Europe . . .

Source: Survey by British Gallup, March 22-27, 1989

Question: The United States and the Soviet Union have just agreed to remove 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. Do you think that NATO should modernize its nuclear weapons that are left, or should they start negotiations for further reductions in their numbers?



Source: Survey by British Gallup, April 14-19, 1988

OPINION

Question: Here are a number of statements which outline different defense policies. Which one comes closest to your view?



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International Limited, latest that of November 1988.

Question: Do you think Britain should or should not continue to possess nuclear weapons as long as the Soviet Union has them?



Note: In a January 18–23, 1989 British Gallup question, 48% agreed that "we owe the peace we've had in Europe for the past forty years to nuclear weapons." 41% disagreed.

Source: Survey by British Gallup, March 16–21, 1988.

Question: On this card is a list of statements that have been used to describe the Soviet Union and the United States. Please read through the list keeping (the Soviet Union/United States) in mind. Every time you come to a statement that fits your ideas or impressions of ___ just tell me the number next to it. It doesn't matter if you don't know much, just give your impressions. You may pick as many or as few statements as you like.



Source: Survey by Market & Opinion Research International Limited, latest that of March 15–19, 1989.

Question: Do you think Russia wants to be friendly with the West, or should we treat her advances with suspicion?



Source: Survey by British Gallup, January 11–17, 1989.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the role (the United States/Russia) is now playing in world affairs?

	United States		Russia	
	App.	Dis.	App.	Dis.
1951				
Feb	40%	35%		
1952				
Mar	37	34		
1954				
April	37	40		
1973				
Jan	26	45		
Nov	34	37		
1974				
Mar	44	25		
1983				
Aug *	30	56	7%	70%
Nov	32	55	9	75
1984				
Feb	29	59	10	71
Nov	34	49	9	73
1985				
Jan	35	47	17	62
Oct	36	48	18	59
1986				
Mar	37	45	25	54
Oct	36	50	31	48
1987				
July	30	50	36	37
Dec	43	41	49	30
1988				
April	42	42	49	29
Dec	41	36	49	26



Note: The first and last point of each year are shown here. * In 1983 the question about Russia was asked in May. The question about the United States was asked in August.

Source: Survey by British Gallup, latest that of December 1988.

Question: Some people say that the United States is antagonizing its allies by her foreign policy. Others don't agree. Do you think that the U.S. foreign policy is or is not losing her friendships among Western countries?



Source: Survey by British Gallup, latest that of May 1986.

Question: As you may know, (name president) has been elected president of the United States. Do you think this will be a good thing or a bad thing for America's relationship with Britain?



Source: Surveys by British Gallup, latest that of November 1988.

Question: On the issue of limiting nuclear weapons, who do you find more believable—Mr. Bush or the Russian leader Mr. Gorbachev?

On the issue of limiting nuclear weapons, find (Bush/Gorbachev) more believable



Note: In a separate question asked January 18-23, 79% of the British had a good opinion of Gorbachev, 8% not so good, and 14% didn't have an opinion. By contrast, 31% had a good opinion of Bush, 20% a not so good opinion, and 49% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by British Gallup, January 1-17, 1989.

WEST GERMAN OPINION

Question: Which is your personal opinion: Should the Federal Republic remain a member of NATO, or should it withdraw from NATO?



Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), latest that of May June 1987

COMING
THIS
FALL

BLACK
AND
WHITE
ATTITUDES

Question: If you were to read in the newspaper tomorrow that the Americans were going to withdraw their troops from Europe, would you welcome or regret this decision?



Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), September 1987

Question: Putting things in simple terms: Is military deterrence actually necessary to our security or is it not necessary?



Note: Of those who said deterrence is necessary, 36% said deterrence will still be adequate after the intermediate range missiles are removed, 6% said it would not be, and 9% were undecided.

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), February 1988.

Question: Here are two people talking about the Soviet Union. Please take a look at this. Which one do you agree with more—the one above or the one below?



Agree with more . . .

"Both Soviet policy and arms are geared to defense today. There is no need for us to feel threatened by the Soviet Union with its new policy."

or

"I don't agree. The Soviet Union is seeking to establish its hegemony over all of Europe. The goal is to use military power to put pressure on us to pursue a policy which mainly serves Soviet interests."

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), May–June 1988.

Question: You often hear the opinion that we will only make progress with disarmament if one side takes the initiative. Are you for or against our taking the first step toward disarmament in the West?



Note: In a British Gallup question (January 18-23, 1989), "Some people say that we will only make progress with disarmament if one side takes the initiative. Are you for or against our taking the first step towards disarmament in the West." 43% of the British favored taking the first step, 43% opposed it, and 14% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), latest that of August 1987.

Question: Can you imagine disarmament resulting in less security and in a possible threat of war, or don't you believe this is possible?



Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), April-June 1987.

Question: Many military experts say that the Warsaw Pact is far superior to NATO as regards conventional weapons, that is, soldiers, tanks, and airplanes. The question is what the West is to do if the East is not willing to disarm as regards these weapons. Here are two people discussing this topic. Which one do you agree with more—the one above or the one below?

Agree with more . . .

"There's nothing we can do about this. We can only hope that the East will be willing to disarm, not only as regards intermediate-range missiles but also conventional arms."

or

"The imbalance is too dangerous. We are going to have to build up our conventional forces in the West or keep enough nuclear arms for purposes of deterrence."

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), February 1987.

Question: This shows two people discussing disarmament. With whom would you generally agree?

Agree with more . . .

"I am afraid that if there are no nuclear arms emplaced in the Federal Republic anymore, we might be subject to pressure from the Soviet Union. In the long run, this may result in our becoming completely dependent on the Soviet Union in political terms."

or

"I don't believe that. After all, we belong to the West. Even if there are no nuclear arms emplaced in our country anymore, the Soviet Union will not be able to subject us to political pressure."

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), June-July 1987.

Question: Are you in favor of withdrawing all nuclear weapons from Europe, or are you not in favor of this?



Note: In a British Gallup question (January 18-23, 1989), 48% favored withdrawing all nuclear weapons from Europe, 42% were against, and 10% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), August-September 1987.

Question: All in all, do you have a good opinion of (Reagan Gorbachev) or not such a good opinion?



	Good opinion of Ronald Reagan	Not so good opinion of Reagan	Good opinion of Mikhail Gorbachev	Not so good opinion of Gorbachev
1985				
Nov Dec	44%	26%	42%	15%
Dec	44	30	—	—
1986				
May	32	39	34	26
Oct Nov	37	35	—	—
Nov	—	—	42	19
1987				
Feb	20	45	46	14
June	33	39	54	13
July	35	39	60	11
1988				
Jan	34	33	65	8
May June	41	31	71	7

Source: Survey by the Allensbach Institute (West Germany), latest that of May June 1988

FRENCH OPINION

Question: In your opinion, what would most endanger the security and the independence of the Western European nations—the United States, the U.S.S.R., or internal quarrels in the Western European nations?

Question: In your opinion, should France align itself closer to, or distance itself farther from, NATO?

Question: At the present time, do you believe that the Atlantic Alliance plays an essential role for the security of Europe?

1953
Would most endanger security and independence of Western European nations



1964
France should . . .



1966



Source: Surveys by Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP)

Question: There is soon going to be a summit meeting of the Atlantic Alliance in Bonn. In general, do you consider French membership in the Atlantic Alliance a good thing or a bad thing?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, May 14-21, 1982

Question: At the present time, France is a member of the Atlantic Alliance, but she is not part of NATO, which is the integrated military command of the armies of the member states. Among these different options, which one do you prefer?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, May 14-21, 1982

Question: Internationally, on which side do you think France should be at the present time . . . on the U.S. side, the U.S.S.R. side, or neither?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, latest that of January 1985

Question: Vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., should France pursue a policy of conciliation or a policy of firmness?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, latest that of March 1987

Question: Are you confident or not that Ronald Reagan can maintain peace in the world? What about Mikhail Gorbachev?



Source: Brule Ville Associcis. March 13-18, 1987

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Question: Do you have a good or bad opinion of (Ronald Reagan Mikhail Gorbachev)?



Source: Surveys by Brule Ville Associés, latest that of December 1987.

ATTITUDES ABOUT ALCOHOL

THOSE WHO DRINK . . .

Question: Do you have occasion to use alcoholic beverages such as liquor, wine, or beer, or are you a total abstainer?



Drinkers

	National	Men	Women
1939	58%	70%	45%
1945	67	75	60
1946	67	—	—
1947	63	72	54
1949	58	66	49
1950	60	—	—
1951	59	70	46
1952	60	68	53
1956	60	—	—
1957	58	67	50
1958	55	66	45
1960	62	—	—
1964	63	—	—
1966	65	70	61
1969	64	—	—
1974	68	77	61
1976	71	—	—
1977	71	77	65
1978	71	75	64
1979	69	74	64
1981	70	75	66
1982	65	69	61
1983	65	71	58
1984	64	73	57
1985	67	72	62
1987	65	72	57
1988	63		

Note: In response to a 1987 Gallup question, 20% of drinkers said they most often drink liquor, 30% wine, and 50% beer.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 1-7, 1988.

AND THOSE WHO WOULD FORBID IT

Question: Would you favor or oppose a law forbidding the sale of all beer, wine, and liquor throughout the nation?

Favor "Prohibition" Law	
1936	38%
1938	36
1940	32
1942	36
1944	37
1945	33
1948	38
1952	33
1954	34
1956	33
1957	28
1960	26
1966	22
1976	19
1979	19
1984	17
1987	17



Note: In 1987, 13 percent of the men and 21 percent of the women surveyed favored the proposed law.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 10-13, 1987.

THE DANGER TO SELF, SOUL, AND SOCIETY

Question: Do you think using alcohol for enjoyment is generally a good thing or generally a bad thing?



Note: Sample size = 509. In 1985 the question asked about alcoholic drinks, and the responses were 34% good thing, 59% bad thing.

Source: Survey by ABC News, August 30-September 1, 1988.

Question: Now I'm going to read you a list of actions. For each, please tell me whether you think this is something you consider to be *morally wrong* or *not* morally wrong ... Drinking alcoholic beverages.



Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time, January 19-21, 1987.

Question: (Do you feel the following prescription and non-prescription drugs are addictive, or not?) ... Alcohol.



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Mead Johnson Pharmaceuticals, August 14-19, 1987.

Question: Now here are some things that people have said are bad for your health. (Card shown respondent) Not everyone agrees that these things are harmful to health. For each one, would you tell me whether you think any amount of it is harmful to health, or only harmful if you do it to excess, or not really harmful at all? First ...



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-3), February 14-28, 1987.

Question: We hear a lot about the problems caused in our society because of the use of various substances—both legal and illegal—by individuals. Which one or two of these things do you think presents the greatest potential health and safety threat to a *person who uses it*? (Card shown respondent) Which one or two of those do you think is the most serious in terms of its effects on the health, safety, and welfare of our *society as a whole*?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 88-7), July 9-16, 1988.

USE AND ABUSE

Question: I'm going to name some different kinds of occasions, and for each one would you tell me which of these types of drink, if any, you think it is proper to have, or whether you don't think that's an occasion for drinking? (Card shown respondent) First . . .



	Not an occasion for drinking	Wine	Beer	Liquor
		Type of drink that is appropriate*		
At a business luncheon	44%	29%	15%	14%
At a sports event	41%	7%	37%	6%
At home alone	40%	24%	31%	21%
At a bar alone	28%	26%	39%	28%
At home with family	27%	35%	39%	28%
After dinner	22%	33%	26%	36%
Before dinner	19%	49%	24%	23%
With a meal	16%	57%	25%	14%
At friends' homes	12%	44%	51%	39%
At a bar with a friend	10%	37%	53%	45%
At parties at home	7%	49%	55%	51%

Note: *This question was asked of those who think drinking is all right on some occasions. Most responses on this question have changed little from 1976, though in 1976, 36% said a business lunch was not an occasion for drinking, and 47% felt that way about drinking at home alone.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-3), February 14-28, 1987.

Question: If you ever drink alcoholic beverages, how often do you drive after drinking—all the time, sometimes, or never?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for *Prevention* Magazine, November 11-25, 1987.

Question: Do you sometimes drink more than you should?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 14-18, 1987.

Question: (I will read you a list of common health concerns. For each one, please tell me if you, personally, are worried a great deal, worried somewhat, not very worried, or not at all worried about that specific issue affecting your health.) . . . What about drinking too much alcohol?



Note: Sample size = 600.

Source: Survey by Gordon S. Black for *USA Today*, June 5-7, 1988.

Question: I am going to read you a list of foods and food substances. For each one, please tell me if you are using it more or less than you were a year ago, about the same, or if you never used it to begin with.) . . . What about alcohol? Are you trying to drink more, less, about the same, or didn't you drink alcohol before?



Note: Sample size = 600.

Source: Survey by Gordon S. Black for *USA Today*, June 5-7, 1988.

ALCOHOLISM: A DISEASE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Question: Has drinking ever been a cause of trouble in your family?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 14-18, 1988.

Question: Have you ever been closely associated with someone who was an alcoholic—either a family member, or a close friend, or someone you worked closely with?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-3), February 14-28, 1987.

Question: How would you compare alcohol abuse to drug abuse in the community where you live. Which would you say is more of a problem?



Note: Sample size = 509.

Source: Survey by ABC News, August 30-September 1, 1988.

Question: Let's turn now to another topic, use of alcohol and drugs. Which do you think poses a greater threat to our society, alcohol abuse or drug abuse?



Source: Survey by Kane, Parsons & Associates for *Parents* Magazine, May 2-20, 1987.

Question: As I read some statements, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with each one. . . .



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 10-13, 1987.

Question: Which of the following describe how you feel about alcoholism: A moral weakness? A lack of willpower? A disease or illness? A mental or psychological problem?



Note: Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 8-12, 1988.

PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS: POLITICS AND ALCOHOL DON'T MIX

Question: Do you think someone who was . . . should be disqualified from being president, or don't you think that should matter?



Source: Survey by CBS News New York Times, November 8 1986

Question: (Do you think any of the following actions should disqualify someone from holding a high-level position in government, or not?) . . . Being drunk in public.



Note: Sample size . . . 504

Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time* and Cable News Network, March 2, 1989

Question: Do you think someone who . . . should be disqualified from serving on the Supreme Court or don't you think that should matter?



Source: Survey by CBS News *New York Times*, November 8 1987

Question: Candidates for president often have to deal with serious accusations during the campaign. If you believed that a candidate . . . , would that be enough to make you vote against him, even if you agree with him on most of the issues?



Source: Survey by CBS News *New York Times*, May 5-6, 1987

Question: (Candidates have been forced to drop out of the [1988] presidential race because of certain things they have done. I will read some things that either have happened or could happen to a presidential candidate. For each one, please tell me whether the event would make you more likely or less likely to vote for a candidate, or if it wouldn't make a difference to you.) . . . What about a candidate who has been known to drink and drive?



Source: Survey by Gordon S. Black for *USA Today* and Cable News Network, October 25-30, 1987

Question: (I would like you to choose between a pair of terms that could describe a president. Although you might want a president with both characteristics, you have to select the one that is more important to you.) Would you prefer: 1) A president who, at the end of a hard day, puts his feet up and enjoys a martini or 2) A president who limits himself to an occasional glass of wine at an important function?



Note: Sample . . . registered voters

Source: Survey by Gordon S. Black for *USA Today* and Cable News Network, October 25-30, 1987

SEE SCHNEIDER AND LADD, PAGES 2 AND 3

ABORTION: RIGHTS AND WRONGS

Question: Do you believe abortion is morally right or morally wrong? . . .



Note: Twelve percent of those who said abortion is morally right were completely convinced of their views, but 10% admitted they sometimes had doubts. Twenty four percent of those who said abortion is morally wrong had doubts about their view, whereas 37% were completely convinced of that view.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: Generally speaking, are you in favor of abortion, or are you opposed to it, or are you indifferent on the subject—or haven't you heard enough about it yet to say?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: Do you believe that life begins at conception, or at birth, or somewhere in between—or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? I personally feel that abortion is morally wrong, but I also feel that whether or not to have an abortion is a decision that has to be made by every woman for herself.



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: If a woman wants to have an abortion and her doctor agrees to it, should she be allowed to have an abortion or not?



Source: Survey by CBS News *New York Times*, January 12-15, 1989.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement: Abortion is murder.



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

LEGALITY

Question: Do you think abortions should be legal under any circumstances, legal only under certain circumstances, or illegal in all circumstances?



Note: Subgroups shown here are selected from the 1988 Gallup survey.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization 1975 and 1980, by Gallup/Newsweek, 1985 and 1989.

Question: Should abortion be legal as it is now, or legal *only* in such cases as rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother, or should it not be permitted at all?



Note: In an AP/Media General poll (March 6–15, 1989), 52% said abortion should be legal as it is now, 41% felt it should be legal only in such cases as rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother, and 7% said it should not be permitted at all.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 12–15, 1989.

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . . the woman wants it for any reason.



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1984–1988 combined.

WHEN WE FAVOR LEGAL ABORTION, WHEN WE DON'T

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion . . .

If the woman's health is endangered



If she became pregnant as a result of rape



If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby



If the family has low income and cannot afford any more children



If she is not married and does not want to marry the man



If she is married and does not want any more children



	1965	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1980	1982	1983	1984	1985	1987	1988	1989
If the woman's health is seriously endangered																
Yes	73%	86%	92%	93%	91%	91%	91%	90%	90%	92%	90%	90%	90%	89%	89%	94%
No	27	14	8	7	9	9	9	10	10	8	10	11	10	11	11	6
If she became pregnant as a result of rape																
Yes	59	79	84	86	83	84	84	84	83	86	83	80	81	81	81	89
No	41	21	16	14	17	16	16	16	17	14	17	20	19	19	19	11
If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby																
Yes	57	79	85	86	83	84	86	82	83	84	79	80	78	79	78	81
No	43	21	15	14	17	16	14	18	17	16	21	20	22	21	22	19
If the family has low income and cannot afford any more children																
Yes	22	49	54	55	53	53	54	47	52	52	44	46	43	45	42	46
No	78	51	46	45	47	47	46	53	48	48	56	54	57	55	58	54
If she is not married and does not want to marry the man																
Yes	18	44	49	50	48	50	50	41	48	49	40	44	41	42	40	44
No	82	56	51	50	52	50	50	59	52	51	61	56	59	58	60	56
If she is married and does not want any more children																
Yes	16	40	47	47	46	46	47	40	47	48	39	43	40	42	40	40
No	84	60	53	53	54	54	53	60	52	52	61	57	60	58	60	60

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, latest that of 1988; the *Los Angeles Times*, March 1989.

RESTRICTIONS

Question: How about this statement. Minors should have to get their parents' permission before they get an abortion?

Before they get an abortion . . .



Note: In another question in the *L.A. Times* survey, respondents were asked: "If you had a daughter who became pregnant and wanted to have an abortion, would you help her get the abortion?" Thirty-four percent said they would help her, 49% said they would oppose it, and 15% were not sure or refused.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: Generally speaking, are you in favor of requiring a woman to get the consent of the natural father before she has an abortion, or are you opposed to that?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: Do you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment to ban legalized abortions?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, January 13-18, 1989.

IF THE LAWS WERE DIFFERENT

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that making abortion illegal will reduce the number of abortions in the United States, or not?

Making abortion illegal . . .



Note: Of those who favored abortion in the *L.A. Times* poll, 76% said making abortion illegal would not reduce the number of abortions, 24% said it would. Of those who opposed abortion, the percentages were 51-49.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: If abortion was illegal in your state, do you think that would stop most women there who want abortions from having them, or would most of them go to another state where it was legal?

If abortion were illegal in your state . . .



Question: If the Supreme Court reversed its 1973 ruling and let each state make its own abortion laws, abortion could become legal in some states and illegal in others. Would you want abortion to be legal or illegal in your state?

If the Supreme Court reversed its 1973 ruling and let each state make its own laws . . .



Source: Survey by AP Media General, March 6-15, 1989.

NO EASY ANSWERS

Question: Generally speaking, do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Legal abortions have encouraged people to become sexually promiscuous.



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: How about this statement: If men had babies, it would be a lot easier to get an abortion.



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: Do you think the solution to abortion is adoption, or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: As a general rule, which would you say is hardest for unmarried women: to have a child out of wedlock and raise it, or to give up the child for adoption, or to have an abortion?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

Question: A new abortion pill, called R-U 486, has been developed in France that can be purchased at a drugstore with a doctor's prescription and is 95 percent effective during the first seven weeks of pregnancy. Generally speaking, would you be in favor of such a pill if it were available here in America, or would you be opposed to that?



Note: An AP/Media General poll (March 6-15, 1989) asked a different question about R-U 486 that produced a different result. The AP/MG question was, "A pill is now available in France that stops pregnancy by preventing the fertilized egg from becoming implanted in the uterine wall. Do you think this drug should be legal in the United States, or not?" Fifty-one percent said it should be made legal, 24% said it should not, 25% said "don't know."

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

ABORTION ACTIVISTS: UNFAVORABLE IMAGES OUTWEIGH FAVORABLE ONES

Question: What is your impression of the (pro-abortion/anti-abortion) movement leaders? As of today, is it very favorable, or somewhat favorable, or somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable—or haven't you heard enough about them yet to say?



Note: In this question, 31% were unaware of the pro-abortion movement, and 25% were unaware of the anti-abortion movement. In a question posed by AP/Media General, "A group that opposed abortion has been holding demonstrations where its members block the entrances to abortion clinics until the police arrest them and carry them off. How do you feel about these demonstrations?" 24% said they supported them, 67% opposed them.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 3-10, 1989.

FEELING DEPRESSED?

Question: Here is a list of things people have told us they sometimes do to help them feel better when they are sad or depressed. When you feel sad or depressed, which of these things, if any, do you do to make you feel better? (Card shown respondent). Just call off the letters.

When you feel sad or depressed . . .



Note: Three categories, all volunteered responses, are not shown. They are "None of these" 2%, "Don't do anything" 2%, and "Never feel depressed" 4%. "Don't know/not shown" 1%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 89-2), January 7-21, 1989.

IS EUROPE A COMMUNITY?

by Richard Rose

Americans believe it is possible to create a community from a continent of peoples of disparate races, languages, and creeds. Europeans, burdened with two millennia of history, are skeptical that this can be done. The first steps toward a European Community were a response to the exhaustion of war. But in the absence of a common enemy, the twelve nations of the European Community have limited interests in strengthening supranational institutions as against their present national governments.

If a community is defined as a group of people with a common sense of belonging, it is hard to see the characteristics uniting the population of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Among the twelve nations of the Community:

- Ten different languages are in official use, and most people can speak only their national language.
- Six countries are Catholic, two are Protestant, three are divided in religion, and one (Greece) is Orthodox.
- In World War II two countries were Axis powers, three were neutral, six were defeated by Germany and then liberated by Anglo-American troops, and Britain was the only combatant not occupied.
- Four governments have had constitutions overthrown in the postwar era, and three were dictatorships in the 1970s.
- Three countries have socialist governments, three have governments of the right, and six countries are governed by coalitions that are not easily classified as left or right.
- Income per capita differs from near-U.S. standards in northern Europe to near-developing country standards in Portugal and Greece.

Many things that people in Europe have in common are part of the common property of the "global village" created by the mass media—watching "Dallas" on TV, for example. While the Beatles could claim to be a European creation—an English pop group that launched its career in Hamburg—they too swept the world. People who follow World Cup soccer matches on Japanese-made TV sets, input data to an IBM computer at work, and vacation on the sunny beaches of the Mediterranean display an internationally cosmopolitan rather than a specifically European identity.

In matters of public policy, national governments still come first, and the supranational institutions of the European Community place a very weak second. National governments levy nearly all the taxes collected in the twelve nations of the Community, and national governments make nearly all the spending decisions. Every Community nation levies high taxes: in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium more than half the national product is spent by government. Yet the cash value of public expenditure is three times as high in socialist France as in socialist Spain, and the Danish coalition government spends twice as much per citizen as does the Italian coalition government.

Things Not Held in Common

Voting in the third direct election of a European Parliament on June 18 is one thing that Europeans do have in common. But the European Parliament cannot exercise democratic control of government because there is no government there. The European Commission in Brussels, which constitutes the executive branch of the Community, is not appointed by the Parliament as would be the case if there were a United States of Europe. The commissioners are appointed by national governments, and their major actions require approval by the Council of Ministers, which represents the twelve member states. Council approval requires the assent of two-thirds or more of the member countries. The Commission has a president, currently the French socialist Jacques Delors, but he is a weak president. When national leaders meet at the annual seven-nation world economic summit each spring, the position of the Community is very much secondary.

Nor can the European Parliament exercise the taxing and spending powers of the United States Congress, for the Community has very little money to spend. Its principal source of revenue is a limited portion of the value added tax on the sale of goods and services. Moreover, the largest portion of its budget finances agriculture subsidies. The Parliament's primary budgetary power is amending the third of Community expenditure that is not compulsory, such as grants to promote regional economic development.

When direct elections were first held in 1979, proponents hoped that free elections from Sicily to Sligo would encourage the creation of a federal Europe. But this has not happened. Instead of fighting on a pan-European basis, party leaders see the Euro vote as a chance to boost their standing with their national electorates. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent division within their country; they have no constituency ties outside their nation and weak ideological affinities.

The result of the June election is easy to predict: no party will win a majority, for the 518 seats will be divided among eight different loosely related "families" or *tendances* of parties from two or more countries (see table 1). Their ties are influenced by an interest in sharing generous Community grants to finance trans-European political activity. The largest single group—the socialists—accounts for less than a third of the seats in the European Parliament and is divided between pro-Community Continental Socialists and anti-European British Labour MEPs. Anti-socialist MEPs are divided between liberal, conservative, and Christian groups. There are also communists, neofascists, Greens, and a mixture of representatives from "nations" not members of the European Community (for example, Scottish nationalists, Flanders, Sardinia, and South Tyrol).

The Single European Act, intended to turn the twelve member nations into a single internal market by the end of 1992, enhances the significance of the Parliament's powers to scrutinize policies of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. The concurrence of the Parliament is a necessary condition for giving the force of law to major proposals of the Council of Ministers and the Commission. Given the requirement for more-than-majority decisions in the Council, stalemate is more likely to occur in Brussels rather than in a battle between the legislature and executive as occurs along Pennsylvania Avenue. Proponents of a federal Europe hope that the challenge of dealing with the many measures needed to allow trade to move within Europe free of tariff and nontariff barriers will strengthen a sense of belonging among the peoples of the twelve member nations and their governments.

Common Enemies

External threats are another source for strengthening the Community. Its original inspiration was a fear of war—between Germany and France, or between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Trade is today the primary concern of the Community (or Common Market, as it is sometimes known), and the threat of defeat in a trade war could also strengthen a sense of European community.

Japan is the specter that looms over the creation of the single market in 1992. While Japan is the world's leading exporting nation, it has yet to achieve the prominence in Europe that it has in the United States. If Japanese exports are to continue to expand in the 1990s, then it is logical for the Japanese to think in terms of "catching up" by increasing exports to Europe. Such a strategy is viewed with anxiety in many parts of Europe. For example, there are currently import quotas on Japanese cars in two-thirds of the European car market, and France, Italy, and Spain want to maintain these restrictions after 1992.

Will the European Community after 1992 become part of a global system of free trade? Or will it become

Table 1

MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Total		Bel.	Den.	Fr.	Ger.	Gr.	Ire.	It.	Lux.	Neth.	Port.	Sp.	U.K.
165	Socialist	8	3	20	33	10	—	12	2	9	7	28	33
48	Communist	—	2	10	—	4	—	26	—	—	3	3	—
115	Christian Democrat	6	1	10	41	8	6	27	3	8	4	1	—
66	Conservatives	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	45
44	Liberal and Democratic Reform	5	2	12	—	—	1	6	1	5	10	2	—
29	Euro-Democrat	—	—	19	—	1	8	—	—	—	—	—	1
20	Rainbow/Green	4	4	—	7	—	—	2	—	2	—	1	—
16	Euro-Right	—	—	9	—	1	—	5	—	—	—	—	1
15	Non-attached	1	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	1	—	8	1
518		24	16	81	81	24	15	81	6	25	24	60	81

a customs union with barriers against imports from Japan and the United States?

Europeans are divided on these questions. Disagreement sometimes reflects differences within nations along left-right lines. Margaret Thatcher favors a supply-side vision of a Europe free of social as well as trade regulation, whereas the British left joins with Commission President Jacques Delors in endorsing a social Europe, in which Community powers are used to promote welfare-state measures. Farmers favor the retention of the subsidies of the Common Agriculture Policy and barriers to importing foodstuffs from the United States, imports that would bring cheaper food to city dwellers.

Differences in the economic structure of Community members lead to divisions along national lines, too. In debates about agricultural policy, British politicians favor cheap imports because farmers are few in Britain, whereas the Irish, French, and Mediterranean national representatives are beholden to rural votes. Debates about car imports tend to line up representatives of countries that have major motor manufacturing plants against countries that import virtually all their cars—the Netherlands, for example. The fraternal feelings of socialists are dissipated if anyone suggests that in a federal Europe, northern European workers would pay higher taxes to provide social benefits for less well-off workers in southern Europe. French and German central bankers have joined to make the European Monetary System (EMS) work as an institution to promote price stability, but Britain has remained conspicuously aloof from the EMS. So great are divisions between member nations of the Community that there is speculation about the evolution of a two-tier Europe, with some countries accepting greater federal ties than others.

From a Washington perspective, developments in the European Community are further complicating an already tangled network of trans-Atlantic ties. On the critical issue of defense against the Soviet Union, it is NATO not the European Community that is central, albeit nearly all the Community countries are also members of NATO. On support for the dollar, it is the German *Bundesbank*, not finance officials in Brussels, who are of primary importance.

As trade issues become more important in Washington, the European Community becomes more important, too. Today it takes close to a quarter of American exports. To reduce its international trade deficit substantially, the United States needs to increase exports to Europe as well as to Japan. Hence, Washington actively supports the position that reducing trade barriers within Europe should go hand in hand with removing trade barriers between Europe and the rest of the world.

While many Europeans favor international free trade in principle, they note that it hasn't happened elsewhere in the world. Why should Europe reduce restrictions upon Japanese imports if Japan does not reciprocate? For that matter, what interest does the European section of Ford Motor Company have in opening the European market to competition from Japanese cars? If the United States wants to increase agricultural exports, then it should first lobby Japan to reduce barriers to American farm exports, rather than expect Europeans to sacrifice an agricultural subsidy system that has been an integral feature of the European Community to date.

United Stakes

Washington officials may express exasperation about the difficulties of negotiating an agreement with a Community that is a twelve-nation coalition—with the Brussels Commission the thirteenth nation of the Community. But Europeans can point out that their institutions are no more exasperating than those they must deal with in Washington. And at least Brussels has the advantage of better and cheaper French restaurants!

That such pointed statements can be made is a reminder that American policy makers can no longer expect European countries to follow wherever Washington leads. In intent, the European Community is not anti-American, and support for NATO—the keystone of European-American relations—remains widespread. The existence of the Community, however, obligates the major nations of the continent to agree on trade matters among themselves. In negotiating the measures that will give pith and substance to 1992, national governments are creating laws that constrain trade dealings with the United States.

> *So great are divisions between member nations of the Community that there is speculation about the evolution of a two-tier Europe.*

Anyone who has ever had direct experience of protracted and awkward multinational and multilingual negotiations about obscure and seemingly unimportant matters knows that there are easier forms of politics than the endless negotiations within the European Community. But Americans representing political constituencies that may be affected by decisions on the road to 1992 must ruefully reflect that the only thing more nerve-racking than participating in European Community politics is to be excluded. ☑

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The Chilean Plebiscite:

Polling under Authoritarian Rules

by Carlos Huneeus and Marta Lagos

What impact does a nation's experience of prolonged authoritarian rule have on public opinion and attitudes? Does it induce radicalization and polarization, jeopardizing the return of democracy—or can moderate tendencies from a democratic past endure? While dictatorship prevails, is there a way to conduct a public opinion poll that helps answer these questions?

These questions prompted the Center for the Study of Contemporary Reality (CERC) to conduct a research project that was funded by the Ford Foundation in 1985. Its goal was to analyze public opinion for changes following prolonged authoritarianism under General Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet has ruled Chile since a violent military coup in 1973 overthrew the democratically elected Socialist President Salvador Allende, who was killed in the process. To measure the magnitude of change, we compared current responses with data from polling conducted in democratic Chile between 1957 and 1973 by Professor Eduardo Hamuy, who collaborated with the CERC project. Our task was to survey public opinion in Santiago, home to 34 percent of the Chilean population.

The issues investigated were crucial to an electoral return to democracy, a point of controversy dominating the Chilean agenda as Pinochet made plans for a national presidential plebiscite to take place in 1988. The plebiscite would decide whether or not Pinochet would continue as Chile's president for another eight years. If not, competitive elections would take place twelve months later. Some worrisome indicators suggested that the climate was polarized. Widespread human-rights violations by the Pinochet regime in the 1970s had become systematized in selective repression in the 1980s. The regime met the peaceful opposition protests begun in 1983 with a policy of open confrontation and violence.

This escalation of public repression stimulated acts of violence by minority sectors on the extreme left, some linked to the Chilean Communist Party (PC). The party had historically been an important participant in the Chilean democratic process (obtaining 15 percent traditionally in parliamentary elections) and a moderating force within Allende's left coalition government. But the new climate radicalized the PC, which began calling for "all forms of struggle" to bring down the regime. Some feared that the PC was behind the "Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front"—FPMR in its Spanish acronym—whose strategy was political violence, beginning in 1983. With this polarized climate, the idea that Chile's political conflict could be solved peacefully with a noncompetitive presidential plebiscite seemed infeasible.

Polling for a Plebiscite

The task of accurately polling the public under authoritarianism was novel and challenging. No comparable experience on which to base our work existed in Chile or elsewhere in Latin America. We did have polling research from a few European countries, particularly Spain after Franco, and some data from post-military Argentina and Brazil. While these provided basic criteria, they were from democratic contexts and had to be adapted to Chile's authoritarian situation.

Furthermore, the very theory and methodology of survey research assumes a pluralist society in which citizens' opinions and attitudes are defined in a context of liberty, without pressures imposed by political conditions. The climate of coercion and selective repression existing under an authoritarian regime, by contrast, generates fear across broad sectors of the society.

All of these constraints were compounded by the lack of polling organizations to carry out the field work. We had to find interviewers who would assume this task without being influenced by fear, and who would in turn not influence those they were interviewing.

We organized the field team with the help of researchers who had worked on the earlier Hamuy polling project, and recruited interviewers among university students in the social sciences. Since those students tended to sympathize with the opposition, we trained them in nonbiased interviewing techniques, especially for interviews with government supporters whose responses would certainly clash with their own.

When the project began, the Pinochet government had no explicit policy toward political polling, and we did not know if it would be necessary to submit the questionnaire to DINACOS, the government agency that approves questionnaires used in market research. Going through DINACOS would mean accepting censorship, something that would significantly limit the issues we could investigate. Given government practice under Pinochet, we could not rule out the possibility that the poll would be banned or that some field interviewers would be detained by the national police. The field work had to be organized to allow for swift collection of sufficient data to meet the standards of statistical significance, in the event that such an emergency might suspend the project.

Due to the complexities, we decided to conduct a pilot poll among students of three universities. This would enable us to refine training of the field team and obtain some clues about the effects of fear and inhibition on opinions about politics. Polling students meant dealing with a sector that was traditionally very active in Chilean politics and expected to favor radical struggle. The student movement was at the time mobilizing intensively against the government, which responded by imprisoning the presidents of the strongest student unions, including the three involved in this study.

Polling Under Siege

Contrary to what we anticipated, the polling results revealed that the majority of students in the three universities held moderate political opinions and attitudes. They rejected radical measures used by the government—exile, press censorship, repression—as well as those used by some of the opposition, such as violence or acts of sabotage. We concluded that students strongly supported democracy. With this first stage completed, we planned to poll throughout Greater Santiago in March and April 1986.

Nevertheless, new problems emerged: in April and May hundreds of combat troops made arbitrary searches in dozens of shantytowns, rounding up women and men in the middle of the night, especially young people, under the pretext of rooting out terrorists.

The renewed searches and intimidation created a climate of repression and fear among broad sectors of society, including our interviewers. We decided to postpone polling until June 1986, during the World Cup soccer championships when we believed public fear would be minimized. This convenient undeclared ceasefire in the government's state of siege facilitated our polling, which proceeded swiftly and free from interference.

The refusal rate for our random sample, comparable with historic norms, was greater among upper-income than lower-income strata, where response was the most enthusiastic. Women, in greater proportion to men, responded to fewer questions on politics.

> *We learned . . . that arriving at smaller villages by car gave the impression that we were government bureaucrats, and so we had to arrive by bus.*

Interestingly, results revealed that the majority of citizens were political moderates, echoing our earlier findings among students. Authoritarian tendencies were concentrated among respondents in the same sectors where Seymour Martin Lipset had found them thirty years ago in *Political Man*: the poorest and least educated, and especially those sixty years and older. These results demonstrated an important continuity with Chilean opinions and attitudes during periods of democracy.

We had to make special efforts to avoid methodological distortions (nonsample errors). During the pre-test we learned, for example, that arriving at smaller villages by car gave the impression that we were government bureaucrats, and so we had to arrive by bus.

After intensive preparation, the national poll was carried out in November and early December 1987 with a sample representing 75 percent of the population eighteen years and older. Results confirmed previous findings: a moderate citizenry, interest in politics, support for democracy, and recognition of the role of the Church in defending human rights. The response to the big question—would Chileans participate in the plebiscite—was clear: 88 percent said they would vote, meaning that the politics of extremes lacked a social base.

The Final Stage

Confident that our data were valid and needing to cut costs and field time, we shifted from a random to a quota-based sample for the final stage. This required that we adopt the methodology that had been used with great success for many years by the Madrid Center for Sociological Research, which offered its guidance. The new system meant raising our data-gathering points from 27 to 112 cities and communities, which broadened the sample to 98 percent of the population, including the rural areas.

Using this sample, we carried out four national and two regional polls in 1988 and created a unique data bank.[1] This broad selection of polls enabled us to follow the main currents of public opinion by updating our findings on a monthly basis from April onward. We could detect tendencies that demonstrated widespread support for a peaceful return to democracy through institutional mechanisms, expressed in the citizens' interest in voting in the plebiscite, which grew as the year progressed. While in the July national poll 72 percent said they would vote despite possible disturbances on plebiscite day, by September this willingness had grown to 85 percent (see table 1).

Table 1

POSSIBLE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING IN CHILEAN PLEBISCITE

Question: On the day of the plebiscite, will you be willing to vote even if one of the following difficulties occur . . . ?

		1988	
	July	**August**	**September**
Willing to vote despite . . .			
Long lines to vote	94%	94%	96%*
A lot to do at home	95	95	97
A personal errand to run	89	89	92
Transportation problem	90	89	93
Public disturbances	72	79	85

Note: *In September, the first response category was "more than an hour-long wait." All percentages have been rounded.

These CERC polls also served to correct certain misperceptions that had been fostered by authoritarianism, thereby enhancing opportunities for voter preparation. Early polling revealed, for example, that a considerable number of Chileans had no confidence in the anonymity of their votes: 28 percent believed it was possible to detect who had voted how. The data from the July poll spurred a civic education campaign about the secret ballot by independent organizations like the Civic Participation Crusade. Later polls demonstrated a decrease in skepticism and an increase in confidence in the secret ballot from 65 to 71 percent (see table 2).

Table 2

CONFIDENCE IN A SECRET BALLOT (CHILE)

Question: The law says that the vote is secret. In spite of this, do you believe it possible for anyone to find out how you vote?

		1988	
	July	**August**	**September**
It is possible to find out how I vote	28%	30%	23%
It's not possible to find out	65	63	71

Table 3

VOTE INTENTION (CHILE)

		1988	
	July	**August**	**September**
Will vote "Yes"	37%	31%	20%
Will vote "No"	42	41	47
Undecided	8	11	14
Not voting	2	2	.3
Do not know/No response	8	9	17
Will cast blank ballot	4	7	2

Note: A "Yes" vote was a vote for another term for Pinochet. A "No" vote was a vote against another term for him.

One of the problems with the polls was that 25 to 30 percent of respondents abstained from answering politically oriented questions. They categorized themselves as centrist politically but would not define themselves further through questions dealing with specific political issues. It was plausible that fear prevented these people from revealing their positions on the plebiscite and arguable that they would probably vote against General Pinochet. The outcome of the plebiscite on October 5, 1988, however, revealed that these voters were Pinochet supporters.

Timid Support; Vocal Opposition

The final stretch of hard competitive campaigning on both sides included three weeks of daily fifteen-minute segments of political propaganda from each side over government-controlled national television. Between September 9 and 15, corresponding to the period of on-air campaigning, our polling showed a steep drop in Pinochet supporters (the "Yes" vote), from 30 percent to 20 percent, and a significant increase in "No" supporters, from 40 percent to 47 percent. In fact, the national poll conducted the week before the plebiscite predicted the No vote precisely—55 percent in the polls, 55 percent at the ballot box—but failed to predict accurately the Yes vote: polling results predicted 21 percent, and the actual Yes vote was 43 percent (see table 3). Of the remaining respondents, 11 percent in the poll were undecided, 11 percent said they didn't know or else chose not to respond, and 2 percent planned to cast blank ballots.

This data led us to alter our conclusions about public fear under Chilean authoritarianism: rather than fear, the operant factors may well have been caution and distrust. And these attitudes inhibited not the supporters of the opposition, as we had expected, but the progovernment respondents. This can be understood in a context of intense preelectoral mobilization.

In contrast to other authoritarian regimes, the Chilean press had gained considerable maneuvering room since 1984–1985, especially in radio and weekly news magazines. Also, massive demonstrations, permitted in late 1983 and 1985, had shown the

(Continued on page 56)

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[1] By 1988 in Chile there were several institutions and market research firms sponsoring polling, both government and opposition, resulting in a virtual polling war between the two sides competing for support in the plebiscite.

Cuba and the United States : A Durable Antagonism

by Mark Falcoff

Few events in Cuba have received as much media attention in the United States as the recent visit there of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev. Journalists and the American public alike were watching closely to see whether the Soviet leader's "new thinking" on economics and international affairs could be exported to Moscow's first client state in the Western Hemisphere. The assumption was that, if Gorbachev could persuade Fidel Castro to fall into line with his own approach, Cuba would assume a less threatening role in the Western Hemisphere (and elsewhere) and render our own problems in Central America more tractable.

Instead, the two dictators agreed to disagree, thus underlining the durability of the U.S.-Cuban antagonism and freezing for the indefinite future any prospects for diplomatic normalization or a loosening of the economic or other restrictions that Washington established after Cuba entered the Soviet orbit in 1962.

The outcome of the Gorbachev-Castro summit is bound to reinforce, as well, the dominant trends in U.S. public opinion toward Castro and Cuba and to further restrict the influence of a small but well-placed public that has long favored a conciliatory policy toward the island and its leader. Just how far Castro has to go with the American public was underlined recently by the release of a new poll of 1,038 adult Americans conducted by the Gallup Organization for Potomac Associates in Washington, D.C., at the request of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.[1]

The Potomac Associates poll is important on two counts. First, it identifies and compares the attitudes of three different constituencies—the general public, policy elites or influentials (in Congress, the academy, and the media), and the Cuban-American community (from separate surveys in Florida and New Jersey). And second, it updates a less differentiated poll conducted in 1977. This lets us track the general direction in which American opinion toward Cuba has long been moving.

On this latter subject, the news for Castro is uniformly bad. Americans dislike or distrust him and his regime, and what is more, they do so markedly more now than they did a dozen years ago (see table 1). What is perhaps even more important, the Cuban dictator himself has dropped considerably in relative U.S. esteem, with the number of people regarding his leadership there as "a bad thing for most Cubans" increasing by *twenty percentage points* (65 percent in 1988, as opposed to 45 percent in 1977).

> *The outcome of the Gorbachev-Castro summit is bound . . . to further restrict the influence of a small but well-placed public that has long favored a conciliatory policy toward the island and its leader.*

What accounts for such a drastic change over such a relatively short period of time? For one thing, since 1977 Cuba has become increasingly visible as a Soviet surrogate in volatile areas overseas, particularly in Africa. (The latest poll was taken before a diplomatic accord was reached to withdraw Cuban troops from

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[1] William Watts, *The United States and Cuba: Changing Perceptions, New Policies?* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates and the Caribbean and Central American Program, The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1989).

Angola.) It has also helped to consolidate a Marxist regime in Nicaragua and to arm and train the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Not surprisingly, therefore, today more than 65 percent of Americans view Cuba as a security threat to the United States (as opposed to 51 percent in 1977).

Table 1

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CUBA

	1977	1988
Very favorable	3%	1%
Somewhat favorable	30	9
Somewhat unfavorable	31	37
Very unfavorable	21	44
Don't know	15	9

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Potomac Associates the Central American and Caribbean Program and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, March 4-13, 1988. The survey of opinion leaders was conducted April 18-May 13, 1988, and the survey of Cuban-Americans (conducted in Florida and New Jersey) April 22-May 22, 1988.

Moreover, Americans are now aware that the Cuban people are deeply dissatisfied with the Castro regime, whose economic failures have been widely reported in the press. They also know that ordinary Cubans are often mistreated by their government. Some 100,000 of them—many black and poor—rushed to take up Castro's offer when he temporarily opened the port of Mariel in 1980 for those who wished to flee his rule. The horrifying prison memoirs of Armando Valladares (*Against All Hope*), published in 1985, made the best-seller list, and the documentary films of Nestor Almendros (*Improper Conduct*, 1983, and *Nobody Answered*, 1987), have done much to undermine what remains of Castro's appeal for the intellectual and artistic avant-garde in the United States.

The 1988 survey reveals, however, significant differences between the general public on one hand and policy elites or influentials on the other. Thirty-one percent of elites have a "somewhat favorable" or "very favorable" view of Cuba (compared to 10 percent of the general public); 35 percent consider Castro to have been good for the island (compared to 9 percent of the general public), and fully 65 percent consider Cuba "not a particularly serious" or "not at all serious" security threat to the United States (compared to 26 percent for the general public). Opinion leaders, however, do generally share the views of the general public (as well as the Cuban-American community) on the human rights situation in Cuba, though with slightly more nuances (see table 2).

When it comes to policy prescriptions, there is a marked difference between elites on one hand and the general public on the other. A slight majority of the latter (15 percent "very strongly," 36 percent "fairly strongly") favor resumption of diplomatic relations with Castro, compared with 94 percent of the elites. Even more interesting, while 58 percent of the general public believe that the existing trade embargo should be maintained "until relations improve," fully 57 percent of elites believe that it should be lifted unconditionally. An overwhelming majority of elites—90 percent—favor negotiations with Cuba on key problems, which might or might not lead to either diplomatic relations or a resumption of commercial exchange (the same question was not asked, unfortunately, of the general public).

Table 2

IMPRESSIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CUBA

	National	Opinion leaders	Cuban-Americans
Very favorable	1%	1%	5%
Somewhat favorable	6	12	5
Somewhat unfavorable	34	44	7
Very unfavorable	48	39	80
Don't know	11	4	3

Thus most Americans, whether rank and file or elite, seem disposed to discussions with the Cuban government on a variety of issues. They differ mainly (though not always radically) in their views of the nature of the Cuban regime, the threat it represents to the United States, and the price they are willing to pay to achieve agreement with Havana. Clearly, elites place much more confidence in diplomacy, but the general public likes the *idea* of negotiations, whether in Cuba or anywhere else, and attaches no particular ideological value to a restoration of diplomatic relations.

Cuban-Americans on Cuba

Cuban-American opinion tends, not unexpectedly, to be somewhat harsher in its views of Castro and Cuba than either the general public or elites. Fully 96 percent believe that Castro's leadership has been a "bad thing" for Cuba; 87 percent have a "somewhat unfavorable" or "very unfavorable" opinion of the human rights situation there. They also hold a somewhat different perspective on diplomatic instruments; only 41 percent, for example, advocate "negotiating with the Cuban government" over outstanding differences.

The depth of antipathy to the Castro regime in the Cuban-American community (as well as its sense of having put its native country behind it) was revealed in two other questions that were put to these respondents alone. Many Cuban-Americans seem to have severed their ties with Cuba. When asked whether they would take advantage of expanded opportunities to visit their families in Cuba should such possibility exist, some 65 percent responded either "not very likely" or "not at all likely." In the hypothetical case of being permitted to send monthly gift parcels (worth $200) to their relatives on the island, only 17 percent said that they would take advantage of the opportunity (78 percent roundly denied that they would).

The Cuban-Americans are nonetheless somewhat divided on the trade embargo. They cannot decide who it hurts most (see table 3) and favor its maintenance by a narrow plurality (44 percent say it should be "kept up," 33 percent "ended altogether," and 6 percent "eased").

Table 3

WHO DOES U.S. TRADE EMBARGO HURT MORE?
(Responses of Cuban-Americans)

Cuban people	29%
Cuban leadership	34
About equal	20
Don't know	17

When it comes to concrete policy recommendations toward Castro's Cuba, a huge gulf opens between the Cuban-American community and America's policy elites (this question was not asked, unfortunately, of the general sample). Whereas the first two priorities of U.S. opinion leaders were to "show willingness to negotiate" (51 percent) and "lift the trade embargo" (36 percent), for Cuban-Americans they were "eliminate communists/communist regime" (11 percent) and "eliminate Castro" (9 percent). On the other hand, 9 percent of the Cuban-Americans joined with the majority of American policy elites in favoring "diplomatic relations/negotiations."

Does this small slice of Cuban-American opinion that favors discussions with Castro reflect a generational divide? In many ways, it does. By age, eighteen to twenty-nine year olds were *relatively* more favorable toward Cuba; more inclined to rate the absence of diplomatic relations as a key problem in bilateral relations; more relaxed about the Soviet Union as a security threat; less concerned about the role of Fidel Castro; more likely to visit Cuba if that were made easier. In short, they are substantially more ready than their elders for a change in relations between the United States and Cuba.

Cuban-Americans who were *born in the United States* were more in favor of talks and negotiations than those born on the island, and less concerned about philosophical and ideological issues. All of which suggests that, unless the Cuban-American community is continually "refreshed" by new elements from the island, it will eventually come to resemble the general U.S. public in its views, which is, however, still very much more skeptical of Castro than opinion elites. On the other hand, this will still take many years, and by the time it does occur, Castro himself will have passed from the scene, at which time it may be necessary to reexamine U.S. relations with Cuba (just as the eventual Cuban leadership may want by then to take a fresh look at its relations with the Soviet Union).

Room to Maneuver

As things stand now there is no sharply defined U.S. consensus on how to proceed toward Cuba. There is a broad recognition that the government there is hostile to us and repressive to its own people; that it represents a security threat to the United States; and that no trade or other privileges should be granted it without corresponding concessions—concessions that would, in fact, materially alter the island's relationship to us and to Moscow. The differences between elite and broad opinion are largely over means rather than goals, with Cuban-American opinion providing, obviously, a special wrinkle to the sample.

> *Unless the Cuban-American community is continually "refreshed" by new elements from the island, it will eventually come to resemble the general U.S. public in its views.*

William Watts, who directed the poll, suggests in a perhaps overly optimistic afternote that his data indicated "a considerable degree of pragmatism and readiness to accept change, given appropriate conditions." Therefore, he adds, "serious *reciprocal* approaches by both sides could proceed against a backdrop of—at the maximum—broadly based support or—at the minimum—tolerance at most levels. . . .Our findings indicate that there is considerable room for maneuver, if mutually agreeable steps are clearly explained and demonstrated as in the national interest of the United States."

The poll suggests that elite opinion is already convinced that the time has come to do this (and in fact, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, which commissioned the survey, has favored a reconciliation with Castro's Cuba for some years now). The American people, however, remain wary of bold initiatives that are not accompanied by sharp reciprocity. And they have a negative view of Castro and his regime that restrains a natural impulse to negotiate with everybody. In short, neither events in Cuba nor their perception in the United States suggest that the time has come for a serious change. ☑

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MORE BAD NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS

by L. Harmon Zeigler and William Haltom

We often blame mass media for the manifest deficiencies of the U.S. electoral process. Trivialization, concern with personality, and coverage of the horse race rather than issues are some of the principal sins.

No doubt about it: we do hold media elections in this country, and we do have an uninformed electorate. A mere 30.5 percent of Americans correctly named one candidate in their own congressional race shortly after the 1984 election; by contrast, 95 percent of the British electorate, according to a poll in *The Economist*, could identify Michael Heseltine as Margaret Thatcher's most likely successor as leader of the Conservative party. For good reason, citizens of the United States are excoriated for their ignorance of the most basic political information, their indifference to most issues, and their inability to understand common political concepts. Our citizens appear to profit little from their frequent use of mass media (especially television). If only television would use its immense power for good (as Captain America does)!

When critics detail the media's sins of omission, however, the media may get off too lightly. A national survey offers further evidence that the media are guilty of sins of commission as well. Under certain conditions, *greater exposure to mass media corresponds to diminished knowledge*.

Testing Citizens' Capacities

In keeping with the popularity of testing teachers for competence, we evaluated the success of the mass media as tutors to the citizenry. Our evaluation tested simple knowledge of national politics, awareness of the candidates' differences on issues in 1984, and minimal ability to apply ideological labels. To be judged knowledgeable, each person had to name and assign a correct party label to both candidates for the House of Representatives in his or her district and to state correctly which party held a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate, both before and after the 1984 election. (Neither house changed majority in 1984.) We tested awareness of the presidential candidates' differences on issues by asking each respondent to place the candidates (or the parties or ideologies) in appropriate positions on a scale that ran from "strongly support" to "strongly oppose," for each of several issues. On "government should help women," for example, a correct answer would place Mondale or liberals or Democrats closer to the "support" end of the scale than Reagan or conservatives or Republicans. (If respondents perceived no difference, we scored that judgment "correct.") We measured minimal familiarity with ideological concepts by asking each citizen to locate Ronald Reagan and the Republican party and Walter Mondale and the Democratic party on the appropriate ends of the liberal-conservative continuum. (Placements at the center of the spectrum were scored as correct.)

Table 1 records the scores on some prominent items from each test and awards grades. Since both the tests and the scoring were very forgiving, each mistake on knowledgeability and ideological competence reduced the grade by a full letter. For issues awareness, the grading was based on percentages of correct responses.

Despite the ease of the knowledgeability test, fully 83 percent of the respondents failed. On the ideological competence test, nearly a third of the respondents correctly applied every label, and a majority managed to pass. We thought the test might have been too easy until we noticed that most respondents received no better than a "D." Awareness of issues was not

Among newspaper readers, ideological competence improved with frequency of reading, but the returns from more frequent reading were slight. Reading a newspaper one or more days a week was associated with far better scores than those for nonreaders, but differences *among readers* were insignificant. Among television viewers, however, returns for viewing became negative for daily viewers. Those who watched TV news four to six days a week scored better than daily viewers on ideological competence. In fact, *daily use of television news was associated with diminished capacity to use ideological concepts.*

Frequent use of media yielded some modest improvements in knowledgeability, but even daily users of television and newspapers averaged fewer than half correct on the knowledge test. Use of television or newspapers was associated with somewhat higher average scores for awareness of issues and ideological competence than no use at all, but more frequent consumption improved average scores little over less frequent use. Daily consumers of news barely improved on the class averages, and they did so poorly on relatively undemanding tasks that no teacher could have been proud of them.

Negative Returns from Television?

Table 2 shows that daily viewing of television news improved the average knowledge score almost imperceptibly over that for frequent viewing (four to six days per week). On other tests, daily viewing of television news led to a lower average score than frequent viewing did. In each test daily readers outperformed daily viewers by a small increment. Does this indicate negative returns to daily viewing of television news? University of Washington political science professor Lance Bennett found in *News: The Politics of Illusion* that everyday viewers tend to be taken in by television news far more often than less habitual viewers. More formally, skeptical citizens tended to expose themselves to media less each week than credulous citizens did, and they read newspapers more and watched television news less than credulous viewers. Table 2 hints at similar results.

We take a closer look at the relationships between frequency of media usage and facility with common ideological concepts in table 3. Reading across table 3 (that is, inspecting data within each category of television viewing), we see that increments in frequency of reading newspapers usually yielded gains in ideological acumen. In each row the highest score was achieved by daily readers (although in two rows the increments were minimal). Reading down the table (and within each category of newspaper reading), in *every column* daily viewers of television news scored *worse* than viewers who watched only four to six days a week. That is, television yielded negative returns in astuteness for daily viewers relative to viewers who watched four to six days per week. Daily viewers usually improved only modestly on the scores of viewers who watched only one to three days per week. For television viewers, then, returns diminished abruptly until they became negative for daily viewers.

Table 3

IDEOLOGICAL COMPETENCE BY EXPOSURE
TO NEWSPAPERS TELEVISION NEWS

	Days per week newspaper read:				
Days per week television news viewed:	**0**	**1–3**	**4–6**	**Daily**	**Total**
0	43%	50%	59%	66%	54%
1–3	49	61	66	67	61
4–6	59	73	68	74	70
Daily	51	66	66	70	65
Total	49	63	65	70	63

Among more frequent readers of newspapers (those who read four days a week or more), scores were relatively consistent no matter the number of days devoted to television news about the campaign. Among less frequent readers the differences were stark. This suggests that television news yielded the most noticeable returns among viewers who seldom read newspapers. Conversely, less frequent viewers of television scored better the more days each week they read newspapers, but among more frequent viewers gains from reading newspapers were modest except between nonreaders (zero days per week) and readers (one or more days per week). From such comparisons we conclude that television and newspapers improve the ideological acuity of their users, but that gains diminish quickly for newspaper readers or become negative as use of either or both become more frequent.

Conclusion

Students of U.S. politics have often criticized the mass media for failing to enhance citizens' awareness. The findings above are alarming. Gains from reading newspapers appear to diminish as reading becomes more frequent. Worse, daily viewing of television news appears to vitiate abilities! In the future, when media reporters and pundits lament our listless voters and our aimless campaigns, perhaps they should think about accepting some of the blame themselves. ☑

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would take more than just a mild recession to create the kind of economic misery that historically gives Democrats an advantage.

While the economy was booming, California governments found themselves shut out by Proposition 13, passed in 1978 by nearly two to one, with its limits on property tax reassessments. Now, according to pollster Mervin Field, 71 percent of Californians favor raising taxes if they are earmarked for safety, transportation, or schools. It remains to be seen whether the tax revolt of the late 1970s is over, but even if it is, that would not automatically correspond to a turn toward big-spending Democrats. After all, it was Jerry Brown who declared himself a "born-again tax-cutter" while George Deukmejian publicly voted against Proposition 13 and kept state spending high. Voters still consistently reject ballot initiatives to loosen the so-called Gann limits, but they will have another chance on the 1990 ballot. Even if the limits stand, a recession would slow inflation and immigration to the state (335,000 new residents last year), giving governments a chance to catch up with the demand for services.

In no other state is the tradeoff between environmental protection and economic growth as clear as in California. Ballot initiatives to limit growth in certain counties or towns have proliferated in recent years, and Los Angeles recently came up with a costly plan for a smog-free city in the twenty-first century. Up to now, the environment has not been a partisan issue, according to Sherry B. Jeffe of the Claremont Graduate School, who notes that Wilson in particular has used his opposition to offshore oil drilling to broaden his appeal among moderates.

Jeffe predicts that the environment will become a more divisive, partisan issue when and if the question of who will pay for cleanup—business, taxpayers, or consumers—moves to the forefront. But GOP pollster Rund contends that the successful California politician of the 1990s will be one who integrates economic issues with the broadest view of the environment imaginable—not just air and water, but transportation, drugs, education, in short, the quality of life. "The environment is not a liberal issue," Rund says, foreseeing "a great environmental-conservative movement" by which a politician will combine environmental protection with traditional conservative concerns about values and a free-market economy.

These may be the contests and the issues facing California in 1992, but a third variable is the voters, who will be a different group of people in 1992 from those today. Besides the immigrants, an estimated 100,000 Hispanics come of voting age every year. Within twenty years, minorities will be the majority in California, and one-third of the state's population will consist of Hispanics. Those Hispanics are not as overwhelmingly Democratic as black voters, but much more so than whites. The problem is that Hispanic turnout is only half the state average. Although a quarter of the population is Hispanic, no Hispanic has ever been elected to statewide office. Howard Elinson, administrative assistant to Congressman Henry Waxman, stresses that in viewing California politics, one must distinguish between the population and the electorate—two very different groups. Political scientist Bruce Cain has predicted that white middle-class voters, suburban and most often Republican, will control Southern California well into the 1990s.

California "will never give up its role of setting trends," Rund says. When Californians vote for one or two senators, fifty new congressmen, and a president in 1992, they will have ample opportunity to set the partisan direction of the nation for the rest of the century. Expect to be surprised, because, as Silicon Valley publicist Regis McKenna said recently, speaking of Jerry Brown, "The future is a moving target." ☑

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Huneeus/Lagos

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opposition's considerable popular support. During the plebiscite campaign, the opposition moreover had access to television as a forum for its messages, which enabled it to legitimate itself in the public eye. Since the government had not developed an intensive political mobilization, the opposition's efforts—buttressed by professional and informative advertising—in all likelihood reinforced opposition supporters' views and their confidence to express them, while having an inhibiting effect on public expression of political views by government-supporting voters. It would be interesting to contrast these results with those of comparable studies from other authoritarian contexts, in which the opposition exhibits a great capacity for political mobilization—Poland or Mexico, for example—and where supporters of the local regime are defensive and inhibited in expressing their opinions.

Conclusion

At the start of our work, we questioned whether the moderate and stability-enhancing tendencies from a democratic past could be maintained despite prolonged authoritarianism, and our conclusion is affirmative. This is important for understanding the resilience of the social and cultural roots that result from a long democratic history.

We also wanted to know if it was possible to use survey research to study citizens' opinions and attitudes even as authoritarian rule prevailed, and our conclusions here are also affirmative. Perhaps this is the greatest testimonial to the durability of democratic roots. ☑

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Jeffe

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respondents in the *L.A. Times* poll favored the combined registration and licensing of semiautomatic weapons. There seems little question that the gun-control movement has been energized and broadened.

Firing Up Gun Control

Public support has increased in both volume and intensity in 1989. Observed Cong. Berman, "The dynamic that was going very much against any gun control is just turned around on this issue of assault weapons. This comes after a time when a lot of people—and even a lot of us [Congressmen]—were saying, 'Well, maybe we should just drop gun control as an issue. It's such a political loser.' To me, this is an expression of how much publicity this issue of assault weapons has gotten."

Still unclear is whether this support is limited to control of the semiautomatic assault weapons that are making their mark on the urban landscape, or whether the level of support can be sustained beyond the current synergy. Once gun control drops out of the headlines and "The Tonight Show" monologues, its supporters may resume their traditional role as an ineffectual majority, while the NRA and its constituents go back to winning the major battles. Or maybe the nation's increasing concern about drugs, crime, and violence will sustain the push for tougher gun laws and reduce the NRA to a voice in the wilderness.

The evidence points to a sustained momentum for gun control. Like the political assassinations and near-assassinations that sporadically focused the nation over the past quarter-century, the Stockton shooting has crystallized public opinion. And in 1989, that single horrible violent event does not stand alone. With accounts of grisly violence regularly dominating the news, people's concern about crime and personal safety is probably here to stay.

Just as the crime problem has coalesced and hardened public support for the death penalty in recent years, a much tougher line on guns seems likely to remain on the public agenda as long as murder and mayhem continue to touch everyday life. ☑

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Langer

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majorities saying that blacks were treated "equally" or "better" or "the same/more leniently."

That is the way Harris reported the data. With 61 percent of its white respondents saying that blacks are treated equally or better in the criminal justice system—and a majority of blacks saying otherwise—it concluded: "It is obvious that most whites are simply not aware of the injustices seen by blacks and seem oblivious to the entire issue." It added: "Clearly, whites are either oblivious to what happens to blacks in the criminal justice system or are convinced that the system is working equitably and well for blacks." The conclusion is a sweeping one for the data on which it is based.

Still, these and other polls have found differing opinions between blacks and whites on a variety of issues, with whites often more sanguine about progress in race relations. In the Harris/*Business Week* survey, 70 percent of whites but only 50 percent of blacks said blacks have the same opportunities as whites "to live a middle-class life." In a survey by the Northwestern University Survey Laboratory, 51 percent of blacks called race fairly important, very important, or essential "to getting ahead in life"; 39 percent of whites agreed.

Some solutions to the question-wording issues are possible. On affirmative action, for example, a poll could seek to counter the program-name versus program-function issue simply by asking if the respondent favors "affirmative action, which is preference in hiring."

Still, the best understanding from these comparisons is a recognition that the wording of poll questions on race relations wields an unusually great influence on the results. Clearly, confidence in polling data on race—and any willingness to base broad conclusions upon it—should be tempered by its demonstrated volatility. ☑

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Braungart

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racial understanding. Although students at predominantly black colleges have a strong commitment to developing a philosophy of life, this desire has slipped substantially over the last twenty years, but not as much as it has slipped among all freshmen.

Some of the civil rights activists' worries about the new younger generation's social aspirations may be well-founded. Like their freshman contemporaries in the 1980s, young people attending black colleges appear to be losing interest in community affairs: fewer of them say they are committed to environmental cleanup, keeping up with politics, and participating in community action than was the case in the late 1960s and early 1970s. On the other hand, this drop-off in interest was not as pronounced among freshmen at black colleges as it was for the college population as a whole in 1988. In addition, while the desire of most college freshmen to influence the political structure remained stable from 1970 to 1988, a larger percentage of youth at black colleges endorsed this goal in 1988 than in 1970, and to a greater degree than all freshmen.

Growing Conservatism

When asked about their attitudes toward social and political issues, again they gave mixed signals. Freshmen at black colleges in 1988 were much more conservative than their predecessors on abolishing the death penalty, legalizing abortion and marijuana, and saying that criminals have too many rights. Moreover, these students were slightly more conservative than most college freshmen on keeping women in the home, and they were somewhat more conservative on laws to prohibit homosexual relations. They were more liberal than the general population of college freshmen on busing to achieve racial balance, and they were slightly more likely to say that the U.S. government does not promote disarmament or protect consumers. Despite their commitment to social and political issues, freshmen from black colleges have grown more likely to say that there is little they can do to change society, and the increase is sharper than for most freshmen.

From 1970 to 1988, a dramatic defection from liberal politics occurred among many college freshmen—no doubt reflecting the national mood. By 1988 a sizable percentage of freshmen at black colleges had shifted from a liberal orientation to middle-of-the-road politics. Yet despite their move to the political center, over twice as many black college freshmen identified themselves as far left, and more claimed to be liberal when compared to the responses for all college freshmen in 1988. The percentage of students at predominantly black colleges who said that the chances are very good that they would participate in a protest had increased since 1968 (from 7 to 12 percent) and was more than twice as high as that for the general population of college freshmen (from 4 to 5 percent).

Seeking the American Dream

The results of this comparative freshman survey suggest that students attending predominantly black colleges are highly committed to mainstream society and to following the American dream of upward economic and social mobility. In several ways, freshmen at black colleges in 1988 were different from their 1968 predecessors. Ambitious, religious, and committed to success, they adhere to the Protestant ethic more than most college youth today. They want to make something of themselves, aspiring to high-status careers where they can earn financial security, have authority, and take on responsibility.

For many students from predominantly black colleges, higher education represents a way to achieve the American Dream. The general population of college freshmen narrowed their academic interests between 1968 and 1988, and by 1988 their orientation toward higher education was primarily vocational. Students from black colleges took a broader perspective on the purposes of a college education. To them, higher education offers career and financial mobility as well as an opportunity to develop themselves.

Making It in Black Colleges, Under Pressure

Taken together, these findings suggest more pressures for youths attending black colleges in the 1980s than for all freshmen. One set of cross-pressures appears in the gap between the growing aspirations of young people at black colleges and the available means of support for their achievement. Black-college youths in 1988 were more ambitious than most college freshmen, choosing some of the most competitive majors. Many of these goals, however, have been made more difficult in the 1980s by rising tuition. The parents of freshmen at black colleges are less likely to have the economic means to meet the increased expenses of a college degree than are the parents of freshmen in general; likewise, freshmen from black colleges are more worried about financing their college education than most students are. To compound the problem, federal aid to education in the 1980s has shifted away from scholarships toward loan programs. Black enrollment in higher education, which peaked in 1980, has been declining ever since, especially among black males. Though one legacy of the civil rights movement was to increase black college admissions, this goal is being undermined in the 1980s.

Another set of cross-pressures exists within the black community itself, due to diverse perspectives that resulted from the civil rights movement about the proper goals and pursuits of young black Americans. Black youths have been told by some activists that they should separate themselves from white society and strive for black power. Moderate black leaders argued that young blacks should pursue careers in teaching and social services and maintain a strong commitment to the black community, while many others encouraged college-bound black youths to work for personal advancement, power, and status through conventional channels in mainstream American society. Most freshmen attending black colleges in 1988 appeared to have rejected the black separatist argument *in toto* and chose instead to enter the dominant social order and share in the affluence of modern American society. In their desire to join the mainstream, many have abandoned liberal political labels for middle-of-the-road politics and social conservatism—representing a major departure from the 1968 cohort of freshmen from black colleges.

More than ever before, freshmen at black colleges and universities in the late 1980s want to play an active role in society and to share in its rewards. Many of their aspirations are higher than those of freshmen in general and have increased substantially since 1968. Yet freshmen at black colleges continue to receive less financial support and experience greater cross-pressures as they struggle for the American Dream. It remains to be seen what the consequences are when those with rising expectations find it increasingly difficult to achieve their goals. ☑

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Schneider

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the GOP may solidify the support of the religious right at the cost of driving away large numbers of upper-middle-class libertarians. The types of questions raised by the abortion issue, even more than civil rights, have a direct, personal impact on voters' lives.

The message of the April 9 "March for Women's Equality, Women's Lives" was that the pro-choice constituency is being activated for the first time. That often happens when people feel their rights are being threatened. The same kinds of fears activated the religious right in the 1970s, when they felt liberals were using the power of government to impose "secular humanist" values on the rest of society.

Religious conservatives resented measures like the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion rights, gay rights, and the banning of prayer in the schools. They saw liberals as aggressors who threatened their religious freedoms. So the religious right got angry. And they got organized.

Now the pro-choice side is beginning to feel threatened by what they see as the same kind of aggression—conservatives using the power of the state to impose their values on others. The pro-choice side is getting angry. And they are getting organized.

In the *L.A. Times* poll, 47 percent of those who opposed the *Roe v. Wade* decision said they would switch their vote on the basis of the abortion issue. Among *Roe* supporters, only 25 percent reported such an intense commitment. The April 9 march was an effort to raise the political consciousness of the latter group. "Pro-life activists are already up to speed," John Buckley, a spokesman for the House Republican Campaign Committee, told the *New York Times*. "The pro-abortion activists are just beginning to put together a first-rate political organization."

Stubborn Ambivalence

The debate over abortion has been monopolized by two extreme positions: that abortion is an unconditional human right and that it is invariably a crime. The American public is not entirely comfortable with either position.

In a recent *L.A. Times* poll, a majority (57 percent) agreed with the statement, "Abortion is murder." But a majority (51 percent) also endorsed the statement, "I am in favor of abortion because every woman has the right to control her own body."

By almost three to one, those polled felt that abortion is "morally wrong." When asked whether they personally favored or opposed abortion, a plurality (40 to 34 percent) said they opposed it. But the same respondents said they supported the *Roe v. Wade* decision allowing abortion during the first three months of pregnancy (46 to 35 percent). And those interviewed strongly opposed an amendment to the Constitution that would prohibit abortions (62 to 28 percent).

In fact, abortion is one of the few issues where Americans are not attracted to the idea of local options. The *Times* poll asked, "Are you in favor of wiping out nationwide standards about abortion and permitting each state to decide whether abortions are legal within its own boundaries, or are you opposed to that?" The public was opposed, 50 to 34 percent.

This mass of contradictory findings suggests that the public has no strong convictions on the issue and can be swayed one way or the other by the way the question is worded. That is not quite true, however.

Opinions on abortion have actually remained quite stable for the last sixteen years. Almost every year since 1973, the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago has been asking people whether it should be possible for a pregnant woman to have an abortion under various circumstances.

> *The United States is a profoundly individualistic culture. It is difficult to persuade Americans to ban anything—handguns, liquor, pornography, cigarettes, saccharin, or abortions.*

Most people say they support a woman's right to have an abortion in cases of rape, incest, a threat to the mother's life or health, or a serious birth defect in the child. The public opposes legal abortions in cases where the woman doesn't want to get married, where the family doesn't want or can't afford another child, or "no matter what the reason."

What people are saying is that they oppose the use of abortion as a form of birth control. In fact, the *L.A. Times* asked people directly whether they favored abortion "when it is used as a form of birth control." They got the most one-sided response to any question in the poll: by 80 to 13 percent, people said no.

The public clearly has moral qualms about abortion. Sixty-one percent say it is "morally wrong." They believe it should be allowed only when there is a more compelling moral argument. To most people, rape, incest, a threat to the life or health of the mother, and a serious deformity in the child present more compelling moral arguments. Birth control does not.

This explains the stability of attitudes on the Gallup question that asks, "Do you think abortions should be legal under any circumstances, legal only under certain circumstances, or legal in all circumstances?" From 1975 through 1988, a majority ranging between 52 and 58 percent has consistently endorsed the view that abortion should be legal only under certain circumstances.

Only 21 to 25 percent accept the view that abortion should be legal under all circumstances. That may explain why many Americans are uneasy about the status quo under *Roe v. Wade*. They feel abortion is used far too often in this country as a form of birth control. If the goal of the anti-abortion movement were to restrict abortions so they could not be used as birth control, it would probably have little trouble rallying the public.

But the right-to-life movement takes the position that abortion is unacceptable under any circumstances. According to the Gallup poll, that view is the least popular of the three alternatives. Only 16 to 22 percent want to ban abortions altogether.

The United States is a profoundly individualistic culture. It is difficult to persuade Americans to ban *anything*—handguns, liquor, pornography, cigarettes, saccharin, or abortions. They should be regulated, perhaps. Heavily taxed, maybe. And certainly not publicly subsidized. But not banned.

> *So why won't a revival of the abortion debate hurt the Democrats too? Because it is the pro-choice side that is likely to get angry if* Roe *is overturned. And pro-choice voters have no quarrel with the Democrats. Anti-abortion voters have been angry with the Democrats for sixteen years.*

Moreover, as Kate Michelman, executive director of the National Abortion Rights Action League, has observed, "Taking away rights that have already been given is a hard thing to pull off." Even if those rights are controversial, as is the case with abortion, it is not easy to convince people to give up a right they have had for sixteen years. Millions of American women have had legal abortions. Despite increased restrictions, the abortion rate during the Reagan years remained steady at 1.5 million a year.

Pro-choice activists also have anti-government sentiment on their side. That is a powerful weapon. The gun lobby, for instance, has won referendums by using the argument that gun control is an unwarranted intrusion of government into people's lives. The pro-choice marchers on April 9 knew exactly what they were doing when they held up banners that read, "Whose choice is it—yours or theirs?"

A decision reversing *Roe v. Wade* would not close the discussion on abortion. It would open it. A battle over abortion would be joined in every one of the fifty states. Six states, for example, have already passed anti-abortion laws that would take effect if the Supreme Court reversed itself. Those laws are not likely to go unchallenged.

The Perils of Success

Republicans cannot be looking forward to those battles. The *L.A. Times* found that people who voted for George Bush last year were divided in their opinion of *Roe v. Wade*: 42 percent supported the decision, while 39 percent opposed it.

Republican party activists are also divided over abortion. When asked their view of "a constitutional amendment that would ban abortions," delegates to the 1984 Republican National Convention were opposed, 59 to 41 percent. Delegates to the 1988 GOP convention were split 50-50. Nevertheless, both conventions approved party platforms calling for just such a measure—without debate.

As *Public Opinion* Senior Editor Everett Ladd points out, the poll data reveal that Democrats are just as divided over abortion as Republicans. So why won't a revival of the abortion debate hurt the Democrats too?

Because it is the pro-choice side that is likely to get angry if *Roe* is overturned. And pro-choice voters have no quarrel with the Democrats. Anti-abortion voters have been angry with the Democrats for sixteen years. The Democrats have already lost most deeply committed anti-abortion voters. True, a debate on abortion will make it hard for the Democrats to reclaim religious conservatives. But it will make it possible for Democrats to replace them with angry pro-choice Republicans and Independents.

So far, Republicans have been able to have their cake and eat it too on the abortion issue. By endorsing the right-to-life position, the party gets the support of the religious right. But by failing to deliver on an abortion ban, the GOP escapes the wrath of those, including many Republicans, who would deeply resent such a measure.

Roosevelt's New Deal coalition held together only as long as the Democrats maintained a historic compromise on civil rights. By forcing the issue onto the national agenda in the 1950s, the Supreme Court made compromise impossible. The Court could do the same thing to the Republicans on abortion. By overturning *Roe v. Wade*, the Court would force the Republican party to deliver on its commitments to the religious right—and face the consequences. ☑

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